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Although I started my PhD studying a different topic, the current topic had caught my 
interest many years before. I got acquainted with HIV/AIDS when the world was jolted 
awake by The Freddie Mercury Tribute Concert for AIDS Awareness, which was organized 
shortly after Freddy Mercury’s death in November 1991. The lyrics of Queens’ famous song 
“The show must go on” can be construed to be a reflection on life and imminent death. But it 
was especially the effort of Freddie Mercury continuing to perform despite approaching the 
end of his life that inspired me. I got intrigued by how people manage in difficult situations, 
such as imminent morbidity and mortality. And I was fascinated by how they managed to just 
go on.  
 
It was many years later that I was confronted with HIV issues more closely, during my stay in 
Mozambique. For my Master’s thesis on a new Bayesian national accounts estimation system 
I was collecting data at the national institute of statistics (INE). While reading the UNDP 
National Development Reports for Mozambique during lunchtime, I came across the 
astonishing high number of HIV infection rates and the assumed implications these numbers 
would have for Mozambique’s economy and society as a whole. However, I was surprised by 
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the lack of a dataset that included both health and economic statistics, which would be 
needed for a correct measurement of the actual impact on both individual and country level.  
 
I also remember the day I got tested for malaria at Maputo’s health center, where I found 
myself in a conversation with a young girl of my age who received a positive test during our 
talk. Her non-reaction to this test result shocked me more than the test result itself. It made 
me question what influence this disease actually has for people in developing countries. Did 
she really understand the consequences of her disease? Or is being infected in such a country 
less important or shocking than in western society because of all the other difficulties and 
risks they are already facing in daily life?   
 
One day during the same internship I came across the convention of putting private savings 
to zero in the national accounts in developing countries. I was astonished and believed this 
was an unreasonable assumption regarding the fact that even in the shacks I had visited 
households had a fridge and television, consumer goods that are impossible to buy out-of-
pocket or from their monthly income. Thus, these households must have saved somehow. 
 
The internship in Mozambique offered me the opportunity to work closely together with a 
world expert in national accounting, Jan van Tongeren, and he made me enthusiastic to use 
the skills I had learned during my study in econometrics for analyzing issues in developing 
countries. I was fortunate that Jan Magnus stimulated me to stay in the academic world and 
enabled me to continue working on the further development of this Bayesian estimation 
system for the national accounts as part of a PhD. 
 
However, after a while I felt that I actually wanted to work with the data instead of working 
on the development of a system that delivers better data and enables others to study 
developing issues. This made me radically change my research topic and after one and a half 
year of research, I started afresh. The questions raised by the three experiences described 
above soon became the ingredients for the main question of this dissertation. Do households 
adapt their economic behaviour such as their saving behavior to the HIV/AIDS health 
shock? Hans Moors stimulated me in changing my field of research to one that was fully in 
line with my interests and compassions. My choice was also both intrinsically and financially 
supported by Harry Huizinga who was the director of the CentER Graduate School at that 
time. Lex Meijdam and Harrie Verbon were willing to guide me in a topic that was not yet 
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theirs, which I admire because it is not at all easy to supervise someone who had already 
decided what she wanted to do. I really appreciate the confidence and opportunity that they 
all gave me to start all over again, and was happy to have discovered the work to which I 
could easily dedicate three full years of my life. 
 
I started with the simple lifecycle model of Chapter 4. However, soon I discovered that with 
the available data, I could not even test this simple model, neither analyzing the other ideas I 
had in mind. Together with Harrie Verbon and Morten Lau, we therefore decided to design a 
survey that next to questions covering socio-economic, financial and health characteristics 
also included experiments from which we could elicit risk and time preferences and we 
choose South Africa as country to conduct the survey.  
 
The incurable illness of close family soon put a different face upon my research. This disease 
had a similar uncertain course like HIV/AIDS: One can live your whole life having only few 
symptoms, but also a short life and in severe illness. How to deal with a disease that may 
change your physical health in the nearby but maybe only in the far future? The economic 
impact of a positive diagnosis is large; for example risk of loosing your job, stigmatization, 
and increased cost of life. Being incurably ill requires making choices from a new often 
smaller set of possibilities under additional constraints.  
 
However, there are not only negative aspects of being incurably ill. It puts a different view on 
life. Many try to enjoy life as much as possible, but not in the “carpe-diem way”. Contrary to 
what some people might think; many people start making investments one would otherwise 
not have done so, like additional saving, studying, etc. In one of the many talks I had with 
several HIV coordinators of the different universities I visited in South Africa, I was told that 
student’s study results improved after a positive diagnosis. Marchal Kender, I really hope to 
research this further together with you in the near future. In a one-to-one interview after one 
of the experiments a student told me “I have more future now then without HIV”. Also K. and G., 
two students who helped me in organizing the experimental sessions, showed this strength, 
positivism and an extreme willingness to go on. These councilors and students did not only 
help me with the actual organization but gave me insight in the influence of HIV on decision 
making in life and above all they inspired me to continue my research. This places the title of 
the famous paper of Alwyn Young in which he estimates a positive impact of HIV on 
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economic growth “The gift of the dying” in a totally different perspective: Looking forward and 
going on. 
 
The contrasts, however, are large and I cannot let some of my heartrending experiences 
unmentioned. Different countries, different people, and different stages of illness; while 
paying a visit to the AIDS department of the St. Joseph Helen’s hospital in Jo’burg, I was 
terrified by the severeness and consequences of the disease: waiting rooms full of people 
surrealistically holding their medical report in different colors indicating their stage of illness. 
Terminal AIDS patients in the open rooms around showed them what was looming ahead. A 
man was falling down to the ground without being picked up, simply because the nurses were 
too occupied with all those other waiting patients. Due to lack of space, consults even took 
place in the same already way too crowded waiting room... The planned experiments at the 
University of the Witwatersrand could not take place, because two of the HIV support group 
members were taken to the intensive care. Besides, in the same week, there had again been 
violence against gay and HIV infected people, so that they could not allow strangers in their 
group. Of course, also the visit to the local VCT center and the AIDS orphanage on the 
outskirts of Potchefstroom hit me, where in one week time two little children had had a heart 
attack because of emotional stress.  
 
The sadness and seriousness of the problem I took home, having difficulties to see these 
people as data points in my dataset, but also the necessity for more research and therefore the 
urgency to continue. All these experiences made the topic real and research difficult and made 
me wonder how all these infected persons managed just to go on. From Marten van 
Garderen and Martine Smits I received enormous help in the organization of respectively the 
first and second round of experiments, but also on the spot and back home they were 
indispensable as sounding board. Their voluntary assistance was of inestimable value.  
 
After the completion of this dissertation, I am still amazed by the commitment to life of 
people in such difficult situations, only now I have proof that they do reconsider the 
remaining options and adapt their economic choices limiting the huge impact as much as 
possible. Still my work is not finished, new questions arose, and some were not answered. 
Therefore, I am happy that the Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID), 
in particular Jacques van der Gaag, offered me the opportunity to continue my research in a 















Next to the other wonderful persons I already mentioned in the preface, there are many more 
colleagues, friends and family to which I owe words of gratitude: Looking back on the 
sometimes long journey to the completion of this work, Tilburg University was a fantastic 
place to conduct this PhD. This was mainly due to the kindness and helpfulness of my 
colleagues from both the Econometric and Economics Department. Thank you all for 
offering me this inspiring environment. I was certainly blessed to have Anne Gielen as my 
officemate. We shared much more than only scientific issues. Thank you for the thousands of 
conversations we had and the positive atmosphere in our office. It made Tilburg University a 
place which I went to each day with a lot of pleasure for three years at a stretch. Same applies 
to Johannes and Yvonne. All three of them were always there for me, and became next to 
colleagues above all good friends. 
 
This dissertation benefited a lot from many discussions, seminars, and conferences. Next to 
my co-authors, in particular Hans Binswanger, Rene Bonnel, Jan Boone, Jeffrey James, 
Katherine Carman, and Norma Coe provided me with useful advice and comments to this 
work. My favorite chapter (Chapter 7) was born from the valuable comments I received 
during the workshop on the Economics of HIV/AIDS organized by the AIID in 2006. 
xii 
Collecting your own data in a country such as South Africa requires a lot of support from the 
people there and here. This dissertation would have had a completely different content 
without the generous financial support of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific 
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1.1  Introduction 
This dissertation studies the impact of the HIV/AIDS1 pandemic from an economic 
perspective. It in particular discusses the effect on intertemporal choice in Southern Africa, 
i.e. it studies how the pandemic changes how and what choices individuals make over time, 
including both economic choices, such as saving decisions, and choices of risky sexual 
behavior. 
 
After its discovery in the late 1970s, HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, started to afflict the 
African continent, and rapidly developed to a widespread catastrophe. By 2005, over 25 
million people have already died of AIDS related diseases, while 39.5 million people are living 
with HIV worldwide. High levels of HIV prevalence rates are concentrated in Southern 
Africa with 18.8% in South Africa in 2005 (UNAIDS, 2006). Especially in Southern Africa, 
HIV/AIDS, originally a health-problem, is expected to cause large changes in society as a 
whole. The projected erosion of some of the main determinants of economic growth such as 
social capital, domestic savings, and human capital caused by the epidemic, will damage both 
                                                 
1 HIV, AIDS are acronyms for respectively Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome 
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social and economic development. Although the social impact appears to be devastating, the 
economic literature is divided on the impact on economic growth.  
 
A possible explanation for the ambiguous effects on economic growth might be that 
behavioral changes take place at the micro level, mitigating the negative effects on an 
aggregate level. Although many impact studies have been written on the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
and economic growth, little attention has been given to the indirect behavioral effects, such as 
the effects on intertemporal choices including saving decisions, which is the central topic of 
this dissertation. 
 
1.2  Motivation 
An epidemic like HIV/AIDS could change intertemporal choices in various ways. 
Although extensive literature discusses how intertemporal choice is changed by either health, 
health risk or by demographic changes, the literature encompassing all three of them is 
relatively limited. In view of the fact that HIV/AIDS is related to all three aspects, the overall 
effect of HIV/AIDS on intertemporal choices is still undefined. Obtaining insight into 
individuals’ economic decisions is, however, important in understanding the coping strategies 
of households and the consequences of the epidemic for economic growth. 
 
Complicating factor is that different groups in society will respond differently to the epidemic. 
As HIV/AIDS is a slow-moving disease, the impact on HIV affected and AIDS affected 
households2 differs. For instance, savings of AIDS affected households is reduced by an 
increase in expenses, like medical treatment and care, aggravated by a decrease in income due 
to lower productivity or loss of job. On the other hand, the increased health risk may 
stimulate cautiousness of both HIV affected and not (yet) affected households and as a result 
raise savings. The total impact on aggregate savings depends thus on the size and effect of 
each group. 
 
Furthermore, demographic changes like a sharp increase in the uncertainty of human life 
(rising mortality rates, or falling life expectancy) modify consumption patterns by making 
saving for old-age consumption less necessary. On the other hand, households may become 
                                                 
2 An HIV or AIDS affected household in the most limited definition is a household that respectively consists of 
at least one HIV infected or AIDS-sick member. In the broadest definition every household in the hardest hit 
countries are affected since the far-reaching consequences of the disease in society. This dissertation uses the 
most limited definition. 
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more prudent when the dependency ratio increases, knowing that the tax base is eroded, since 
HIV strikes an unequal share of prime-aged adults.  
 
Moreover, the extent to which consumption behavior is influenced depends on individual risk 
and time preferences, which at the same time may be associated with perceptions of HIV 
contamination risk or HIV status. Inasmuch as HIV is mainly contracted through own risky 
behavior, possibly related to preferences for the present, the impact on the level of savings is 
likely to vary across households classified by both risk attitudes and time preferences. The 
existing literature however, lacks any opinion on this matter. Finally, risky sexual behavior is a 
type of “consumption” with consequences later in life, and is therefore an intertemporal 
choice in itself. Knowledge about this particular consumption choice is relevant for 
prohibiting HIV spreading further. 
 
In summary, at the micro level intertemporal choices in societies with high HIV prevalence 
rates are influenced in many ways, such that the overall effect is ambiguous. Two important 
characteristics of HIV result in opposing forces on savings: Mortality increases, which reduces 
savings. However, long-term illness risk increases, which increases savings. Although the first 
effect is generally accepted in the current literature on the economics of HIV/AIDS, the 
second effect is not yet recognized however important in understanding both prevention and 
coping strategies of households and the consequences for economic growth. Therefore the 
second effect is particularly object of study in this dissertation.  
 
1.3 Outline 
This dissertation is a first attempt to simultaneously study the different channels 
through which the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Southern Africa influences intertemporal choices. 
In particular, illness risk, mortality and risk and time preferences. In this way, it adds to a 
better understanding in how societies respond to health shocks having the scale of 
HIV/AIDS.  
 
The thesis is written so that each chapter can be read independently. Given that the themes 
treated in the different chapters are very much related to each other, the reader will find some 
back and forward references in the different chapters. Moreover, the reader of the whole 
dissertation will find some overlap between the chapters. This manuscript roughly consists of 
three parts indicated in Table 1.1. 




Table 1.1: Thesis outline 
Part Chapter Method Level 
I 2 Empirics Macro 
 3 Empirics, Literature & Theory Macro & Micro 
II 4 Empirics & Theory Micro 
 5 Theory Macro & Micro 
III 6 Experiments Micro  
 7 Theory & Experiments Micro 
 
Part I (Chapter 2 and 3) is a general introduction to the topic. Chapter 2 summarizes some 
general facts on the disease that are relevant for the following chapters. It presents HIV 
incidence and prevalence figures and describes the demographic impact for the hardest hit 
countries. 
 
Subsequently, Chapter 3 provides background information on the different channels through 
which HIV/AIDS influences intertemporal choice and vice versa. Without having the 
ambition to give a complete overview, the chapter briefly discusses the current literature on 
impact studies of HIV/AIDS on economic growth and the existing literature that deals with 
health shocks, health risk, and demographic changes separately. In addition, it discusses the 
relations between risk and time preferences and health, mortality and sexual behavior, and 
touches upon the limited number of experimental studies that analyzed these relations.  
 
Part II models the impact of HIV/AIDS on saving behavior. Chapter 4 in particular tests 
whether individuals consider both the reduction in expected lifetime, the risk of contracting 
the virus and its economic consequences when deciding on how much they save. The chapter 
theoretically derives the relation between saving behavior, mortality and illness based on a 
simple two-period lifecycle model that specifies a utility function that includes both regular 
consumption and health expenditures. Agents are assumed to be homogeneous and have the 
same exogenous probability of getting infected and die prematurely. The chapter shows that 
mortality and illness risk have opposing forces on the level of savings. Using micro data 
obtained from a self-conducted experimental study using monetary rewards among students 
in South Africa (fully documented in the Appendix), the chapter finds evidence for the so-
called “HIV anticipatory saving motive”. The data show that individuals perceiving to be highly 
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exposed to contracting HIV save significantly more, whereas individuals perceiving to live 
relatively short lives, save significantly less. 
 
Chapter 5 shows that HIV knowledge is an important ingredient for the opposing effects 
found in the previous chapter. Without awareness of the illness risk households face, they will 
not anticipate the costs entailed by HIV/AIDS. The chapter extends the simple lifecycle 
model of Chapter 4 by distinguishing groups in society on the basis of HIV-status knowledge. 
It studies aggregate savings according to four specified stages of the epidemic and predicts a 
nonlinear relationship between HIV prevalence rate and aggregate savings. Although the 
AIDS epidemic reduces welfare, increasing HIV-status knowledge by diagnostic testing may 
limit this reduction because illness risk and its related costs enhances anticipatory savings. As 
a consequence, underestimating HIV contamination risk as in an early stage of the epidemic 
leads to a substantial decrease in both savings and welfare. 
 
Part III studies the impact of HIV/AIDS on intertemporal choice from a behavioral 
economic point of view. It identifies the individual characteristics of different groups in 
society based on perceptions of HIV contamination risk. In particular, it studies risk and time 
preferences using experimental data and relates this to sexual behavior. Infection risk is 
related to individual behavior and is therefore not exogenous as assumed in the two previous 
chapters. Sexually active agents and especially agents having unprotected sexual intercourse 
are obviously more at risk of getting infected with HIV. Individual characteristics like risk and 
time preferences influence this behavior. Furthermore, the extent to which agents anticipate 
future illness costs depends on time preferences of agents, which are different across agents 
as well and may likewise be related to risk behavior. Since sexual risk taking is likely related to 
risk behavior and time preferences too, the negative impact on savings may be limited. In this 
case, HIV positive individuals are those agents that would already have saved less when HIV 
was not present.  
 
In Chapter 6 risk and time preferences are elicited using the same experimental data collected 
among students in South Africa as in Chapter 4. Specifically, the chapter determines what 
individual characteristics determine one’s risk and time preference, in particular, those of both 
HIV positive students and high-risk groups. Chapter 6 finds that both subjects with high-
perceived contamination risk as well as HIV positive subjects are less risk-averse (even risk-
seeking). They seem to have different time preferences, however; whereas subjects perceiving 
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to be highly at risk display significantly higher discount rates, HIV positive subjects have 
significantly lower discount rates compared to all other groups. This paradoxical result is 
explored in Chapter 7 by dropping the assumption that the pure rate of time preference is the 
only factor that enters the pricing of future benefits. The chapter provides a theoretical 
framework that allows other factors to be included in the discount rate such as mortality, risk 
attitude and expected differences in future consumption level. This leads to estimates for the 
pure rate of time preference different from the observed discount rates. Once these factors 
are taken into account, HIV positive agent’s time preferences conform to expectations. Risky 
sexual behavior appears to be partly an economically explicable choice belonging to high risk 
and time preferences. Finally, Chapter 8 synthesizes the results and draws broad policy 
conclusions in light of the findings in this dissertation for both HIV prevention and reducing 






























2.1  The disease 
AIDS is an acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. It is a fatal 
infectious disease in which the immune system collapses. It is a syndrome of opportunistic 
diseases, infections and certain cancers, which all have the ability to kill an infected person in 
the final stages of the disease. So, AIDS does not cause death itself, a person dies because of 
an illness that the body could no longer fight off because of the damaged immune system. A 
person can only develop AIDS after being infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
(HIV), a virus that aims at a person’s immune system. Once a person is HIV infected, the 
virus remains in the body for life.  
 
In contrast to many other infectious diseases, which tend to mainly affect weak individuals, 
HIV/AIDS is frequently found among prime-aged individuals. This group is primarily 
affected due to the fact that the spread of HIV/AIDS is strongly correlated with sexual 
activity. Although in Sub-Saharan Africa, most HIV infections are heterosexually transmitted, 
a substantial part is transmitted through health care (Gisselquist et al., 2002) and an increasing 
number of infections take place from mother-to-child. 
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It is not exactly known from when or where the virus originates, but researchers have found 
evidence that HIV originates from a virus that was found among chimpanzees in West 
Central Africa. It is believed that the virus jumped from primates to humans through the 
consumption of chimpanzees by African tribes (Moore, 2004). Although individual cases had 
been recognized before, it was not before the late 1970s that the epidemic was observed on a 
larger scale. Only in 1982, the disease was named AIDS and by that time it had already spread 
to a least five continents (North and South America, Europe, Africa and Australia).  
 
Figure 2.1 Graph showing HIV virus and CD4+ levels over the course of 




Once a person is infected, the virus goes through several stages. How fast or slow the final 
stages of AIDS kick in can be predicted by the so-called CD4+ cell counts and the Viral load. 1 
The CD4+ cell2 count is an indicator of how healthy the immune system is, indicated in cells 
per mm3, measured by taking blood samples. The Viral load refers to the actual number of 
viruses in the blood. The Viral load and CD4+ cells vary together. Because the virus destroys 
the CD4+ cells, a higher Viral load will lead to a lower CD4+ cell count. A lower Viral load 
will go hand in hand with a higher CD4+ cell count, because less viruses in the blood give the 
immune system a chance to built up its resources again. So, the higher the Viral load, and the 
                                                 
1 http://www.health24.com/medical/Condition_centres/777-792-814-1756,22216.asp 
2 CD4 positive T-lymphocytes (CD4 cells) are a type of white blood cell. CD4 cells are also known as “helper T 
cells” because they play an important part in directing the immune system to respond to infections. 
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lower the CD4+ cell count, the easier it will be for all kinds of infections to successfully attack 
the body.  
 
The three phases of the disease 
The disease knows roughly three different phases, illustrated in Figure 2.1. The figure shows 
the Viral load and CD4+ levels over the course of the disease without treatment.  
 
In the first stage, the human body starts to develop more and more antibodies in order to 
fight off the virus. From this stage onwards, a HIV-test is able to identify the presence of 
antibodies and can thereby determine whether a person is infected. In this stage, most 
infected people experience flu-like symptoms for about one to three weeks and researchers 
believe that people are most infectious at this point.  
 
Following this first phase of infection, a person will go through a period in which there are 
almost no symptoms of illness at all. Without treatment, this period may last from 6 months 
to over 10 years.3 This ‘silent’ stage is probably the reason why the virus has been able to 
spread so rapidly for so many years as infected individuals might get the impression that they 
are cured or not infected at all. It is therefore not surprising that estimates show that around 
90% of infected individuals are not aware of their status at all. Although HIV does not affect 
well-being yet, a healthier way of life is strongly advised to keep the CD4+ level high and Viral 
load as low as possible in order to prolong this latent phase. This includes healthy balanced 
food, rest and exercise, supplements and immune-boosters, routine visits to the doctor or 
clinics such that early treatment of opportunistic infections can take place. Besides the 
implicit insurance provided through the (almost) free public health care system, only few 
individuals in Southern Africa are covered by health insurance. Thus, for poor families, in 
general having no formal health insurance, and unbalanced diet habits, this demands a more 
expensive way of life.  
 
The final stage of the virus is when HIV has destroyed the immune system below a certain 
level. According to the definitions of the Centers for Disease and Prevention (CDC) HIV 
infected persons develop AIDS when they have one or several opportunistic infections or a 
CD4+ cell count below 200/mm3. From this moment on, the virus is called AIDS. In this 
                                                 
3 Median time from seroconversion (clinical latency) to AIDS in east Africa is estimated to be 9.4 years (Morgan 
et al., 2002). 
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phase, the human body is extremely vulnerable to infections and substantially reduces weight; 
most people do not survive longer than a few years. A study in Uganda shows that median 
survival time after the progression to AIDS is 9.2 months (Morgan et al., 2002). 
Opportunistic infections are generally the cause of death. It is in this final stage where the 
patient becomes unable to work and dependent on extensive treatment and care. When the 
HIV status has been determined in an early stage, the silent phase enables an infected person 
to anticipate the high costs and decline in income associated with the AIDS-illness. One of 
the central issues studied in this book is whether people actually do so. 
 
Sketching the course of HIV roughly in three phases illustrates that consumption patterns are 
influenced differently in all three phases. These changes include both direct changes in food 
and medical consumption based on medical advice in the first two phases and extensive 
treatment costs in the final stage. On top of that indirect changes in spending patterns might 
take place even before phase one, i.e. before HIV infection has taken place, as persons might 
anticipate the costs related to a possible HIV/AIDS infection later in life. The indirect 
changes will only take place if an individual considers his HIV contamination risk as 
significant. In addition productivity levels are influenced differently as well; while AIDS sick 
people are unable to work in the final stage, HIV infected persons may have a lower level of 
productivity in the latent phase. Both effects on consumption patterns and productivity 
obviously have negative implications for income. 
 
There is no drug that can cure HIV infection, but there are drugs like antiretroviral therapy 
(ART), that can control the virus and delay the onset of AIDS. CD4+ cell counts below 500 
cells per mm3 are usually an indication of immune suppression and vulnerability to 
opportunistic infections4. However, due to the high costs of the medicines themselves and the 
lack of professional medical institutions and high treatment costs, in low income countries 
ART is usually given whenever the CD4+ cell count is below 200 cells per mm3 (WHO, 2003). 
Only recently the WHO adjusted this level in their guidelines to 350 cells per mm3 (WHO, 
2006). First-line ART used to cost more than $10.000 per patient per year, but since 2000, the 
widespread production of medicines has reduced these prices to $152 in June 2005 
(Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, 2005). However, treatment is still out of reach 
for most people in the countries hardest hit. Whereas in many western countries virtually all 
                                                 
4  The normal number of CD4+ cells varies from individual to individual, but it is usually between 800 and 1500 
cells per mm3. 
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infected persons receive treatment, the Sub-Saharan region shows very low treatment rates, 
which differ considerably across countries. For instance, the treatment rate for people with 
advanced HIV infection5 in Zimbabwe is 8%, and in South Africa is 21%, whereas the 
treatment rate in Botswana is 85% (see Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2 People with advanced HIV infection receiving antiretroviral  
(ARV) combination therapy (%) in 2005. 







Receivers of ARV combinationtherapy in %
 
Source: WHO, World Health Statistics 2006 
 
Roughly 10% of all HIV infected people in Southern Africa is also aware of its status. Status 
knowledge is not only important for receiving the appropriate treatment, but also for 
mitigating the further spread of HIV. One of the important policy decisions in countries 
affected by HIV/AIDS is the frequency of testing. Whether intensifying HIV testing also 
increases social welfare depends on several aspects. In Chapter 5, this question is addressed 
focussing on the effect of diagnostic testing on the ability to optimise saving choices including 
the disutility of stigmatization and knowing to die prematurely. 
 
2.2  HIV/AIDS globally 
After its discovery in the late 1970s, HIV/AIDS has rapidly developed to a 
widespread catastrophe. In 2005, 39.5 million people were living with HIV worldwide, and 
over 25 million people have already died of AIDS related diseases. Many will follow if the 
spread is not halted soon and proper treatment remains unavailable to the larger part of the 
HIV infected people. In Sub-Saharan Africa only, were living 12 million AIDS-orphans6. 
                                                 
5 CD4+ cell count below 200mm3. 
6 in 2005 
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(UNAIDS, 2006) This large number of HIV infected, AIDS sick people, and orphans put a 
heavy burden on society. 
 
Figure 2.4 Adults and children to be living with HIV in 2006.  
 
Source: UNAIDS/WHO Epidemic update: December 2006 
 
Figure 2.4 clearly illustrates the magnitude and width of the pandemic. HIV is prevalent in all 
continents of the world: fifty-six countries have HIV prevalence rates7 greater than 1%, which 
is the point at which it is believed to begin its diffusion through the general population. 
Seventeen countries have reached crises levels, i.e. have prevalence rates over 4%, the point at 
which the epidemic spins out of control.8 High levels of adult prevalence rates are 
concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, where HIV prevalence is highest among young adults 
(20-35 years). The four countries of the world with estimated prevalence rates exceeding 20% 
are: Swaziland (33.4%), Botswana (24.1%), Lesotho (23.2%), and Zimbabwe (20.1%). Six 
other countries, all from the same region, Namibia (19.6%), South Africa (18.8%), Zambia 
(17.0%), Mozambique (16.1%), Malawi (14.1%), and Central African Republic (10.7%), have 
prevalence rates between 10 and 20% (UNAIDS, 2006). For shorthand, I hereafter refer to 
                                                 
7 HIV prevalence is the percentage of a certain population that is HIV infected. 
8 Following the definition of Bonnerjee (2003) 
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these countries as the “hardest hit” countries. Due to high HIV incidence rates9, these high 
levels are predicted to endure in the far future.   
 
Although prevalence rates remain high, the spread of HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa seems to 
stabilize: HIV incidence is decreasing in some countries. This decline can be ascribed to the 
fact that many people with high-risk behavior have already been infected, to effective 
prevention programs that enable people to reduce their risk of exposure, but also to possible 
mispredictions of past HIV prevalence rates. Although HIV incidence seems to stabilize the 
rate of infection remains high. In 2005 worldwide 4.3 million people became newly infected 
(UNAIDS, 2006). Societies affected by HIV do therefore not incur a temporary shock but a 
long-lasting one. This creates a heavy burden on several aspects of society amongst others the 
ability to accumulate capital or to sustain a sufficiently high level of economic growth.  
  
Figure 2.5 Estimated HIV prevalence and 
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Figure 2.6 Estimated HIV prevalence and  
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year...
AIDS sick x1000 Not on ART x1000
Non-AIDS deaths x1000 AIDS deaths x1000
Source: Actuarial Society South Africa, 2007 Source: Actuarial Society South Africa, 2007 
Although differences are large across countries, this chapter focuses on data of South Africa 
(being ranked number 6 in terms of HIV prevalence rate), since the empirical results in the 
following chapters are based on experimental survey data collected by the author in this 
country. Figure 2.5, showing both HIV incidence and prevalence rates for South Africa over 
the period 1985-2025, illustrates the recent stabilizing effect of the further spread of HIV. 
Adult HIV prevalence started to rise sharply in the early nineties. After 1998 the adult HIV 
incidence rate decreased and the adult HIV prevalence rate is expected to peak 13 years later 
                                                 
9 HIV incidence rate is the percentage of a population that contracted HIV in a certain period. 
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in 2011. The total HIV prevalence rate will peak a couple of years later in 2015, after which 
both are expected to slowly decline. For the same country, Figure 2.6 expounds the severe 
impact of the epidemic, as already in 2011 the number of AIDS deaths10 will make up more 
than 50% of total death cases in South Africa. Although the number of AIDS sick keeps on 
rising, the number of AIDS sick that receive ART is projected to slowly increase. The 
Actuarial Society of South Africa estimates that in 2025 over 50% of the AIDS sick will be 
receiving ART. 
 
2.3  Demographics 
Although Sub-Saharan Africa has suffered from many difficulties including wars, 
famines, and other epidemics, the impact of HIV/AIDS on the composition of the 
populations hardest hit, has never been of such a size neither has been the influence on age-
structure of such diversity.  
 
Figure 2.9a: Life expectancy for 6 highest 
























Figure 2.9b Life expectancy over the period  
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International 
Data Base, 2006 
Source: Actuarial Society South Africa, 2007 
 
The devastating effect of HIV/AIDS on the population in Sub-Saharan Africa is easily 
demonstrated by the decrease in life expectancy over the last 20 years in the worst hit 
                                                 
10 Data on the actual number of AIDS deaths are not very reliable, since they are collected from death 
notification forms, which give the direct cause of death, such as tuberculosis, influenza, pneumonia, and so 
forth. 
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countries. As Figure 2.9a shows, various Sub-Saharan countries face a decrease in life 
expectancy at birth of almost 20 years. The most dramatic fall in life expectancy also occurs in 
the countries most severely hit, i.e. those having HIV prevalence rates over 20%. Also South 
Africa and Botswana, two of the more developed nations in the Sub-Saharan region, have 
seen the life expectancy fall by more than 19 and 30 years, respectively. Both countries are 
now below the level that they had in the 1960s. Panel 9b shows the course of life expectancy 
for different age groups in South Africa. As mentioned before, people face the highest risk of 
infection in their sexually most active years, between the ages of 15 and 35 (UNAIDS, 2004). 
The figure clearly shows that although HIV has a major impact on life expectancy at birth and 
at age 20, it has barely any effect on life expectancy of 65-year-old people.  
 
Figure 2.10 Adult mortality in South Africa 






















Source: Actuarial Society South Africa, 2007 
 
The demographic impact becomes also evident when looking at mortality rates. Adult 
mortality has risen from 0.28 in 1985 to 0.55 in 2005, will peak at 0.58 in 2013, after which it 
remains at a higher level than in 2005 over the next decades (see Figure 2.10). Also child 
mortality has not been decreased as projected in a situation without AIDS. Children become 
infected by their infected mothers through pregnancy or breast-feeding. They will develop 
AIDS and eventually die at a young age. There are signs that also fertility rates have dropped 
in Sub-Saharan countries in response to AIDS. This may be explained by a higher awareness 
of the need of protected sex, but also by the increasing number of abortions. Several studies 
have also found lower pregnancy rates among HIV-infected women (Ntozi, 2002).  
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Due to the rise in mortality and decrease in fertility, by the year 2025, six countries in the 
region will even be experiencing negative population growth rates: Swaziland (–1.0%), 
Botswana (–0.5%), Lesotho (–0.8%), Namibia (–0.3%), Zimbabwe (–0.1%), and South Africa 
(–0.7%) (U.S. Census Bureau August 2006).  
 









Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, 2006 
 
Figures 2.11a-d, presenting population pyramids for South Africa, exemplify the demographic 
changes caused by HIV/AIDS in the hardest hit countries. By 2025, AIDS mortality will 
produce population pyramids in these countries never seen before. Before the epidemic 
(1985), the age-structure in South Africa was comparable with other developing countries, i.e 
a wide base created by the younger population, that gradually narrows as the survival rate 
become less for the older age groups. A decrease in fertility already creates a smaller base in 
2005. Because of the increase in child mortality and mortality of young adults due to 
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HIV/AIDS, the population pyramid eventually transforms to a bun in 2045. This will result 
in higher dependency ratios11 creating problems for the sustainability of social security. 
 
2.4  Conclusion  
In conclusion, in the hardest hit countries, where HIV prevalence rates exceed 10%, 
life expectancy has fallen dramatically, dependency ratios have risen sharply and population 
pyramids show forms hardly ever seen before. Although the spread seems to stabilize, HIV 
prevalence remains high. Obviously in these countries, households are daily confronted with 
the disease and the effects of HIV are impinging on every aspect of society. Once a person 
has contracted the virus, the illness-process follows roughly three phases, which influence 
consumption patterns differently. Not only affected households’ behavior is influenced, but 
due to the major demographic impact, all households are affected one way or another 
including their lifetime consumption choices. 
                                                 
11 Not reflected in the population pyramid, is the loss of available labor. Due to HIV/AIDS labor supply is 
reduced due to periods of sickness, care-giving for those having AIDS sick family members or relatives, 
attending funerals, mourning periods after death etc. Thus, the dependency ratio in economies hit by 
HIV/AIDS is likely to be underestimated, if only the absolute number of adults is considered like in population 
pyramids presented in Figure 2.11. 

















3.1 Introduction  
Intertemporal choices encompass decisions based on tradeoffs among costs and 
benefits occurring at different times. How an epidemic like HIV/AIDS changes these choices 
is rather complex. This dissertation focuses on three specific channels through which the 
epidemic influences intertemporal choices, i.e. illness risk, mortality and preferences for risk 
and time. To clarify the different channels through which the epidemic influences these 
choices, this chapter provides background information on HIV/AIDS and intertemporal 
choice. It in particular describes the different ways in which illness risk and mortality 
influence savings behavior. Preferences for risk and time are important in the choice of the 
amount of savings. They, however, also influence the risk of getting HIV infected. This 
chapter studies this relationship by examining the coherence of risk and time preferences and 
sexual behavior. The discussion is supported by an overview of both previous theoretical and 
empirical work. Furthermore, this chapter explains the structure of this thesis and the relation 
between the following chapters.  
 
Figure 3.1 presents a schematic overview of the three specific relations studied in the 
following chapters. In general, the major box in the center “Intertemporal choice” represents 
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the lifetime choices made at an individual level. The upper three boxes: “Illness risk”, “Risk 
and time preferences”, and “Mortality”, represent the interdependent factors that influence 
these choices and are from now on called “parameter” boxes, because in this study they are 
represented by parameters. The lower box is the outcome of the processes that take place 
within the major box, including savings both at an individual and aggregate level, welfare and 
economic growth. The numbers in the boxes refer to the chapters that study the concept 
itself and the numbers next to the arrows refer to the chapters that study the concerning 
relation. For completeness, the dotted arrows show that the specific relationship exists, but 
that it is not object of particular study in this dissertation. Although the endogenous relations 
between the boxes are relevant, this thesis is a first attempt to explore the different relations.  
 



















                                                 
1 Although it may seem that there is only a subtle difference between the increased illness and mortality risk, 
since they are both caused by high prevalence of HIV, distinguishing between the two is relevant. As already 
mentioned in Chapter 2, roughly 10% of the total HIV infected persons in Southern Africa is also aware of their 
status. This is due to the low testing rates. As a consequence, many HIV infected persons will not actively 
experience the latent phase and will die soon after AIDS unexpectedly sets in. This scenario influences savings 
differently and is therefore analyzed separately from illness risk. 
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Figure 3.1 also illustrates the relevance of obtaining insight into the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
intertemporal choices. The arrows pointing in opposite directions between intertemporal 
choice and illness risk, e.g., show that intertemporal choices do not only affect one’s wealth, 
but also one’s health: The choices households make over time, for instance, influence the 
probability of contracting HIV. Harris & Van Aardt (2007), e.g., find that HIV infection is 
mostly found among low-income groups. Choices on labor supply and investment in human 
capital, influencing income, thus apparently also influence HIV infection risk and thus ones 
health. But households’ choices also determine the ability to cope with the economic 
consequences after being HIV infected. Prudence in healthy times enables buying medical 
treatment when unhealthy. If ill individuals can break into their savings, the necessary 
additional expenditures on medical consumption would not affect the ability to maintain their 
usual level of regular consumption. Moreover, medical treatment limits the productivity shock 
associated with illness, prohibiting a sharp fall in income and consumption level. Thirumurthy 
et al. (2005), for example, show that providing HIV positive patients with ART in Western 
Kenya leads to a large increase in their labor supply being a 20% rise in the probability of 
labor force participation and a 35% rise in the weekly number of hours worked.  
 
The negative externalities for the whole society resulting from the different choices made at a 
household level are not less important. Unprotected sex, for instance, enhances a further 
spread of HIV. Higher HIV prevalence rates obviously raise the infection risk for other 
households in society. In addition, if infected households cannot bear the illness costs (e.g. 
including a fall in income and the need for medical treatment), society might choose to 
contribute to these costs. This burden could affect expenditure possibilities and thereby 
influences the intertemporal choices of all households.2 A study by Over (1992), for instance, 
estimates a fall in the yearly growth rate of GDP due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic of 0.33 
percentage points, based on predictions of a 50% reduction in savings due to increased health 
expenditures and the reduced productivity of the workforce. Next to the wealth at household 
level, intertemporal choices thus also determine the economic prosperity of nations and are 
thus in particular important to measure the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on economic 
growth.  
 
                                                 
2 In South Africa public health care is for 94% funded from general taxation. Private health care, however, 
primarily via medical schemes and out -of -pocket expenditure (Booysens & Visser, 2006). 
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In order to obtain some intuition on the complexity of how HIV/AIDS changes 
intertemporal choices, the next section graphically illustrates how changes in mortality (upper 
right box) influence individual savings using a standard life-cycle model. Section 3.3 describes 
how health shocks such as HIV/AIDS (upper left box) influence intertemporal choices 
through their direct and indirect effect on lifetime wealth. It discusses the mechanism through 
which households cope with such shocks and explains in what sense HIV/AIDS is different 
from other health shocks. Section 3.4 discusses the literature that relates risk and time 
preferences (upper middle box) to health, mortality, saving behavior, and sexual behavior (the 
section demonstrates that the latter is also a particular type of intertemporal choice). After the 
different relations have been discussed at a micro level, Section 3.5 discusses the implications 
at a macro level (lower box) providing a brief overview on the current empirical findings. 
Section 3.6 concludes with an overview of the chapter. 
 
3.2 Mortality:  HIV/AIDS and in the standard lifecycle model 
Among the demographic changes caused by the prevailing epidemic, the sharp fall in 
life expectancy illustrates the increased mortality risk most evidently. In South Africa, for 
instance, life expectancy has fallen with almost 20 years over the period 1985-2005 (see also 
Chapter 2, Figures 2.9a-b). The reduction in longevity in Sub-Saharan Africa is actually rather 
striking, since over the last century, in general, life expectancy has been rising all around the 
world. This explains why the effects of increased longevity have been widely studied, while 
the literature that examines increased mortality is relatively limited. The “longevity models”, 
however, can easily be used to analyze decreases in expected lifetime. For instance, models 
based on lifecycle theory (Ando & Modigliani, 1957), which hypothesize that agents smooth 
consumption over their expected lifetime, predict an increase in savings if life expectancy 
rises3: the probability of reaching the retirement age and the length of the retirement period 
increases and agents will therefore be more inclined to safe in order to have enough wealth 
when reaching this age to maintain their lifetime consumption level. The opposite, of course, 
can be reasoned for decreases in the expected lifetime. In this case, thus predicting a fall in 
savings.  
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the negative effect on savings just described in a simple standard life-
cycle model. In this model, agents choose a consumption level (C0) such that the total lifetime 
                                                 
3 Under the assumption that the rise in life expectancy is caused by an increase in longevity and not by a 
reduction in e.g. child mortality. 
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savings equal the total lifetime dissavings. Assume that agents die at their life expectancy, in 
this example at age 75, and that agents cannot choose their income path (Y). Consider now a 
fall in life expectancy from e.g. 75 to 70 years. Holding everything else constant, this reduces 
the total consumption needed after retirement, i.e. the square spotted box halves, which 
reduces the total dissavings compared to the total savings. In this situation, the lifetime 
consumption level is not optimal anymore, since there is an unused amount of savings. To 
equalize total lifetime savings and dissavings, the individual will choose a higher lifetime 
consumption level (C1), which decreases the total amount of savings (indicated with the 
checked area). 
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An additional negative effect is observed when considering a sharp fall in life expectancy 
below the retirement age as observed in the hardest hit countries. Considering a fall to for 
example 55 years as illustrated in Figure 3.3, not only makes savings for retirement 
consumption abundant (since there is no retirement period anymore), this fall also reduces 
agents’ productive period. In this situation, agents only have to smooth consumption over the 
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dissavings (grey shaded triangle) and savings (white triangle), are equal.4 This reduces savings, 
compared to the base year, even further (see checked area). 
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One of the few studies that analyze the impact of HIV on savings is exactly based on the 
sharp fall in life expectancy. Freire (2004) models savings behavior and finds a significant 
reduction in saving due to this fall. Ferreira & Pessoa (2003) used a similar idea in their study 
on the impact of HIV on economic growth, thereby predicting a fall in economic growth.  
 
The story, however, becomes a bit different when considering a period of severe illness prior 
to the actual death. As explained in Chapter 2, HIV/AIDS is a slow moving disease, which 
means that the period from infection to actual death can take many years. Suppose instead of 
dying at age 55 as in the previous example, agents now become unproductive due to illness at 
age 55, and will still live for let’s say another 10 years (see Figure 3.4). During the period of 
illness, the agent wants to keep its lifetime consumption level but also needs expensive 
                                                 
4 Note that whether the consumption level C2 is chosen above or below C0 depends on the actual decrease in 
expected lifetime. In this case C2 is chosen above C0. When considering an extreme fall to e.g. 35 years, C2 is 
chosen below C0. In both cases the amount of savings will decrease compared to the benchmark due to the 
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medical treatment (here assumed to be around 30% of total expenditures) in order to be able 
to enjoy this consumption. This figure shows that the negative effect on savings compared to 
the base year is not so evident anymore: Like in the former case, holding everything else 
constant, savings would decrease with the checked area. But due to additional expenditures 
on medical consumption, agents are now forced to choose a lower consumption level (C3) to 
smooth consumption over lifetime. This increases savings with the dashed area. In this case, 
the total effect on savings depends on both the time of illness and death and the amount of 
money they have to spend on medical treatment (M3). Although the increase in mortality has 
been incorporated in the previous studies on the impact of HIV/AIDS on savings behavior, 
as yet morbidity has been left out of consideration. 
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In reality, the total effect on savings, of course, depends on many other things, some 
compliant by the agent himself, some out of his control. In this simple example, it was 
assumed that agents cannot choose the path of income. Dropping this assumption, agents 
may also choose to shift or change the slope of the income line Y, instead of adjusting their 
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for instance, by increasing labor supply or changing the investment in human capital 
respectively. Furthermore, agents’ lifetime is uncertain; i.e. they do not die exactly at their 
expected time of death as was assumed in the simple graphical illustration. Uncertainty about 
future economic conditions and the duration of one’s life can increase as well as decrease the 
incentive to save (Olson & Baily, 1981). Rotschild & Stiglitz (1971) call the negative effect of 
uncertain lifetime on savings the substitution effect. The effect is explained by the fact that agents 
can only enjoy consumption when alife. As explained in Chapter 2, the expected time of 
death after being infected by HIV varies widely among patients, and as a result, so does the 
total amount needed for consumption and medical treatment. In addition, of course HIV 
infects not every agent in society, and thus agents only face a risk of getting infected. Both 
types of uncertainty induce agents to save more to anticipate both the possible period and the 
length of illness. The increase in savings due to this “anticipatory behavior” resulting from 
increases in uncertainty is called the income effect (Sandmo, 1970). Whether the income effect 
dominates the substitution effect, depends on agents’ risk preferences (Rotschild & Stiglitz, 
1971). At the same time, agents’ risk preferences also influence the probability of getting 
infected by HIV. Risk attitude thus has countervailing effects on savings. Saving choices also 
depend on preferences over time. If agents do not assign any value to future consumption, 
they would not like to save, to insure against a possible rise in expenditures in a later period. 
They may even be less willing to avoid getting infected by HIV, a disease not having major 
economic consequences in the short-run (although large in the long-run). In this case, high 
time preferences increase the need to save (in terms of higher infection risk), but they limit the 
willingness to save, thereby creating suboptimal outcomes. The above examples show that there 
are many ways through which HIV/AIDS influences intertemporal choices. 
 
3.3  Illness risk: direct and indirect costs 
Major health shocks like HIV/AIDS have a direct and an indirect effect for uninsured 
or partially insured households in terms of their long-term income (illustrated by Figure 3.5). 
The immediate or direct effect of illness in terms of economics is a decrease in labor supply 
(absenteeism) and productivity (while working) presented by the thick horizontal arrow, 
which lowers income at the same time that expenses rise (medical treatment). This is in 
particular the case when the sick person is the head of the household. The required medical 
treatment is the most important indirect effect of health shocks. This results in a shift of 
regular consumption or savings to medical consumption. Consumption, however, cannot fall 
below the subsistence level, which complicates the tradeoff between spending income on 
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consumption and medical treatment for poor households. The figure shows that illness may 
create a vicious circle for poor families resulting in a situation in which they cannot afford 
medical treatment at all. 
 















Health shocks may thus have major implications for households living in countries with a 
limited social security system. Kochar (1995), for instance, shows that among farmers in 
India, male sickness during peak season decreases wage income with 30% and increases 
informal borrowing with 24%. This shows the lack of income security and suggests the 
inability to incur the costs from own savings instead. Moreover, Gan et al. (2004) find that 
among a sample of households of 48 Chinese villages, even 15 year after a health shock, a 
household on average still falls short of its normal income trajectory by 12%. Bell et al. (2003) 
give an explanation for the long-run effect of AIDS on income. In their paper, they model the 
long run effects of HIV/AIDS on economic growth through the negative impact on human 
capital formation. AIDS not only destroys existing human capital of the AIDS sick household 
member, it also limits the human capital formation of the household members and its 
children by the decrease in household income.5 As a result, the affected household (partially) 
loses its capability to generate an average level of income6 in the long run. Adding together, 
                                                 
5 Steinberg et al. (2002), however, give little empirical evidence for the latter effect. Although many HIV infected 
households in South Africa considered to cut on school fee payments, due to fall in income and increase in 
medical costs, only 4% had actually done so.   
6 With an average level of income is meant, an income similar to the level of income of comparable households 
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these effects may cause a household hit by a major health shock to fall into persistent poverty, 
which could lead to a substantial welfare loss. Illness of a household member may also 
influence another member’s productivity, which is another direct effect of health shocks: for 
instance, taking care for ill household members and frequent funeral attendance reduces labor 
supply of these household members (Steinberg et al., 20027). Strong social communities spend 
much time treating sick people and in the case of Zimbabwean agricultural workers, people 
on average spend 10% of their working time attending funerals due to AIDS (Ncube, 1999). 
Although the direct effect of health shocks like HIV/AIDS on labor supply and income are 
fully recognized, analyses of the indirect behavioral effects are relatively limited. 
 
Indirect effect 
The indirect effect of health shocks is related to the treatment of the illness, i.e. the costs of 
the medical care used to diagnose and treat the illness. As illustrated in the simple standard 
lifecycle model in Figure 3.3, this may lower the consumption level for uninsured households. 
From an economic perspective however, a person has a clear incentive to buy treatment: he 
cannot derive utility from consumption in any period unless he also preserves a basic level of 
health needed to enjoy consumption. Furthermore, medical treatment enables persons to 
remain productive or speeds up recovering, such that a person is able to work sooner and is 
able to earn income again. Therefore, medical expenditures might not be seen as regular 
consumption but as a crucial investment in human capital needed to earn income and enjoy 
regular consumption. The dashed arrow in the flowchart of Figure 3.5 demonstrates that 
medical treatment (improving health) reduces the negative effect of the health shock on 
income-generating possibilities. Although the models in this thesis do distinguish between 
regular and medical consumption, for explanatory purposes, the endogenous influence of 
medical consumption on productivity is not taken into account. 
 
The effect of the indirect costs may be large since medical costs for uninsured households are 
relatively high. If households unexpectedly have to spend a large amount of money in a short 
period of time, this may lead to heavy indebtedness. This slows down their pace of asset 
accumulation including children’s education. Steinberg et al. (2002), for example, shows that 
                                                 
7 Among a sample of South African AIDS affected households, 40% of the caregivers had to take time off from 
work, or other income-generating activities, or school. Almost 60% decreased the time spend on gardening 
activities, affecting the ability of poor households to grow food for consumption or sale. 
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in South Africa, AIDS affected households8 spend more than a third of households’ 
expenditures on private medical care. Two third of these households reported a loss of 
income9 as a consequence of HIV/AIDS contributing to the total financial burden. Their 
findings are supported by an empirical study in India, which shows that the share of medical 
expenses in total household spending is significantly higher in the period after a household 
member was tested HIV positive. The salaried group spends the highest amount on medical 
expenses, which reduces regular consumption expenditure by about 12% (Pradhan et al. 
(2006)). Also Gertler (1997) shows, using survey data10 from Indonesia that there are 
significant economic costs associated with health shocks albeit more from income loss than 
from medical consumption. The empirical studies show that the indirect costs of health 
shocks are substantial and should thus be taken into account in measuring the economic 
impact of HIV/AIDS. 
 
Savings as insurance against health shocks 
The size and unpredictability of both direct and indirect costs of health shocks may imply that 
households are not able to smooth their consumption over periods of major poor health, 
especially in developing countries where few individuals are covered by formal health and 
disability insurance (World Bank, 1993). While in developed countries families with sick 
members are able to access formal insurance markets, families in low-income countries must 
rely on informal mechanisms like participating in informal insurance groups (LeMay, 2007), 
or individual saving. As mentioned before, the costs of health shocks are relatively high. 
Households spend a relatively large proportion of their income on health related 
commodities. LeMay shows that while 51% of the households in Cotonou (Benin) made 
expenses related to funeral and or illness during the last six months, only 18% of the surveyed 
observations were participating in some form of insurance, to cover these costs. Although 
Kochar (1995) found that households can relatively well protect themselves from 
idiosyncratic crop shocks by increasing their labor supply, this type of insurance is clearly 
ineffective in protecting households from shocks such as sickness, and death. Health shocks 
                                                 
8 The research population consisted of households that contained an AIDS-sick individual, or households where 
someone had recently died of HIV/AIDS. Households with an HIV infected member that was not sick were 
not included in their sample. 
9 The medical expenditures ranged from 8 – 4.000 Rand a month (monthly income ranged from 40 – 24.5000 
Rand). 
10 He used data from a panel survey (IRMS: Indonesian resource Mobilization Study) of households designed to 
evaluate an experimental increase in user fees charged at public medical care facilities, collected in 1991 and 
1993. 
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require alternative, possibly costlier, methods of insurance and may then affect the economic 
condition of households to a greater extent than for example crop shocks. Also Dercon & 
Krishnan (2000) show that although within poor households in Ethiopia generally risk-
sharing takes place, full insurance against illness shocks does not. This might be due to the 
inability to predict actual illness risk and the associated costs. Pettifor et al. (2004) for 
instance, show that youth in South Africa are indeed unable to correctly predict their HIV 
infection risk. Only 21% of the HIV positive youths in their sample qualified their risk as 
high, whereas 62% reported to have a small or no risk at all. This study unfortunately did not 
report anything about the expected costs of illness. Failures in predicting expected illness cost 
thus leads to sub-optimal level of insurance. 
 
Although few households in Indonesia have medical insurance, Gertler (1997) finds that 
households’ willingness to pay for insurance is roughly 67 percent of the expected income 
loss. Moreover, in the absence of disability insurance (so that the marginal utility of 
consumption when ill is high) this willingness to pay to smooth consumption over medical 
expenditures is 150% of expected medical costs. The latter results would plead for collective 
insurance. Several impact studies like Booysen & Visser (2006) and Marzo (2004) show that 
HIV affected households fall into chronic poverty. This fact could stimulate unaffected 
households to anticipate the costs of illness. But although Kochar shows that families in low-
income countries are fairly well able to smooth illness shocks, Gertler (1997) finds that the 
more severe the physical limitation, the less families are able to actually do so. If households 
lack access to alternative means of protecting consumption, income uncertainty may generate 
precautionary savings (Kochar, 1995). Currently there is no clear evidence to what extent 
households anticipate the costs of HIV-related illness risk by saving or whether they 
anticipate these costs at all. Chapter 4 contributes to lessen this gap by examining whether 
uninsured groups, groups that perceive to be highly at risk, and HIV infected persons on 
average save more than others. 
 
Specific characteristics of HIV/AIDS 
Compared to other health shocks, HIV/AIDS infection has special characteristics that might 
lead to different or more sizable effects on household income and society. These large effects 
may have a different impact on the anticipating strategies of households relatively than other 
health shocks.  
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First, AIDS is fatal, which means that the shock is persistent. This makes it difficult to recover 
from the shock. If the AIDS sick person is the main income earner, this requires a 
decomposition of the household structure, i.e. other household members need to earn the 
household income, but at the same time have to take care for the AIDS sick household 
member. 
 
Second, HIV affects people who are most sexually active, mainly prime-age adults (see Chapter 
2). Because (young) adults are also the most productive group of a population, the AIDS 
epidemic not only affects the age composition, size and growth rate of the future labor force, 
it will also change its skill composition, which in turn feeds into growth rates of potential 
output and of productivity. Moreover, the relatively strong decrease in societies’ productivity 
level subsequently undermines the tax base. So, HIV not only influences households with 
HIV infected members, but it affects every person at any level in society. Arndt & Lewis 
(2000) included this effect in measuring the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Based on an 
economy wide computable general equilibrium, where the effects of HIV/AIDS are 
transmitted through various channels such as public spending, productivity and diminishing 
human capital, their model shows that the loss in GDP is primarily caused by a decline in 
total factor productivity and a shift from government investment towards government 
spending on health. They find a difference in yearly growth rates between a ‘with-AIDS’-
scenario and without-AIDS’ scenario of 2.6 percentage points over a twelve-year period. The 
World Bank (1999), however, predicts a substantial smaller effect. For the top-10 African 
countries ranked by their HIV prevalence rates, the annual average growth of GDP per capita 
would turn out 0.3 percent lower by the year 2025. They explain the small negative effect by 
the expected disproportionate burden of HIV/AIDS on low-skilled individuals, which would 
lead to a smaller loss to society compared to losses among high-skilled workers since the low-
skilled are easily replaced by the large pool of low-skilled unemployed.  
 
Third, AIDS is slow-moving, both within society and also within human body, i.e. the 
incubation period is extended and the morbidity level is high (see Chapter 2). As a result, both 
households and society must bear the costs of treatment and palliative care, which are high 
and lasting relative to other killer diseases. This affects the level and composition of future 
consumption by both private and public agents, and thus also the levels of savings and 
investment. In a theoretical framework, Chapter 4 includes this period of long-term illness by 
a reduction in regular consumption during the period of illness. However, because of the 
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slow-moving characteristic of HIV households can anticipate these costs, in the latent phase 
of HIV infection (as defined in Chapter 2) when they are still productive. 
 
Fourth, in certain regions HIV/AIDS prevalence is high. In South Africa, for instance, HIV 
prevalence was estimated at 18.8% in 2005 (see Chapter 2 for more data on HIV prevalence 
rates). At such high levels of the spread of HIV, also not (yet) infected households may 
anticipate HIV related health shocks, by insuring or saving. Empirical evidence shows that 
awareness of the presence of HIV in the South African society is high: 26% of the youth 
reported to personally know someone with HIV/AIDS, and 45% of youth reported that they 
personally knew someone who had died of AIDS (Pettifor et al., 2004). High awareness is 
likely to enhance savings or insurance strategies, however no empirical evidence is found in 
the present literature on HIV/AIDS. The idea, however, is supported by Kochar (2004) who 
found that higher expectations of future ill-health increased overall savings among Pakistani 
households. I will call the hypothesized positive effect on savings the HIV anticipatory savings 
hypothesis, which will be both theoretically explained and empirically tested in Chapter 4.  
 
Fifth, as mentioned before, HIV/AIDS mainly affects low class households (Harris & Van 
Aardt, 2007). Households having income close to subsistence level clearly have more 
difficulties to anticipate health shocks. As a consequence, the anticipatory savings effect may 
be limited.  
 
Finally, contrary to many other epidemiological diseases, HIV infection is related to risky 
behavior. This makes it possible to reduce the risk of infection or even anticipate the costs of 
risky behavior, although the latter might seem paradoxical: On the one hand, persons take the 
risk of getting infected, while on the other hand they display risk-averse behavior by taking 
precautions in terms of income security.11 
 
In summary, a key limitation of past work is that relatively small health shocks are considered, 
but not the kind of large and persistent major illness caused by HIV/AIDS. If households 
would anticipate these large persistent shocks, total savings could rise substantially. However, 
especially low-income groups, which are highest at risk, may have difficulties in fully insuring 
against this particular health shock, since they have incomes close to the subsistence level. 
                                                 
11 This behavior occurs in many cases. Consider for example a person taking the risk of driving 250 km per hour 
but wearing a seat belt incase something happens. 
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The extent to which household anticipate the HIV/AIDS related costs is uncovered in the 
current literature. Because of the complex nature of this health shock, its total effect in 
particular on individual savings behavior is difficult to predict and has special attention in 
Chapter 4 and 5.  
 
3.4 Risk and time preferences 
Assumptions about risk and time preferences play a central role in the analysis of 
major economic decisions. In most cases, welfare analysts implicitly assume risk neutrality and 
use constant discount rates as the basis for evaluations. However, individual risk and time 
preferences vary across individuals and may even adapt to significant changes in mortality and 
illness risk, such as caused by the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa. The 
previous sections explained that intertemporal choices like saving decisions are subjective to 
expectations about mortality and HIV infection risk. To what extent these expectations 
influence intertemporal choices is determined by individual preferences, like preferences over 
risk and time12. Lower time preferences, and risk tolerance, for example enhance saving 
behavior. How an epidemic like HIV/AIDS changes these preferences is, however, 
uncovered in the current literature. Thus, the reduced life expectancy and perceived risk of 
getting HIV infected may influence intertemporal choices like individual saving and 
investment behavior in a way we yet do not know. This could seriously bias welfare analyses 
of public policy in the region.  
 
Risk and time preferences do not only play a major role in measuring the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on economic decisions, these preferences may also influence other types of 
behavior, like sexual behavior. Using hypothetical questions among a sample in the US, 
Barsky et al. (1997), for example, find that risk tolerance is not only related to economic 
choices like failing to have health and/or life insurance, and holding stocks rather than 
Treasury bills, but also to risky behaviors like smoking, and drinking. Quantifying risk and 
time preferences may therefore be important in understanding risky sexual behavior. 
Identifying the characteristics of HIV infected persons will contribute to the development of 
policies aimed at mitigating the welfare effects and reducing the further spread of HIV.  
 
                                                 
12 As already mentioned, Rotschild & Stiglitz (1971) shows that uncertainty influences savings by both an income 
and a substitution effect. In the same paper they theoretically derive that the income effect dominates if the 
value of the risk parameter 1γ > . Thus, if agents exceed a minimum level of risk aversion, savings increase. 
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How strong intertemporal choices in general are related to risk and time preference is an 
empirical question and has been studied widely by experimental economists. Without having 
the ambition to give an overview of this entire field, this section gives a brief outline of the 
literature closely related to the object of study in this thesis. The interested reader is referred 
to Starmer (2000) and Frederick et al. (2002) for an extensive overview of respectively risk 
and time preferences. The focus of this section is threefold: First, since HIV is most prevalent 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, it provides an overview of the empirical results found on risk and time 
preferences in developing countries. Second, it gives a brief outline of the relation between 
risk and time preferences and health. Third, it illustrates the relation between risky sexual 
behavior and time preferences using a theoretical example and discusses the empirical data 
found on the relation with risk-taking behavior. 
 
Risk and time preferences in developing countries 
Individuals in developing countries in general face extraordinarily more risky environments 
than individuals in the developed world. For instance, political instability, food scarcity, high 
mortality, high inflation, insufficient health care, unsteady wage employment, insufficient 
financial institutions etc. (Fafchamps, 1999).  This high incidence of risks may incite 
individuals to prevent risks from occurring more than people living in a risk-free 
environment. On the other hand, taking risk becomes less costly, when surrounded by many 
other types of risk. For example taking the risk of getting infected with consequences in the 
long-term is lest costly when living in environments with a high level of short term mortality 
risk. 
 
A similar reasoning applies to time preferences. Conventional wisdom has it that people living 
close to absolute poverty live a more day-to-day life than others. This would imply that they 
assign less value to future consumption, which is reflected by higher time preferences. How 
an epidemic like HIV/AIDS influences these preferences is not so obvious, however. The 
shorter expected lifetime, due to the increase in mortality, could enhance this day-to-day 
perspective (“a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush” (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1971, p. 69)), but 
could also increase the relative value individuals assign to future consumption if they want to 
get the best out of the final years of their life. HIV/AIDS might therefore as well as increase 
or decrease individuals’ risk and time preferences. 
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Although there are many empirical studies on risk and time preferences in Western countries, 
these preferences have rather sporadically been studied in developing countries. To the best 
of my knowledge Binswanger (1980) was the first who measured risk behavior in a developing 
country. It was many years later that Harrison et al. (2005b) elicited risk coefficients based on 
similar methods in India, Ethiopia, and Uganda. They found risk aversion in these countries 
to be close to estimates obtained with comparable experiments and statistical methods in 
developed countries. Tanner et al. (2005) compared both risk and time preferences between 5 
countries from 4 continents. They, however, did find evidence for higher discounting and 
substantially lower risk aversion among more collective cultures and low-income countries. If 
in general risk and time preferences are higher in developing countries, this would mitigate 
agents’ willingness to take health insurance or save for the risk of getting ill in response to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. This would affect agents’ ability to meet the costs of future health 
shocks and therefore enhance poverty.  
 
Moreover, if high individual risk and time preferences carry over to sexual behavior, these 
preferences would enhance HIV infection. Then, agents that should anticipate illness costs are 
less likely to actually do so. This could have an additional negative impact on HIV infected 
households’ coping ability of these costs, which makes studying both relations absolutely 
relevant for intervention policies. Furthermore, studies that relate poverty and risk and time 
preference show that the rich are more “patient” than the poor (Lawrence, 1991)13. As 
HIV/AIDS increases poverty, we may conclude that on average discount rates are expected 
to increase in the hardest hit countries. If time preferences were indeed related to sexual 
behavior, this would create a downward spiral. 
 
Health and risk and time preferences 
While there is no literature on the relation between risk and time preferences and HIV/AIDS, 
a number of studies have experimentally analyzed the relation between risk and time 
preference and preventive health behavior. Studies of vaccination, medical adherence to 
medical treatment, and exercise show little relation with time preference and preventive health 
behavior (see Chapman (2005) for an overview). On the other hand, studies of addictive 
behavior show strong evidence for the relation between time preference and preventive 
health behavior (see Bickel & Marsch, 2001 for an overview). Chapman (2005) explains this 
                                                 
13 She explains this finding by the fact that time preferences are culturally acquired Maital & Maital (1977). 
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result by suggesting that time preference measures reflect an ability to refrain from immediate 
gratification that is applicable to “hot” behavior, such as smoking, and drinking, but not to 
cold behavior such as vaccination.  
 
Age and time preferences 
Several theories of intertemporal choice predict that peoples’ discount rate differs 
systematically with age. Different theories however predict different patterns. Some predict 
that the individual discount rate decreases over the lifespan (Becker & Muligan, 1997) but 
others predict exactly the other way around (Trostel & Taylor, 2001). Other theories, some 
supported by empirical or experimental data, predict non-monotonic relations Read & Read 
(2004), Sozou & Seymour (2003), and Rogers (1994). The HIV/AIDS epidemic changes the 
age-structure in countries with high prevalence rates. Therefore, time preferences can be 
changed in ways we yet do not know. 
 
Rogers (1994) define individuals’ utility function by Darwinian fitness; the representation of 
one’s genes in future populations. Young adults would gain the most from a unit of resource 
and are expected to have the highest discount rate. After a period middle-aged, with almost 
constant discount rate, the old age discount rate is expected to decrease. Old-aged are unable 
to directly transform resources into offspring, and may even choose to transfer resources to 
their offspring. Rogers uses fertility data, to support his theory. When considering HIV 
positive individuals to be less reproductive, this would make them, according to this theory, 
relatively more “patient” predicting lower time preferences. 
  
Using longitudinal consumption data, Trostel & Taylor (2001), estimate significantly higher 
discount factors for old age individuals. They explain their findings by arguing that over 
lifetime people’s ability to appreciate consumption decreases, due to the deterioration of 
people’s health over the lifespan, at an increasing rate, reducing the prospect of getting 
pleasure out of future consumption. Future poor health may indicate expected decrease in 
pleasure from experience, which would predict HIV positive subjects to have higher discount 
rates. 
 
Sozou & Seymour (2003) combines the two theories and adds a third effect. The “learning 
about the environment”-effect. Young people enjoy present consumption relatively more, 
because they do not know what they can expect from the future. Using the first argument; the 
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HIV epidemic increases uncertainty, predicting an increase in the overall discount rate. Being 
tested HIV positive would partly resolve uncertainty, reducing the discount rate for these 
individuals. However, poor health increases one’s uncertainty about whether future rewards 
will be received, moreover mating opportunities are reduced, both posing a positive effect on 
the discount rate. Although they conclude that the net-effect is an increasing discount rate at 
old age, the effect of the epidemic on the overall discount rate and HIV positive’s discount 
rate is not clear-cut. Chapter 6 and 7 will provide more insight in this matter, by analyzing the 
relation between time preferences perceived HIV contraction risk and HIV status. 
  
Sexual behavior and risk and time preferences 
Intertemporal choices involve a tradeoff between short-term benefits and long-term costs. 
The choice whether to have unprotected sex involves a similar tradeoff: the short-term 
benefit of sexual pleasure and long-term costs of getting HIV infected. If individuals are 
unable to correctly estimate the future harm caused by risky sexual behavior, there is a clear 
role for policy makers to intervene. O’ Donoghue & Rabin (2001) describe in a systematic 
way how people make unfavorable choices by underestimating future harm caused by current 
behavior like unprotected sex. This subsection provides some examples on how individuals 
could end up making an unfavorable choice. The first example illustrates the role of time 
preferences in this behavior. 
 










+∑  (3.1) 
where Ut lifetime utility at time t and ρ  is the individual’s discount rate. Assume there are 
two periods, youth and adulthood. Engaging in unprotected sex when young yields utility 
1 10u =  and causes an expected future cost of 15. Abstaining from risky sex would yield 
1 2 0u u= = . Suppose a person’s discount rate is 0. In this case, the individual would choose to 
abstain from unprotected sex. But if this person’s current discount rate is different from his 
future discount rate e.g. 12ρ̂ ≥ , he would choose to have unprotected sex and ends up in an 
suboptimal situation. From this example the question arises whether people engaging in 
unprotected sex indeed display higher discount rates, i.e. do HIV positive persons and 
persons highly at risk of contracting HIV display higher discount rates? Exactly this question 
will be addressed in Chapter 6 and 7. 
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A simple modification of this example, illustrates that individuals that underestimate the risk 
of getting HIV infected from unprotected sex, will end up choosing unprotected sex more 
easily. Suppose that the risk of getting HIV infected by unprotected sexual intercourse is 
10%14, and considering expected costs of risky sex of 15, the actual cost of unprotected sex 
equals 150 (solving 9 110 10.0 15x+ = ). Suppose now that an individual thinks his risk is lower 
than 236 %  and his discount rate equals 0 ( 21 2 310 6 %(15) 0u u+ = − = ). In this case the 
individual would choose to have unprotected sex, while he would not in case he had known 
the actual risk. Perceptions of HIV contamination risk are thus important in decisions on 
whether to engage in risky behavior.15 Raising perception of the severity of infection risk will in 
this example directly diminish risky behavior and hence improve the welfare of adolescents. 
However, whenever individuals would display risk-seeking behavior, this intervention should 
be implemented with reservation. It is therefore relevant to measure risk behavior among 
high HIV infection-risk groups. Moreover, economic theory suggests that higher relative risk 
aversion is likely to increase preventive behavior like condom use as well if there is 
uncertainty like on the incidence of illness. Whether individuals engaging in risky sex or 
individuals highly at risk have specific risk attitude will be empirically tested in Chapter 6 and 
7. 
 
Evidence shows that when people make decisions having both short-term and long-run 
consequences, they tend to choose for immediate gratification in a way that they would not 
like from a long-run perspective (O’ Donoghue & Rabin, 2001). This behavior was already 
described by Rae in 1834 (p. 120):  
 
“Such pleasures as may now be enjoyed generally awaken a passion strongly prompting to t
partaking of them. The actual presence of immediate object of desire in the mind by exciting t
attention, seems to rouse all the faculties, as it were to fix their view on it, and leads them to
very lively conception of the enjoyments which offers to their instant possession”  
 
In his work, Rae argued that next to the limiting effect of health and uncertainty of human 
life for savings as explained in the previous sections, “the effective desire of accumulation”, was 
constrained by the excitement generated by the prospect of immediate consumption and the 
                                                 
14 The value used for HIV contraction risk is purely fictive number and only chosen for illustrative purposes. 
15 Perceptions about HIV contamination risk might be related to risk and time preferences as well. 
Mispredictions are however not studied in this thesis since my data did not allow testing for this. 
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disutility in delaying this consumption. This strain of thought not only finds it link with saving 
behavior. Loewenstein (2005), for example, who calls this phenomenon the “hot-cold-
empathy gap”, analyzes its relation with medical decision-making. He finds that the hot-to-
cold empathy gap contributes to the lack of adopting healthy lifestyles, taking simple 
preventive measures, such as taking multivitamins, and getting routine medical tests. This 
behavior may be in particular applicable to sexual behavior. Decisions about sexual behavior 
might be made in the “heat of the moment” at which little thought may be given to the 
possible future consequences of sexual (unprotected) activity. An extension of the former 
example illustrates this myopic behavior. Suppose an individual’s intertemporal utility 














+∑  (3.2) 
 
where [0,1)β ∈  is a preference for immediate consumption. For 0β =  utility in all future 
periods are disregarded and for 1β =  there is no special preference for immediate 
consumption. Suppose the same individual has a β = 12  and still an actual discount rate of 0 
and is considering to have unprotected sex now (t = 1, yielding again a utility of 10 and a cost 
of –15) or having sex in the near future using a condom (t = 2, yielding e.g. 4). Having sex 
now yields a utility of 1 11 2 2 210 (15) 2u u+ = − = , which is larger than postponing sex 
( 11 2 20 (4) 2u u+ = + = ). Thus, the person will choose to have unprotected sex now. However, 
whenever period 2 arrives he would not have chosen to have unprotected sex since at that 
point in time he values 1 1 11 2 2 2 2(10) (15) 2 2u u+ = − = − < , which is clearly lower than 
abstaining from unprotected sex. In this case, individuals having preferences 1019β <  behave 
time-inconsistently and will end up having unwanted unprotected sex. 
  
This example shows that individuals may have self-control problems wherein they are unable 
on a moment-by moment basis to behave in their own long-term interest. Agents displaying 
this “impatient” behavior might already save less compared to low-risk groups of getting 
HIV/AIDS. This might limit the total effect on savings as the agents at risk could be 
expected to have saved less already in a no-AIDS scenario. However, if these agents are aware 
of their visceral induced behavior, risk averse agents might still anticipate the costs related to 
Chapter 3: Background   
 
42 
the illness risk they face by increasing their savings. Chapter 6 and 7 also addresses this 
question, i.e. whether individuals behave time-inconsistently.  
 
While there is no literature on the relation between risk and time preferences and HIV/AIDS, 
there are also only few studies that have determined the relation with sexual behavior. In 
particular, Chesson et al. (2006) infers that indeed time preferences and risky sexual behavior 
are positively related. But they do not find a significant relation between time preferences and 
having Herpes simplex virus type 2 (HSV-2) antibody in subjects’ blood (an other incurable 
sexual disease). They study these preferences in the US, a country much less afflicted by HIV, 
and a relatively risk-free environment in general compared to the situation in developing 
countries. In addition, they do not study the relation with risk preferences. Moreover, they are 
using hypothetical payoffs, which might bias their results (Holt & Laury (2002)). In a study, 
that measures risk and time preferences among the Danish population, Andersen et al. (2005) 
find that joint estimation of risk and time preferences significantly reduces the discount rate. 
Part III contributes to the current literature by measuring both risk and time preferences 
using real incentives in a country highly affected by HIV/AIDS, i.e. South Africa. It measures 
individual perceptions of health risks, in particular, HIV contamination risk and mortality and 
relates this to the elicited risk attitude and discount rate. Furthermore, it empirically tests for 
the myopic behavior described above. 
 
Diagnostic testing 
Chapter 2 mentioned that only around 10% of all HIV infected persons are also aware of 
their status. In order to mitigate a further spread of HIV, it is important to increase status 
awareness. Coates et al. (2000), for instance, show that learning HIV status substantially 
reduces reported sexual behavior. Although some advocate making HIV testing mandatory, 
most researchers agree that doing so is unethical. Therefore, countries have to rely on 
voluntary testing. HIV screening itself however, does not prevent the person from HIV, 
nevertheless it enables HIV infected persons to protect themselves and prevent spreading 
HIV further to others. Detecting HIV in an early stage, however, might prolong the lives of 
HIV infected persons, because then regular check-ups can monitor changes in the Viral load 
and CD4+ cell count (see Chapter 2) in time, enabling early medical intervention.16 A 
disadvantage of early testing, however, is that once tested HIV positive, people might suffer 
                                                 
16 This is less of an advantage in countries where medical treatment is only scarcely available. 
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from the stigma and knowledge to die prematurely. From a welfare perspective it is therefore 
not immediately clear whether testing benefits society. Chapter 5 analyzes the welfare 
implications of increasing HIV testing, in particular the tradeoff individuals make between 
being able to have medical treatment and the knowledge to die prematurely. The endogeneity 
of HIV testing and the further spread of HIV is not incorporated in the model, but is left for 
future research.  
 
Empirical research shows that putting oneself to a medical test is related to both risk and time 
preferences (Picone et al., 2004). Although less risk-averse individuals tend to be more likely 
to undergo testing, individuals with low time preferences are more likely to undergo cancer 
screening. Loewenstein (2005), moreover, shows that the cold-hot empathy gap contributes 
to the failure of persons to get medical tests. He raises the ethical question, whether 
individuals who cannot make self-interested decisions over the long run should decide on 
whether or not to undergo medical tests. Under the assumption that sexual behavior is 
associated with high time preferences, voluntary testing will lead to an under-representation 
of HIV infected persons among the test-takers. Taking into account the effect HIV status 
knowledge has on risky sexual behavior, this could have serious welfare implications. Chapter 
6 empirically tests the relationship of testing behavior and risk and time preferences. 
 
In summary, behavioral economics provides some valuable insights into the harm agents 
cause themselves by taking the risk of unprotected sex. Evidence on the relation between risk 
and time preferences and risky sex will help policymakers understand the connection between 
such behavior and welfare. Chapter 6 and 7 quantifies this relation. These chapters do not aim 
to give a proper estimate for the average level of risk and time preferences, but aim at finding 
the relation between sexual behavior, mortality and HIV infection risk, and testing. The 
contribution of these chapters is clear: knowledge about when and how people make risky 
choices like unprotected sex, helps developing interventions that mitigate this behavior. This 
could both help in prohibiting the further spread of HIV and limiting the economic 
consequences of the epidemic. 
 
3.5 Savings and economic growth: empirics  
This section provides a brief overview of the literature on the relation between 
HIV/AIDS and savings and economic growth (the lower box in Figure 3.1). Already in 1834 
the importance of health and the uncertainty of human life for intertemporal choice was 
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recognized by John Rae in his publication of The Sociological Theory of Capital, where he 
was looking for the reason why wealth differed across nations. According to Rae, together 
with the amount of labor allocated to the production of capital, it was the psychological factor 
“the effective desire of accumulation” that determined a society’s level of savings and investment and 
caused the difference in wealth. This effective desire of accumulation was encouraged by a 
bequest motive17 and the propensity to exercise self-restraint, but was limited by the 
uncertainty of human life.  
 
“When engaged in safe occupations, and living in healthy countries, men are much 
more apt to be frugal, than in unhealthy, or hazardous occupations, and in climates 
pernicious to human life” (Rae 1834, p. 57) 
 
Following Rae, mortality and illness risk induced by high HIV prevalence rates in society, 
would thus not only limit savings, investment, and the coping strategies of households, but 
also economic growth. In such a setting, countries are trapped in a vicious circle, since low 
economic growth caused by the epidemic leads to lower investments in human capital, more 
income equality, and a degenerated health infrastructure. This will in turn facilitate an increase 
in the spread of the epidemic.  
 
There is no general agreement of opinion in the macro literature about the size of the 
economic impact of HIV/AIDS. While the effects in the field of social and demographic 
issues are often evident, economists have found mixed results when modeling the effects of 
HIV/AIDS on economic growth. The measured impact on economic growth ranges from no 
to negative effects (Bloom & Mahal (1995), Over (1992), Bonnel (2000), Arndt & Lewis 
(2000)) to large devastating effects (Bell et al. (2003)). However, there are also recent studies 
that even predict positive effects (Young, 2005).  Different reasons might explain these 
equivocal results: First, it could be that none of the effects of the epidemic is yet large enough 
to influence economic growth. Second, Section 3.3 shows that HIV/AIDS is a slow-moving 
disease, which means that there is a lag between infection and AIDS sickness between 6 
months and 10 years without treatment. This sickness-postponed effect might create a similar 
lag on the observability of the negative impact of HIV/AIDS in the empirical macro 
economic data. Especially early empirical studies might not yet capture all negative effects, 
                                                 
17 Hurd (1989) and Gan et al. (2004) show that bequest motives are on average small and are mostly the result of 
uncertainty about the date of death. 
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such that larger effects will become visible over time, when the disease has destroyed some 
pillars of the economy like both physical and human capital, generating accumulated negative 
effects on future generations in terms of investments and human capital. Third, opposing 
effects, like anticipatory savings, may be present which are hard to catch at a macro level. 
Finally, Results are sensitive to the underlying assumptions of the models used. Amongst 
others it is often hypothesized that either HIV/AIDS will decrease (Over (1992)) or have no 
effect (Young, 2005) on savings, which biases the impact found on economic growth. This 
motivates more in-depth research on the influence on the main determinants of economic 
growth, like the impact on savings.  
 
There is little empirical evidence on how savings is influenced by HIV/AIDS. The first 
empirical study on the macroeconomic effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on savings 
showed (using cross-country regressions over the period 1990 to 1996) that an increase in the 
HIV prevalence rate is associated with a reduction in the domestic saving rate in developing 
countries (Bonnel (2000)). Pradhan et al. (2006) show that HIV households in India have a 
lower level of savings: 18.1% had negative savings and 52% were zero savers. Furthermore, 
43% had either borrowed money or liquidated assets for consumption. Empirical evidence 
seems to show a reduction in aggregate savings and savings among HIV-affected households 
due to HIV/AIDS, which would have serious impact on economic growth and widen the gap 
between western and developing world in terms of wealth even more.18   
 
However, no study has analyzed the effects on savings behavior of not (yet) affected 
households. As illustrated in the simple lifecycle model, savings might as well as increase if 
agents consider future illness costs. The total effect on aggregate savings is thus not so clear-
cut and should be tested empirically. Bonnel’s empirical study does not provide a convincing 
answer, since it has been carried out with data from the 90s, when the epidemic was not as 
widespread and when the negative impact was not so evident for households as it currently is. 
If anticipatory behavior would develop as a response to HIV/AIDS, it could be the case that 
it can only be measured in the data recently.   
 
                                                 
18 Africa’s saving rate is already the lowest across all continents (Loayza et al. 2000). 
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3.6  Summary  
Major differences of opinion are emerging in assessments of the economic impact of 
HIV/AIDS. It is, however, implausible that the epidemic would not affect the countries 
hardest hit. The value of the projections depends on how realistic the assumptions are 
underlying the different models. Savings and investment rates, and demographic projections 
are important elements in analyzing the impact of HIV/AIDS on economic growth. One 
explanation for the ambiguous results is that microeconomic changes might take place 
mitigating the effect at a macro level. Studying behavioral changes will therefore add to a 
better understanding of the welfare implications of the epidemic. Giving an overview of the 
current literature on HIV/AIDS and intertemporal choice, this chapter showed that little is 
known about these behavioral changes. This lack motivates the study in this thesis. 
 
Households with AIDS sick, or HIV infected members are likely to change their 
intertemporal decisions different from households not (yet) affected. The current literature on 
HIV/AIDS and intertemporal choice, however, concentrates either on HIV as a health shock 
for affected households, or either as a disease that increases mortality risk for all households. The 
first line of literature, mostly poverty studies, points at the negative effects on income of 
AIDS affected households. They attribute the decline in available income for consumption to 
decreases in the number of hours worked, decreases in productivity or loss of job (the direct 
costs of illness) aggravated by increases in medical expenditures (the indirect costs of illness). 
The second stream of literature, the life-cycle studies, examines the effects of demographical 
changes through a decrease in lifetime, or changes in fertility. Both study consumption 
smoothing over lifetime, whereas the first mostly studies whether households are able to 
smooth consumption over their lifetime, the second strain of literature focuses more on how 
households smooth consumption over their lifetime. Although it is not so obvious what 
mechanism in intertemporal choice are actual present, the current literature on the economics 
of HIV/AIDS in general believes that savings will fall. However, empirical evidence is only 
obtained from data in an early stage of the epidemic, and theoretical models mainly consider 
mortality and do not consider anticipatory behavior induced by illness risk, that would 
enhance savings behavior.  
 
Moreover, the extent to which perceptions of illness and mortality risk influence savings 
behavior depends on individuals’ risk and time preferences. Large health shocks like 
HIV/AIDS influence these preferences in a way we yet do not know.  In addition, sexual 
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behavior might be related to these preferences. The same risk and time preferences that 
mitigate savings or insurance behavior may also enhance risky sexual behavior. In this case, 
those who should anticipate illness costs are less likely to do so. This could not only create a 
serious problem for the coping abilities of affected households themselves, but causes 
negative externalities for society as a whole, which as a result has to care for these households.  
 
This thesis adds to the current literature by simultaneously analyzing the effect of both illness 
and mortality risk on savings.  The focus will be on the extent to which households anticipate 
illness risk and the related costs. This would give an indication of whether individuals are able 
to cope with the economic consequences once they become infected. Sub-optimal outcomes 
would plead for government interventions. Furthermore, this thesis attempts to clarify which 
groups are at risk of getting infected and to what extent these groups consider this risk in 
their economic decisions. Identifying the characteristics of different risk groups in society 
helps making HIV prevention and policymaking more tailor-made. 



























The HIV Anticipatory Saving Motive: An Empirical 




This chapter studies the effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on saving behavior. It 
addresses the following main questions of this thesis: Do individuals in societies afflicted by 
high HIV prevalence rates anticipate illness risk by individual saving? And is this effect larger 
than the decrease in savings caused by an increase in mortality risk? 
 
To answer these questions, this chapter first introduces a simple two period life-cycle model 
with uncertain lifetime including perceived HIV contamination risk to illustrate the opposing 
effects of the HIV epidemic on individual saving behavior. It furthermore tests the 
predictions of the model with survey data obtained from an economic experiment with real 
monetary incentives performed in South Africa.  
 
After its discovery in the late 1970s, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has rapidly developed into a 
widespread catastrophe. Over 25 million people have died of AIDS related diseases and 39.5 
million people are living with HIV worldwide. High levels of adult prevalence rates are 
concentrated in Southern Africa with 18.8% in South Africa (UNAIDS, 2006). Because of the 
enormous size of the epidemic, main determinants of economic growth such as social capital, 
domestic savings, and human capital are expected to be affected. This would harm both social 
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and economic development. Many studies have been written on the effects of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic on economic growth. However, as described in Chapter 3, little attention has thus 
far been given to the possible indirect economic behavioral effects of the HIV epidemic.  
 
Once HIV infected, uninsured individuals face a long period of high expenses. The treatment 
of the disease requires additional expenses on healthy food and medical treatment. Steinberg 
et al. (2002), for example, show that in South Africa, AIDS affected households1 spend more 
than a third of households’ income on private medical care. At the same time, however, the 
disease lowered income with one third by a decrease in productivity or loss of job 
contributing to the financial burden.  
 
While in developed countries families with sick members are able to access formal insurance 
markets, families in low-income countries must rely on informal mechanisms like participating 
in informal insurance groups (LeMay, 2007), or individual savings. LeMay shows that while 
51% of the households in Cotonou (Benin) made expenses related to funerals and or illness 
during the last six months, only 18% of the surveyed observations were participating in some 
form of insurance, to cover these costs. Dercon & Krishnan (2000) show that although 
generally risk-sharing does occur within poor households in Ethiopia, full insurance against 
illness shocks does not. This might be due to the inability to predict actual illness risk and the 
associated costs. Pettifor et al. (2004), for instance, show that the youth in South Africa is 
indeed unable to correctly predict their HIV infection risk: only 21% of the HIV positive 
youths qualified their risk as high, whereas 62% reported to have a small HIV infection risk or 
no infection risk at all. Another explanation for underinsurance can be that households 
cannot afford full insurance and therefore save instead. Several impact studies like Booysen & 
Visser (2006) and Marzo (2004) show that HIV affected households fall into chronic poverty. 
This fact could stimulate unaffected households to anticipate the costs of illness by increasing 
savings. 
 
It could thus be hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between HIV contamination 
risk and individual savings: individuals with a high contamination risk increase savings if they 
take the possible additional future costs caused by the illness into account when deciding how 
                                                 
1 Their research population consisted of households that contained an AIDS-sick individual or households 
where someone had recently died of HIV/AIDS. Households with an HIV infected member that was not sick 
were not included in their sample. 
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much to save: the HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis as introduced in Chapter 1. On the other 
hand, being HIV infected significantly reduces life expectancy. Therefore, the probability of 
reaching the retirement age declines and agents will be less inclined to safe in order to have 
income when retired. Because the HIV epidemic causes both a decrease in life expectancy and 
an increase in the expectancy of near future illness, the overall effect of the HIV epidemic on 
individual saving behavior is ambiguous. (For a graphical illustration of these effects see 
Figures 3.3-3.4) 
 
Although to the best of my knowledge the HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis has not been 
tested empirically, results from existing studies on the economics of HIV/AIDS do indirectly 
support the presence of the aforementioned opposing effects of the HIV epidemic on saving 
behavior. For example, Ferreira & Pessoa (2003), and Freire (2004) found a negative 
relationship between the HIV epidemic and saving behavior due to a fall in life expectancy. In 
his study about the macroeconomic effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic using cross-country 
regressions, Bonnel (2000) found that the increase in the HIV prevalence rate from 1990 to 
1996 reduced the savings rate in developing countries with -0.61 percentage points. Bonnel 
does however mention that in a well-established HIV epidemic savings could increase because 
households increase their savings to cover the expected higher medical costs if they view the 
risk of contracting AIDS related diseases as significant. Kochar (2004) found that higher 
expectations about future illness increased overall savings in Pakistani households, as 
predicted by the HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis. Pradhan et al. (2006) empirically show 
that HIV affected households2 in India have lower levels of savings and almost half of these 
households had either borrowed money or liquidated assets for consumption. 
 
This chapter presents a two-period lifetime optimization model that illustrates the opposing 
effects of HIV contamination risk on individual saving behavior. This model is based on the 
life-cycle theory (Ando & Modigliani, 1957), which posits that agents smooth consumption 
over their expected lifetime. The predictions of this model are tested using data from a 
laboratory experiment with real monetary incentives held among students in South Africa. 
The results indicate that both effects of the HIV epidemic (increased mortality and increased 
illness risk) indeed affect individual saving behavior as predicted by the simple model. The 
                                                 
2 An HIV affected household in the most limited definition is a household that consists of at least one infected 
member. In the broadest definition every household in the hardest hit countries are HIV affected since the far-
reaching consequences of the disease in society. In this thesis, by affected household, the limited definition is 
meant. 
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results thus plead for educating the population with correct and actual information on the 
magnitude of the disease and their actual lifetime HIV contamination risk. Providing this 
information will encourage savings and thus will reduce the welfare loss caused by the HIV 
epidemic.      
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple two-
period lifetime optimization model to illustrate the opposing effects of the HIV epidemic on 
individual saving behavior. Section 4.3 presents the experimental design followed by the 
experimental and estimation results in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.   
 
4.2 Model 
Consider a country where a large group of agents (normalized to one) optimizes 
consumption over two periods. When HIV starts to spread, it affects individual savings in the 
following way. First, the period over which agents optimize consumption declines because 
there is a fall in life expectancy. The model operationalizes this effect through an increase in 
perceived mortality risk and assumes that HIV contaminated agents will not enter the second 
period. Second, in a well-established HIV epidemic, agents will become aware of the HIV 
contamination risk they face. Agents understand the necessity of expensive medical treatment 
whenever they become HIV positive. This enhances savings, as predicted by the HIV 
anticipatory saving hypothesis.  
 
Agents face a mortality risk q (i.e. with probability q agents do not enter the second period) 
and a certain risk p of contracting HIV. Agents optimize a simple logarithmic lifetime utility 
function and discount the future with discount factor 11 ρδ += , where ρ  is the discount rate. 
Agents only earn income w in the first period and earn interest rate r on their savings s in the 
second period. Savings of the deceased are distributed equally among their generation. 
Because agents are aware of the mortality risk of their generation, they consider the transfers 
of the deceased in the expected future income when optimizing their lifetime utility. The 




qR +−= . Agents can spend income on regular consumption (ci) in both periods, but to keep 
things simple, it is assumed that only HIV contaminated agents are allowed to spend income 
on medical treatment, m2 with price Pm. The parameter 0μ >  is the marginal rate of 
substitution of regular and medical consumption. μ > 1 shows the importance of medication 
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since it improves the quality of life. μ < 1 might incorporate the disutility of taking medicines. 
See Problem (4.1) for the specific optimization problem.  
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Taking first derivatives with respect to q and p illustrates the opposite effects that the HIV 
epidemic has on individual savings. A marginal increase in mortality risk (q) negatively affects 
the amount of money agents save (see Equation (4.3)). However, a marginal increase in 
perceived HIV contraction risk (p) induces people to save more (consume less) in the first 
period (see Equation (4.4)). Note that for 0 1μ< ≤  the marginal effect of an increase in p on 
savings in this model is smaller than the effect of a marginal increase in q. The more 
important medical consumption becomes compared to regular consumption the larger the 























∂ − + +
 (4.4) 
                                                 
3 In this thesis medical consumption is a generic term for the additional consumption that is advised for HIV 
infected individuals. It includes e.g. medical care and treatment, healthy balanced food, supplements and immune 
boosters etc. 
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A limitation of this simple two-period model is that medical consumption does not prolong 
lifetime of HIV positive agents. Incorporating this effect would enhance the HIV anticipatory 
saving motive even further. 
 
4.3 Experimental design 
To test the predictions of the simple model, data is used from an economic 
experiment with real monetary incentives held among students in South Africa. This 
experiment builds on the discount rate experiments of Coller & Williams (1999) and Harrison 
et al. (2002). This section presents a short description of the experimental design. The 
appendix contains a more detailed description of the experiment including the experimental 
script, experimental tasks and the questionnaires. 
 
Participants 
A total of N = 213 students (114 males and 99 females) from a wide range of disciplines 
recruited at the Northwest University and the University of Pretoria in South Africa 
participated in the experiment. Students took part in 12 groups of around 20 respondents 
each. 82% of the respondents was black South African, 15% of the respondents was white, 
and the remaining 3% was colored. The average age of the white participants (15%) was 21.1 
years (ranging from 19 till 24 years) whereas the average age of nonwhite (colored  and black 
South African) participants was 22.9 years (ranging from 18 till 36 years). On average 
nonwhite students were poorer; the income distribution of nonwhite subjects is skewed to the 
left whereas the income distribution of white students is skewed to the right. Note that 
individuals’ answers were based on perception4 and might differ across both race groups. 
Therefore, the model includes a dummy for subjects who lived in an informal dwelling to 
capture the variation in socio-economic background. For more details on the characteristics 
of the participants, the reader is referred to Appendix A, Section A.5. 
 
Procedure 
At the start of the experiment, subjects received experimental instructions and the random 
devices used throughout the experiment (a bingo cage containing 100 balls, a 6-sided die, and 
a 10-sided die) were presented to subjects. In the instructions, it was emphasized that the 
experiment was anonymous (since it also involved sensitive questions related to health states) 
                                                 
4 Subjects were asked to describe the income position of the household in which he lived at age 15. Classified by 
low, middle, and high. 
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and that there were no right or wrong answers. Both at the start and at the end of the 
experiment, participants were asked to fill out a short questionnaire. The first questionnaire 
concerned questions regarding socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, race 
etc., while the questionnaire at the end of the experiment concerned questions on financial 
instruments such as whether the participant did save or not and the current balance on 
participants’ savings account and health related questions including questions on HIV status, 
perceived life expectancy and perceived HIV contamination risk.5 
 





















Because individual time preferences play a central role in saving behavior, the experiment 
measures individual discount rates. More specifically, the so-called multiple price list design 
                                                 
5 Assuming that students truthfully reported on these perceptions, this is exactly the information that is needed 
for this study. Namely, these perceptions would influence economic behavior and not the actual individual life 
expectancy and HIV contamination risk.  
Decision Annual
Interest rate
1 R 172 R 182.60 3% A B
2 R 172 R 193.76 6% A B
3 R 172 R 205.51 9% A B
4 R 172 R 217.88 12% A B
5 R 172 R 230.90 15% A B
6 R 172 R 244.60 18% A B
7 R 172 R 259.00 21% A B
8 R 172 R 274.14 24% A B
9 R 172 R 290.05 27% A B
10 R 172 R 306.76 30% A B
11 R 172 R 324.30 33% A B
12 R 172 R 342.72 36% A B
13 R 172 R 362.05 39% A B
14 R 172 R 382.32 42% A B
15 R 172 R 403.58 45% A B
16 R 172 R 425.87 48% A B
17 R 172 R 449.22 51% A B
18 R 172 R 473.69 54% A B
19 R 172 R 499.32 57% A B
20 R 172 R 526.15 60% A B
Option B
To be paid in 24 months
Option A
To be paid in 1 month (Circle A or B)
Your choice
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(MPL) used by Harrison et al. (2002) is adjusted to the new setting. Participants were asked to 
make 20 outright choices between two options, called option A and option B, by simply 
encircling the preferred option on a sheet of paper. Both options yielded monetary prizes at 
specified dates. More specifically, option A yielded 172 Rand6 in X months, while option B 
yielded an amount of Y Rand in Z months. The amount Y that option B yielded increased 
after each choice, starting at Y=172.43 Rand. Thus, option B became more and more 
attractive after each choice. In addition, participants received information about the annual 
interest rate that reflected the different prizes offered by option B, similar to Coller & 
Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002). The options were presented in a table format 
similar to Table 4.1 reproduced on the previous page, as to make the task as easy and 
transparent as possible. 
 
Motivating participants 
In addition to a show-up fee of 30 Rand, performance-based real incentives are used to 
motivate participants based on the random lottery incentive system, the nowadays almost 
exclusively used incentive system for individual choice experiments (Holt & Laury, 2002). The 
main advantage of this system is that it avoids income effects such as Thaler & Johnson’s 
(1990) house money effect, while it has been shown empirically that it is indeed incentive 
compatible, that is, agents do not interpret choice tasks rewarded with the random lottery 
incentive system as one grand overall lottery (Cubitt et al. 1998, Starmer & Sugden 1991). 
Since the task reported here was part of a larger experiment that all involved outright choices 
between two options, the probability that one of the chosen options would be played out for 
real was low. When selected for additional payment, subjects received a postdated check 
issued by Tilburg University, which could be cashed at any Standard Bank in South Africa any 
time after the specified date. 
 
Treatments  
There is empirical evidence that agents are more impatient about immediate delays than they 
are about future delays of the same length (Coller & Williams, 1999). Therefore, the timing of 
the prizes of both options varied between treatments. More specifically, in one treatment, 
called nFED (no Front-End-Delay) , option A always yielded an immediate prize while option 
B yielded a prize that would be paid in 23 months. In the other treatment, called FED (Front-
                                                 
6 1 Rand equals about 0.14 USD in the year of the experiment. 
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End-Delay), option A always yielded a prize that would be paid in one month while option B 
yielded a prize that would be paid in 24 months.  
 
4.4 Experimental and estimation results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics  
First of all, the results show that most students owned a savings account: 64.4% of 
the subjects reported to save and of these 52.6% reported to use informal saving methods. 
82.0% reported to save on a formal account. Table 4.2 below shows how saving behavior 
differs among groups of subjects having different levels of perceived HIV contamination risk 
classified by no risk at all, small, moderate, high or HIV positive.  
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics.7 
























Not at all 54 (27.4%) 30.8% 65.4% 78.8% 55.9% 1.54 36.69 
Small 83 (42.1%) 39.3% 61.4% 80.0% 51.9% 1.53 40.30 
Moderate 28 (14.2%) 17.9% 60.7% 94.1% 70.6% 1.99 36.98 
High 25 (12.7%) 28.0% 64.0% 73.3% 37.5% 2.19 43.92 
HIV positive 23 (10.8%) 30.4% 78.3% 88.9% 44.4% 3.09 20.73 
Total 213 (100%) 32.1% 64.4% 82.0% 52.6% 1.72 37.80 
 
Subjects with a high perception of HIV contamination risk and HIV positive subjects appear 
to save more often compared to subjects that indicated to perceive their contamination risk as 
small or moderate. The amount of savings of HIV positive subjects and subjects with a high 
perception of HIV contamination risk is also significantly higher compared to the other 
groups (p-value9=0.03). Note however, that the group of subjects that indicated to perceive 
their contraction risk as high did report to use both informal and formal saving methods less 
                                                 
7 For other characteristics of these groups, see Appendix B, Tables B4-B6. 
8 The discount used is the for mortality corrected discount rate as described in Chapter 7.  
9 Based on the Mann-Whitney test statistic (see for example Siegel & Castellan (1988). 
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frequently. The amount of savings among those who have a savings account however, is 
higher for this group and for the group of HIV positive respondents. 
 
Life expectancy 
Due to the HIV pandemic, life expectancy in South Africa has fallen from an average of 63.2 
years to 42.7 years over the period 1990-2006 (see Section 2.3, Figure 2.9a). The reported life 
expectancy of the subjects varies from 25 to 120 years, with a mean of 72.38 years, which is 
substantially higher than the country average for people at age 20-24, which varies from 55 to 
60 years (WHO, 2007). Subjects who indicated to be HIV positive reported a significantly 
lower life expectancy (59.1 years). Subjects who have a higher perceived HIV contraction risk 
reported an average life expectancy of 68.9 years, which is 4.55 years lower compared to 
subjects who indicated to have a lower risk.10 
 
Perceived HIV contamination risk 
The largest part of the subjects (80.9%) reported that HIV is the major cause of death in the 
North West province. Tuberculosis, a disease that is an important cause of death for many 
HIV infected patients, was seen as the second most important cause of death (60.3%). This 
shows some understanding of the HIV epidemic among the subjects. Subjects estimated their 
own risk of getting HIV infected, however, significantly lower than the risk of other students.  
 
Although 57.2% of the nonwhite participants indicated that the HIV contamination risk of 
other students was high, only 15.9% of them perceived their own HIV contamination risk as 
high. None of the subjects reported that other subjects’ HIV contamination risk was zero, 
whereas 27.5% indicated that their own HIV contamination risk was zero. 25.0% of the white 
participants reported to perceive others’ HIV contamination risk as high, which is rather low 
compared to the 57.1% of the nonwhite participants. In general, these numbers again show a 
substantial awareness of HIV among subjects participating in the experiment. 
 
The overall reported HIV prevalence rate among the sample was 10.9%. However, 4.7% of 
the subjects indicated to prefer not to report their test- or HIV status. This prevalence rate is 
comparable with the average HIV prevalence rate (9.9%) among the youth in the North West 
province (Pettifor et al., 2004), but the observed prevalence rate is high considering the fact 
                                                 
10 The data furthermore show that the expected remaining lifetime is significantly decreasing in perceived risk 
exposure (corr=-0.32, p-value=0.0000), which conforms to expectations (see also Chapter 7, Section 7.4). 
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that among the students that are HIV positive only 10% is also aware of their status (Pettifor 
et al., 2004). Finally, 12.7% of the subjects indicated to have a high HIV contamination risk 
(see Table 4.2).  
 
Discount rates 
For each individual the individual discount rate is estimated by taking the average discount 
rate when a subject switched from choosing option A to option B. Thus, for example, from 
the choices made by the hypothetical subject whose choices are listed in the fifth column of 
Table 4.1, it can be inferred that the individual discount rate was equal to 25.5%. The 
resulting average discount rate over all sessions was 34.78%, which is substantially higher than 
an average discount rate of 24.2% obtained by Harrison et al. (2005a). This implies that the 
average South African is more impatient than the average Dane, which is perhaps not 
surprising if considering the economic differences between both countries. Compared to 
previous studies conducted in Western countries, a remarkable large proportion of subjects 
(42.6%) switched between the options more than once. If a participant switched more than 
once between options, then the discount rate was assumed to be equal to the midpoint of the 
interval over which the subject is indifferent. 
 
The last column of Table 4.2 shows the average discount rates for each group of subjects. 
The observed discount rates of the first four categories are in agreement with ‘common sense’ 
observations. Among the subjects who considered themselves to have no HIV contamination 
risk at all, a relatively large percentage had the lowest discount rate, while, on the other hand, 
among the group of subjects that indicated to have a high contamination risk, a relatively large 
percentage had the highest discount rate. These findings are supported by Chesson et al. 
(2006) who show that unsafe sexual behavior is positively related to time preferences. 
Although Table 4.2 shows that subjects with a high-perceived risk exposure had a higher 
discount rate in the experiment, subjects who knew that they are HIV positive strikingly 
showed to be very patient. HIV infection thus seems to affect discount rates which may be 
explained by the HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis: HIV positive subjects might be aware of 
the additional spending they will face at the time they become ill, and are therefore prepared 
to delay consumption for a relatively long time. Chapter 7 analyses this remarkable finding. 
 
The major drawback of the experimental method as often applied in Western countries is the 
debatable assumption that subjects are credit constrained. The financial data of the sample, 
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however, shows that this assumption among students in South Africa is less contentious. 
Subjects appear to have little arbitrage possibilities. Only 9.9% of the subjects reported to 
have a line of credit. Furthermore, only 15.9% reported to have a chance of at least 90% of 
being approved to obtain a loan if they would go to a bank. 
 
4.4.2  Estimation Results 
In order to test the hypothesis that there is a significant positive relationship between 
saving behavior and perceived HIV contamination risk and life expectancy as predicted by the 
life-savings model presented in Section 4.2, while controlling for individual differences 
between discount rates, marital status, gender, race, and the probability of obtaining a loan, a 
Simple Ordered Probit regression analysis is performed using the amount of savings on a 4-
point scale as the dependent variable. To capture the variation in socio-economic background 
of the subjects, a dummy for subjects who lived in an informal dwelling is included in the 
regression. The results of this simple regression are reported in Table 4.3 below.  
 
First of all, as can be seen in the table, students that reported to have a small probability of 
obtaining a loan significantly save less. This finding can be explained by the lack of income to 
be able to save and the related lack of collateral to obtain a loan. White students appear to 
significantly save more, possibly because they face less liquidity constraints. 
 
Interestingly, there is a significant positive relationship between perceived HIV contamination 
risk and the amount of savings. This finding supports the HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis: 
If individuals consider the risk of contracting the virus and are aware of the related costs of 
being HIV infected, they save in order to anticipate these costs. The HIV positive subjects in 
the sample turn up to significantly save more as well. It should be noted here, that all the HIV 
positive subjects did not have AIDS yet. Although their spending pattern might already have 
changed (in order to delay the development of HIV into AIDS, infected individuals need 
things like balanced food, and medical care etc.), the most expensive period in which they are 
going to need extensive medical care and treatment is still to come. The saving effect for HIV 
positive students appear to be higher than those of students who perceive to be highly at risk, 
which can be explained by the fact that HIV positive students know for sure that the 
expensive period is looming ahead, while for the other group this is still just a risk.  
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In addition, Table 4.3 shows that students who have medical insurance, and therefore do not 
expect a dramatic increase in expenditures in case they become infected, save significantly 
less. Savings thus appears to be a substitute for medical insurance. This is not surprising in a 
country where many people do not have access to or cannot afford to have full medical 
insurance and as a result use savings as “insurance” for illness risk. The coefficient for a 
positive HIV status appears to be higher than that for the dummy for medical insurance. This 
indicates that medical insurance alone does not insure individuals for the full costs of illness. 
The fall in income and the need for a different consumption pattern seems to enhance 
savings as well.  
Table 4.3: Estimation Results. 
 Estimate Standard Error 
Discount Rate 0.001 0.007 
Female -0.070 0.267 
White 1.140 0.377*** 
Urban -0.345 0.291 
Informal Dwelling 0.662 0.424 
High Perceived HIV 
Contamination Risk 1.132 0.470
** 
HIV Positive 1.465 0.470*** 
Perceived Life Expectancy 
(years) 0.018 0.009
** 
Medical Insurance -0.772 0.340** 
Poor Chances Loan -0.544 0.275** 
Dependent variable: Amount of savings on a 4-point scale 
 
Perceived life expectancy also significantly increases the amount of savings, which is in line 
with what life-cycle theory predicts. Thus, the empirical results clearly show that both 
opposing effects of HIV on individual saving behavior are present in the data. The overall 
effect of a fall in life expectancy with, e.g., 15 years on savings is less than the effect of having 
a high perception of HIV contamination risk or being HIV positive. This implies that 
individual savings among these participants in the experiment are positively affected by the 
HIV epidemic overall.   
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Although students that had lived in informal dwellings appear to save more (p-value=0.118), 
the other variables, gender, urban, and individuals’ discount rate have an insignificant effect 
on the amount of money students save. 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter presents empirical evidence that suggests that the HIV epidemic has a 
positive effect on individual saving behavior, as predicted by the HIV anticipatory saving 
hypothesis. To illustrate this effect a simple lifecycle model is used that includes mortality risk 
and HIV contraction risk. The HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis posits that in a well-
established HIV epidemic, agents consider the improved risk of contracting HIV and will 
save additionally to be able to make possible future expenses on medical treatment or to 
anticipate a decrease in income due to illness. Results from a regression model with data from 
a laboratory experiment using real monetary incentives in which is controlled for differences 
between individual discount rates, gender, race, way of life, the probability of obtaining a loan, 
and having medical insurance, show that there is a nonlinear relationship between HIV 
prevalence rate and saving behavior. The results show that HIV contamination risk and a 
positive HIV status positively affects savings. Furthermore, it is found that although 
individual saving is a substitute for medical insurance, the total increase in savings cannot be 
explained by the lack of medical insurance alone. Individuals seem to save on top of that for, 
e.g., lack of future income and additional illness-related expenditures not covered by medical 
insurance. 
 
The HIV epidemic seriously affects economic growth by the erosion of social and human 
capital, and domestic savings. This study shows that it is also important that the population of 
countries hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic knows its contamination risk from an economic 
point of view. Anticipatory saving improves the coping ability of HIV/AIDS infected 
households. Government inaction with respect to HIV knowledge will make the countries 
were the HIV epidemic is spreading worse off with respect to economic growth and welfare 
through the negative effects on savings caused by an increase in mortality risk. The results 
therefore plead for HIV prevention campaigns that encourage HIV testing and educate the 
population with correct and actual information on the magnitude of the disease and their 
actual lifetime HIV contamination risk. These policies will induce an anticipatory saving 
motive and thus positively affect social welfare and may therefore partly indemnify the 










HIV Contamination Risk, Savings and the Welfare 




This chapter models the effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on aggregate savings and 
studies the welfare effects of diagnostic testing for HIV. It analyzes how the epidemic 
influences aggregate savings according to different stages of the epidemic. The epidemic 
decreases savings if especially young individuals are (perceived to be) affected by the virus, 
but may increase savings if individuals perceive a sizable probability of getting infected later. 
By the same token, the welfare effects of testing young individuals differs from the welfare 
effects of testing older individuals, since the savings responses to testing differ according to 
whether old or young individuals are tested. Chapter 3 showed that the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
affects every person in society. This chapter controls for the fact that it affects people with 
different test status differently. Obviously infected individuals are affected disproportionately: 
Since the incubation period of the virus is about 7-10 years (Bonnel, 2000), they face a long 
period of high expenses of specific food and medical costs. Persons tested HIV negative face 
relatively less uncertainty, compared to untested persons and can therefore allocate their 
incomes more efficiently.1  
                                                 
1 The interested reader is referred to Chapter 2, Section 2.1 for a description of how consumption patterns are 
required to change over the course of HIV and to Chapter 3, Section 3.3 for a brief discussion on the empirical 
evidence of the influence of HIV infection on income and expenditures. 
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In many respects, the disease is of economic interest in developing countries where extensive 
social-insurance systems are lacking. In an influential paper, Young (2005) claims that the 
widespread infection, and its associated lower fertility, increases the scarcity of labor and, 
therefore, enhances future consumption possibilities. He assumed, however, a constant macro 
economic savings rate, implying that the stock of physical capital will not be affected in the 
long run. As described in Chapter 3 and 4, there are, however, many reasons to believe that 
societies adjust their savings pattern when a virus like HIV spreads, in short: the increase in 
medical expenditures due to infection forces households to reduce and finally exhaust their 
savings or assets (see Steinberg et al., 2002). In addition, savings for retirement are less 
necessary in societies where high mortality decreases the chances of getting old. As a 
counteracting force, however, savings may increase when the HIV epidemic spreads further. 
Since then individuals may anticipate that they may contract HIV in the future and are 
confronted with high costs of medical treatment by increasing their savings. Chapter 4 
empirically showed that the latter effect dominates the negative effect of an increase in 
mortality if individuals perceive to be highly exposed to contracting the virus. Also Kochar 
(2004) confirmed the existence of this effect as he found that expectations of future illness 
increased overall savings in Pakistani households. However, these results do not tell much 
about the effect on aggregate savings, as perceptions of illness risk vary widely among 
individuals. 
 
Most empirical studies to date found a negative effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on savings. 
Ferreire & Pessoa (2003) attributed this decline to a reduction in life expectancy.2 Bonnel 
(2000), who estimated the macroeconomic effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic using cross-
country regressions, found that from 1990 to 1996 an increase in the HIV prevalence rate 
significantly reduced the change in the domestic saving rate in developing countries. 
However, he remarked that in a well-established epidemic savings could increase. In fact, 
recalculating his model including data from a more recent period, i.e. 1990-2004, provides no 
significant results anymore (see Annex A5.1). This calculation suggests that the effect of the 
epidemic on the domestic saving rate can be non-monotonic, and depends on the stage of the 
epidemic. 
 
                                                 
2 Chapter 2, Section 2.3 shows that the reduction in life expectancy is substantial: over the period 1985-2005, the 
worst-hit countries saw the life expectancy fall by around 20 years. 
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Plotting actual HIV prevalence rates against net national savings in 2003 for a number of 
African countries indeed suggests that the relationship between HIV prevalence and savings 
indeed can be of a non-monotonic nature (see Figure 5.1).3 In particular, an increasing 
prevalence rate might first decrease the national savings rate, then lead to an upswing in 
savings, and finally to a downfall again. Actually, the theoretical model presented below, 
predicts exactly such an evolution of savings over the spread of the virus.4  
 
Figure 5.1: Net national savings (in %) and HIV prevalence  
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Source: World Development Indicators, 2006 
 
This chapter employs a two-period lifetime optimization model to explain savings by a four-
stage process partly supporting Bonnel’s (2000) conjecture that savings are affected differently 
in the various stages of the epidemic. In the first distinguished stage, the disease is unknown. 
Some individuals die from the disease without knowing that AIDS killed them. These 
individuals are therefore not able to adapt saving behavior, so that aggregate savings are not 
affected. In the second stage of the epidemic, a group of young individuals falls ill, and get 
                                                 
3 Note that excluding Swaziland, the data point on the far right, having a prevalence rate over 30%, changes this 
graph in a U-shaped curvature, showing a positive relation with net national savings for countries with a 
prevalence rate over 14%.  
4 Zhang et al. (2003) find a similar non-monotonic effect on savings due to increases in longevity based on a 
different model. In particular, starting at high mortality a mortality decline will first increase and later on decrease 
savings. 
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tested HIV positive. This group knows they contracted the virus and that they will not 
survive the first period. Being diagnosed HIV positive, they face a rise in expenditures on 
medical treatment5 without having been able to save in advance for these costs. Because this 
group will not save for future consumption, a decrease in aggregate savings characterizes this 
second stage. In the third stage, the population becomes aware of the future risk they face of 
contracting the virus and will save for a possible future fall of income and increase in 
expenditures. In this stage, the number of young individuals with a positive HIV status is still 
small. Therefore, the increase in savings of the uninfected fraction of the population exceeds 
the decrease in savings of the HIV contaminated group. However, if the infection rate 
increases further, i.e. if many young individuals get infected, the decrease in savings by these 
diagnosed HIV infected individuals will exceed the increase in savings of the group that faces 
the risk of contracting HIV later in life and aggregate savings will fall again. 
 
A second focus of the chapter is the effect of individual diagnostic testing for HIV. It is 
estimated that only 10% of the HIV-infected people are also aware of their status. Increasing 
status knowledge could therefore mitigate a further spread of HIV. Apart from, the effect on 
the HIV prevalence rate, testing can have important direct effects on individuals’ welfare, 
which is crucial for decision making on the intensity of HIV-testing. This chapter analyzes 
these direct welfare effects of diagnostic HIV tests. The model assumes that individuals who 
are infected by the virus will derive less utility from the consumption of regular goods and 
derive more utility from the consumption of medical treatment than uninfected individuals. 
Furthermore, it assumes that being diagnosed HIV positive is necessary for getting the 
appropriate medical consumption.  
 
Individuals can be tested in both periods of their life. Testing in period 1 obviously resolves 
the uncertainty in period 1, but not in period 2. Assume that testing only takes place at the 
start of each period. If the test result turns out to be positive, individuals are receiving a 
negative utility shock caused by a “fear-of-death” or “stigmatization” parameter. On the other 
hand, these individuals are better able to attain optimal (medical) consumption. On top of 
that, the individuals who receive a positive test in the first period of their life do not have to 
save for an uncertain chance of survival. Surprisingly, testing individuals who turn out to be 
                                                 
5 Chapter 3 showed that medical costs are a significant part of HIV affected households’ expenditures. Steinberg 
et al. (2002), for instance, finds that affected households in South Africa on average spend 34% on medical 
treatment. 
HIV/AIDS, Risk and Intertemporal Choice     
 
 69
HIV negative does not necessarily imply a positive welfare effect for these individuals. The 
reason is that although untested individuals will save less in the first period, they are still able 
to consume more in the second period of their lives. The latter is due to an (informal) 
“longevity” insurance system that is postulated for untested individuals6, which redistributes 
savings from the diseased due to AIDS to the uninfected survivors. The positive effects of 
this redistributive insurance system have to be weighed against the negative utility effects of 
sub-optimal consumption choices if individuals are uncertain on being HIV infected or not. 
 
Diagnostic HIV testing during the second period of individuals’ life has, however, less 
ambiguous welfare effects. A higher frequency of testing during old age makes it more likely 
that an individual will be able to get the right medical consumption if he contracted the virus. 
This prospect makes it attractive to save more in order to be better prepared for possible 
higher medical consumption in the future. Due to more frequent future testing these savings 
have become more efficient in terms of individual utility, and so young individuals’ expected 
lifetime utility will rise.   
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic 
setup of the model. Section 5.3 derives the course of savings over the four distinguished 
stages of the epidemic. Section 5.4 evaluates the marginal effects of diagnostic testing for HIV 
status knowledge on social welfare and Section 5.5 concludes. 
 
5.2 Model 
This section describes the model assumptions and briefly defines the four stages of 
the epidemic. After presenting the broad outline of the model, the section turns to the 
specification issues. 
 
5.2.1  Outline of the model 
Consider a country where a large group of agents of the same age (their number 
normalized to one) optimizes consumption over two periods. In each period, agents face a 
certain probability, ,  ( 1,  2)actt tα = , of contracting HIV, which might be different from their 
perceived probability of contracting the virus, α t  and a probability tβ  of getting tested for 
                                                 
6 Tested individuals are assumed not to participate. HIV positive individuals will not be alive in the period when 
the insurance pays out. HIV negative tested individuals are assumed to survive the first period and would thus 
got paid with certainty. 
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HIV. Assume that the perceived HIV contamination “risk” in each period, tα , and the 
probability of knowing one’s status in that period, tβ , is equal for all agents
7. Agents die at 
the end of the period in which they are infected. Four different stages in the evolution of the 
epidemic are distinguished. 
 
Stage 0 
This is the benchmark case, in which HIV does not exist. Individuals optimize a simple 
logarithmic lifetime utility function containing regular and medical consumption. They save to 
smooth consumption over their lifetime.  
 
Stage 1 
In this stage, HIV starts to spread but the virus is yet unknown and therefore HIV testing 
cannot take place. A small fraction of the young population, 1 0
actα > , is infected without this 
being perceived by the population, i.e. 1 0α = . In this initial phase of the disease, agents are 
not aware of their infection, and so they keep on behaving as in stage 0. Individual saving 
behavior is therefore not influenced, but after the first period of life, the savings of the 




In stage 2, HIV is diagnosed for the first time. Although the prevalence rate 1
actα  is still very 
small, the population has become aware of the contamination risk that they face, although not 
fully. In particular, agents underestimate the probability of contracting HIV and assume that 
the probability of infection when old is negligible, i.e. 1 1 2 0
actα α α> > ≈ .8 Infected agents 
learn about their status only after a diagnostic HIV test.9 Starting in this phase, testing takes 
place: a fraction 1β  of all young individuals is randomly selected to be tested. As a result, a 
fraction 1 1
actβ α  of the young individuals will become aware of its positive status. On the other 
hand, a fraction 1 1(1 )
actβ α−  receives a negative test and is thus certain to reach the second 
                                                 
7 Moreover it is assumed that 1 2 1 2, , ,  and α α β β  are independent. Although these are strong assumptions, they 
are necessary to keep the model as simple as possible. 
8 Annex 5.2 includes the age profile of infection. The figure shows that infection on average takes place among 
young adults. 
9 Although there is some controversy on the validity of HIV testing, in this dissertation it is assumed that a 
diagnostic HIV test exist and that it is 100% accurate in diagnosing HIV. 
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period.10 In this phase of the disease, where HIV becomes visible in society, individual savings 
are negatively affected in the following two ways. First, the fraction 1 1
actβ α of young 
individuals who know they are infected will no longer save.11 Second, those young agents who 
are not tested, perceive to have a lower life expectancy as they now expect to have a lower 
probability (i.e. 11 α−  instead of 1) of reaching the second period.
12 As a result, their savings 
will decrease.  
 
Stage 3 and 4 
In stage 3, HIV develops into a serious epidemic. Agents who have been tested negative or 
who have not been tested at all in the first period, take account of the higher probability of 
being infected in the second period, i.e. 2 0α > . In particular, if agents in the second period 
get a positive test result, they will want to buy more medical consumption to fight the 
consequences of the disease. Therefore, the higher-perceived value of 2α  will engender 
higher savings by the agents in this group. On the other hand, as the group of positive-tested 
individuals in the first period increases as well due to the spread of the disease, the group who 
does not save at all increases in size. In stage 3, the former effect on savings dominates the 
latter effect, i.e. aggregate savings increase. Stage 4 is defined by the property that the effect of 
the decrease in savings of the HIV positive agents in period 1 dominates the effect of the 
increase in savings by the individuals who have a chance of reaching the second period. It is 
assumed that in stages 3 and 4 perceived and actual contamination rates converge, i.e. 
1 1
actα α→  and  2 2α α→
act . 
 
5.2.2  Specification of the model  
Expected utility of a young individual who lives in a phase j of the epidemic depends 
on whether he is tested or not, and if tested, on the outcome of the test. The utility of an 
individual tested HIV positive is:  
 1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) ln lnξ μ= + +
j j j j j
i iu c m c m z  (5.1) 
    
where c (m) represents regular (medical) consumption with prices equal to 1 and mp  
respectively. ξ  and μ  are preference parameters for regular and medical consumption 
                                                 
10 For simplicity, abstract from other sources of mortality in the first period of life.  
11 Individuals that are infected in the first period are assumed not to survive to the next period. 
12 The model assumes that irrespectively of lifestyle, individuals have an equal probability tα of being infected. 
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respectively. The subscript on these parameters indicates that the utility of both regular and 
medical consumption depends on the health position of the individual. In particular, if the 
individual is HIV infected, indicated by i, he derives less utility from regular consumption 
than if he is healthy, indicated by h, but more utility from medical consumption, i.e. ih ξξ >  
and h iμ μ< . Consequently, if agents get a positive test, they will substitute medical 
consumption for regular consumption. A negative constant z1 is added to indicate that the 
positive-tested individual suffers from knowing to die prematurely and/or being stigmatized.13 
Expected utility of a negative-tested individual is: 
 
 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2( , , , ) ln ln ( , )
j j j j j j j j j j
h hu c c m m c m u c mξ μ δ= + +  (5.2) 
 
where 0δ >  is the discount factor and 2 2 2( , )
j j ju c m  stands for the expected second-period 
utility. Untested individuals in a certain period can be HIV-positive nevertheless. However, 
the model implicitly assumes that these individuals do not have access to the kind of medical 
consumption that is suited for HIV patients. Thus, even if untested individuals learn to have 
been infected, they will not be able to consume more medical care in that period. This 
assumption is built into the model directly since untested but infected individual has to takes 
hμ  as the relevant parameter in the utility function ex ante, although ex post iμ  determines 




1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
( , , , ) ln ln (1 ) ( , )
 ( , ) ( ln ln ) (1 )( ln ln )
(1 )( ln ln )
j j j j j j j j j j
h
j j j j j j j
i i i h
j j
h h
u c c m m c m u c m
u c m c m z c m
c m
ξ μ α δ
α β ξ μ α β ξ μ
α ξ μ
= + + −




where (1 )t t i t hξ α ξ α ξ≡ + − . The model assumes that untested individuals in the first period 
take part in a mutual insurance system in which the savings of those who decease in the 
period are distributed among the untested survivors.   
 
                                                 
13 Note, however, that z1 can be a positive constant as well. A participant of the survey in South Africa, for 
instance, said: “I have more future now after being tested HIV positive”, when he was explaining his increased positive 
attitude towards live. 
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Agents only earn an income w in the first period and earn interest rate r on their savings. 
Given this and the specified utility function, the individual and aggregate savings for all 
distinguished stages of the spread of the virus can be derived. 
 
5.3 The evolution of savings  
Stage 0: 0; 0,  1, 2actj j j jα α β= = = =  








where aggregate savings, 0S , equals individual savings, 0s , as the size of a generation has 
been normalized to one.  
 
Stage I: 1 1 2 20; 0; 0,  1,  2
act act
j jα α α α β> = = = = =  
HIV unexpectedly shows up. However, as the disease cannot be diagnosed yet, saving 
behavior does not change, the only difference with stage 0 being that the total savings of the 
deceased, Iact s1α , will be distributed among the 1(1 )
actα− survivors.  
 
Stage II: 1 1 2 1 20; 0; 0
actα α α β β> > ≈ > =  
In this period, HIV tests for young individuals become available, and a percentage 1β  of 
young individuals will be tested. Three different groups become relevant for saving behavior. 
First, a fraction act11αβ  of agents, to be indicated by group G1, who have been tested 
positive, will not save, as in they will not enter the second period. Second, a fraction 
1 1(1 )
actβ α− , group G2, is sure to reach the second period and will save 
1
( 2)II ws G δ
δ+
= . 
Third, the 11 β−  untested agents, indicated as groups G3 and G4, perceive to have a chance 
of 11 α−  of reaching the second period. Groups G3 and G4 consist of agents that, 
respectively, do carry and do not carry the virus, but are unaware of their HIV status. Only ex 
post, can the untested individuals be allocated between groups G3 and G4. Consequently, 
they have equal ex ante optimal savings. Maximizing expected utility for the groups G3 and 
G4 yields their individual savings:14 
                                                 
14 Note that the model assumes an equal discount factor for groups 2, 3 and 4. This assumption is supported by 
the empirical evidence of the survey conducted among students in South Africa (see Appendix A for a detailed 
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Aggregating over the groups gives the total savings in stage II of the epidemic: 
 
 11 1 1
1
(1 )(1 ) (1 )
1 1 (1 )
II actS w wδ δ αβ α β
δ δ α
−




As can be readily seen from Equation (5.4) and (5.6), it holds that 0IIS S< . 
 
Stage III: 1 1 2 0, 0,  1,  2
act
j jα α α β≥ ≥ > > =  
This third phase distinguishes itself from stage II by the fact that young individuals have 
become aware of the HIV contamination risk they face in both periods of their life. Individuals 
know that in period 2 they can be tested with a probability 2β  and they understand that a 
positive HIV status brings along a decline in utility of regular consumption and that medical 
treatment improves the way of life. This will affect savings of the groups distinguished above.  
 
The young agents that are tested HIV positive (group G1), behave the same as in stage 2 and 
thus will not save. The agents in group G2, who are sure to reach the second period, and the 
untested agents in group G3 and G4, who perceive to have a probability of 11 α−  of reaching 
the second period, do change their savings behavior. Since they are now aware of the 
possibility to get positively tested in the second period of their life, they will save more to be 
able to better cope with the consequences of HIV infection. These ‘anticipatory’ savings will 
initially be larger than the decrease in savings due to the risk of not reaching the second 
period.  
 
For the 1 1(1 )










                                                                                                                                                   
description of the study). Based on the estimations of the corrected discount rates as described in Chapter 7, the 
discount rates do not statistically differ between those reported to be tested HIV negative and those that report 
to have never been tested (p-value=0.28).  
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where )()( 222 hihihh μμαβξξαμξχ −+−++≡ . Comparing the savings of group G2 in 
stage II and stage III, it can easily be seen that savings is higher in stage III, i.e. 
( 2) ( 2)III IIs G s G>  if and only if the following condition holds 
 
 2( ) 0i h i hξ ξ β μ μ− + − >  (5.8) 
 
Condition (5.8) implies that the relative decrease in utility of regular consumption when HIV 
infected is smaller than the relative increase in utility of medical consumption weighted for 
the fact that individuals can also make use of medical consumption. Thus, in a well 
established epidemic savings of HIV negative tested individuals (G2) are enhanced, whenever 
medical consumption is relatively important compared to regular consumption in case tested 
HIV positive, under the condition that testing in the second period takes place at a certain 
level. The further analyses assume that this condition holds. 
 
Agents that are not tested in the first period (group G3 and G4), save for the second period 








s G G wα δχ






Comparing ( 3; 4)IIIs G G  with ( 3; 4)IIs G G  in Equation (5.5) shows that stage III will generate 
more savings for groups G3 and G4 than stage 2. Consequently, aggregate savings in stage 
III, specified in Equation (5.10) is higher than in stage II. 
 
 1 1 1(1 ) ( 2) (1 ) ( 3; 4)
III act III IIIS s G s G Gβ α β= − + −  (5.10) 
 
Aggregate savings in stage III may even rise to a level higher than in the situation without 
HIV, i.e. .0SS III >  Whether this inequality actually holds depends on the parameters of the 
model, the degree of testing in the first period, 1β , being one of the critical parameters. In 
general, for any given probability of first-period testing, i.e., 10 1β≤ ≤ , 
0SS III >  will hold if 
2 1( )fα β≥ . If testing increases, the number of agents who know for sure not to survive the 
first period will increase for a given first-period mortality rate. Thus, the best condition for an 
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increase in savings above the benchmark level is when 1 0β = . Savings is least likely to 
increase with 1 1β = , when all young individuals know their HIV status. Considering both 
cases in turn provides an idea when savings will increase. If 1 0β =  it is straightforward to 






i h i h
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 (5.11) 
 
Obviously, condition (5.11) can only hold if the perceived mortality rate in the first period 
1α is small enough.  
 
The other extreme case is where 1 1β = , i.e. where complete testing takes place in the first 
period. This takes away all uncertainty on the probability of dying in the first period, and only 
those who are sure to survive the first period will keep on saving. In this case, savings will 
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According to Equations (5.11) and (5.12) savings rise to a level above the benchmark level if 
the perceived and actual first-period mortality rates are small enough, compared to the 
second-period contamination rate. This makes intuitive sense as the spread of the virus 
among young individuals decreases their savings, while the expected spread of the virus 
among old individuals increases savings. So, for a given testing rate 1β  and with a relatively 
small-perceived infection rate 1α compared to 2α , aggregate savings may increase.  
 
Stage IV 
If the actual number of HIV-infected individuals, 1
actα , keeps rising, the number of individuals 
in group G2 will decline. Although individual savings will remain unchanged, the group 
composition changes, in this case implying that aggregate savings will eventually decrease. 
Moreover, notice from Equation (5.9) that with an increase in the perceived contamination 
rate when young, 1α , individual savings of untested individuals will decrease as well. In fact, if 
both 1α and 2α  increase by the same proportion, then it is easy to see from Equation (5.9) 
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that the savings-decreasing effect of the current rate 1α  will eventually dominate the savings-
increasing effect. In stage IV, prevalence rates are at such levels that the savings-decrease 
effect dominates. 
 
Figure 5.2 gives an example of the development of savings over the evolution of HIV15. The 
solid line represents the four different stages of the epidemic as specified by the model above. 
The horizontal part of the line shows the situation without HIV, where agents save a certain 
amount for future consumption (stage 0). Then stage I arrives where the disease overtakes 
some agents. Since the presence of the disease is still unknown, the infected agents are not 
aware of their illness. As a result, they die prematurely, making it impossible for them to 
optimally use their lifetime resources. Their redundant or unused savings for the second 
period are transferred to the survivors. In stage II, testing makes it possible for HIV infected 
agents to know they will not survive the first period. This enables them to optimize lifetime 
utility by spending all income in the first period. The fall in aggregate savings represents the 
decline in savings of this particular group of agents. Next, a stage sets in where agents become 
(gradually) aware of the pervasiveness of the possibility of infection over their whole life. As a 
result, those who have a chance of surviving the first period will save more to take account of 
the additional costs in case of being contaminated by the virus in the second period of their 
life. In this stage, the savings-decreasing effect of higher young-age mortality (i.e. an increase 
in actual, 1
actα , and expected mortality, 1α  is counteracted by the savings-increasing effect of 
higher expected old-age mortality, 2α , so that savings increase above the benchmark level. In 
the figure, this occurs for values of 10.14 0.32
actα≤ ≤ . If the spread of HIV continues and 
manifests itself via an increase of the prevalence rates in both periods, the savings-decreasing 
effect of young-age mortality will be dominant and savings start to decrease. In Figure 5.2, the 
decline of savings (compared to the benchmark) sets in after the HIV prevalence rate reaches 
the value of 32%. 
                                                 
15 The drawing in Figure 5.2 assumes that populations gradually become aware of the HIV contamination risk 
they face. Agents first underestimate the actual HIV contamination risk, but when the disease spreads, actual and 
perceived HIV contamination risks converge. The calculations in Figure 2 assumed this convergence process 
over time to be specified by 1 1 1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( 1)
actt t tα λα λ α= + − − . For 2α , an analogous specification holds.  
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Figure 5.2: The different stages of aggregate  
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5.4. The social-welfare effects of testing for HIV 
One of the important policy decisions in countries affected by HIV is the frequency 
of testing, in the model indicated by 1β  for young and by 2β  for old agents, respectively. The 
question addressed here is whether intensifying testing directly increases social welfare. That 
is, the analysis abstracts from the (possible) long-run effect of testing on the HIV prevalence 
rate and analyzes the effect of HIV testing on social welfare, using ex post individual utility as 
the relevant criterion.  
 
Assume that implementing a test does not involve any cost. Testing when young resolves the 
uncertainty on the true values of the parameters in the utility function, making it possible to 
purchase the utility-maximizing ratio of regular and medical consumption. When tested 
positive, individuals will no longer have to save for an uncertain future, as they know for sure 
to die young, i.e. before the second period. However, if the utility function contains a ‘fear-of-
dying’ or ‘stigma’ parameter, agents experience a negative utility shock if they are actually 
diagnosed HIV positive and realize that they will die prematurely. On the other hand, if 
individuals get a negative test result they will save more, as they will reach the second period 
with certainty. These individuals however, can no longer take part in the longevity insurance 
scheme, which means that, after surviving the first period, they will no longer get a transfer 
payment from their deceased contemporaries. 
 
Increasing the frequency of testing during older age does not take away the uncertainty of 
later infection at the time when the saving decision is made. It does increase, however, the 
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probability that an individual can consume the right amount of medical consumption when he 
turns out to be infected later in life. The prospect of utility maximizing consumption later in 
life incites individuals to save more. In this case, this appears to be welfare increasing.  
 
5.4.1  Testing young individuals ( 1β ) 
We use ex post individual utility as the criterion to evaluate the effects of testing on 
social welfare. Individuals make their saving decisions at the beginning of the first period of 
life, however. Social welfare is then defined by: 
 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) [ ( 1) (1 ) ( 2)] (1 )[ ( 3) (1 ) ( 4)]
act act act actW U G U G U G U Gβ β β α α β α α= + − + − + −  (5.13) 
 
In Equation (5.13), ( ), ( 1,.., 4)U Gi i =  indicates ex post utility of young agents distinguished by 
both their HIV status and their test status in the first period. In particular, as noted before, 
the groups 1G  and 2G  are composed of the individuals who have been tested HIV positive 
and negative, respectively. The groups 3G  and 4G  consist of the individuals who have not 
been tested in the first period. In the first period, they may turn out be HIV infected, 3G , or 
to be healthy, 4G . The marginal effect of first-period testing on social welfare obviously 
depends on the utility difference between tested and untested individuals, as specified in 
Equation (5.14): 
 
 ( ) ( )1 2 1 1
1
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It is straightforward to derive that for those infected with HIV the utility difference 
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The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (5.15) is the utility gain from lower savings. 
The term in brackets represents the utility gain due to consuming the optimal proportion of 
regular and medical consumption. The last term is the “stigma” parameter. Obviously, for the 
Chapter 5: HIV Contamination Risk, Savings and the Welfare Effects of Diagnostic Testing   
 
80 
agents with a positive HIV-status testing is only utility improving, i.e. ( 1) ( 3) 0,U G U G− >  if 
the “stigma” parameter is small enough. In that case, the utility improving effects of getting 
the appropriate medical consumption and the elimination of excess savings dominate the 
stigma effect. 
 
Tested negatively in the first period, resolves the uncertainty in this period, but not in the 
second. Again, the utility improving effect of the revelation of their status is that they are able 
to purchase the optimal ratio of regular and medical consumption goods (the term in brackets 
in Equation (5.16)). On the other hand, if their status is revealed, they can no longer take part 
in the insurance system that insures them against longevity risk. As a result, the return on 





( 2)( 2) ( 4) ( ) ln
( 3; 4)
( 2)[ ( ) (1 ) ( )]ln
( 4)
ln ( ) ln
h h
act act




w s GU G U G




α δ ξ μ α δ ξ μ
ξ ξ μξ ξ μ
ξ ξ μ
−
− = + +
−
+ + − + +
⎡ ⎤+
+ +⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
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where )4(Gs  represents the savings of individuals from group ,4G including the transfer 











The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (5.16) is negative due to the fact that 
savings will be higher if the individuals are certain to reach the second period, i.e. 
( 2) ( 3; 4)s G s G G> . The next term represents the effect on disposable income in the second 
period, in case the individual is infected or not infected, respectively. Strikingly, although 
untested individuals save less than individuals tested HIV negative, if they survive, their 
disposable income in the second period is higher, i.e. ( 4) ( 2)s G s G> . This is due to the 
transfers they receive from the group of deceased individuals, 3G .  
 
In both periods, individuals tested HIV negative thus appear to have a lower disposable 
income compared to individuals who turn out to be HIV negative without having been tested. 
Obviously the last term, representing the utility effect of getting the ‘right’ consumption ratio 
HIV/AIDS, Risk and Intertemporal Choice     
 
 81
when tested HIV negative, is positive again. So, for the group if HIV-negative individuals, 
testing generates a positive ex post welfare effect if this consumption-ratio effect is larger than 
the disposable income effect.  
 
Notice that when the virus is not widespread yet, i.e. when 1
actα is small, more testing might 
turn out to produce a negative welfare effect, due to the decrease in disposable income of 
tested individuals. If the virus spreads, the first utility difference in Equation (5.16) will 
become relatively more important and the welfare gains of testing then depends largely on the 
relative strength of the fear-of-dying parameter. 
 
5.4.2  Testing old individuals ( 2β ) 
Consider now a change of testing frequency in period 2. Changing the frequency of 
testing will cause all individuals who were tested HIV negative in the first period, and those 
who were not tested at all, to increase their savings. For these groups the increase in savings is 
motivated by the expected increase in medical consumption when tested HIV positive in the 
second period of life. A second effect of future testing is the increased probability of being 
able to consume the right proportion of regular and medical consumption. Notice, however, 
that ex post group 3G  will not enjoy this positive effect of testing because they die 
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where the terms in brackets are again the utility effects of being able to consume the optimal 
ratio of goods after having received a positive or a negative test, respectively. Obviously, these 
terms are positive. The first term indicates the effect of the additional savings on utility for 
group 2G . It can be derived that 2( 2)/ 0S G β∂ ∂ >  under the assumption that medical 
consumption generates higher utility if individuals are HIV infected, i.e., μ μ− > 0.i h  Given 
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this result, from the first term on the right-hand side of Equation (5.17) it can be inferred that 
the additional savings engendered by a higher testing frequency 2β  leads to a gain in ex-post 
utility. Apparently, by saving more and having more disposable income for financing the 
higher expected medical consumption, individual utility increase. The only negative effect is 
the negative utility shock 2 2zα δ−  produced by the information of being infected, i.e., the 
stigma effect. Equation (5.18) specifies the ex-post social-welfare effects of a change in 2β  for 
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Not surprisingly the effects that can be distinguished are qualitatively the same as with group 
2G , i.e. a savings effect (the first term), a consumption effect (the second and third term) and 
a direct negative utility shock (the last term). It is fairly easy to prove that the effect of higher 
savings on utility is again positive. Moreover, the two terms in Equation (5.18) representing 
the ability to purchase the correct consumption ratio represent a positive effect as well. Thus, 
also for this group testing implies a trade-off between the ‘stigma’ and the opportunity of 
optimal consumption according to their medical condition.  
 
Finally, untested individuals who do not survive the first period, i.e. group 3G , will save more 
if the frequency of future testing increases. However, they will not experience the higher 
utility of consumption in the second period. Their increased savings fall due to the surviving 
members of the untested group, i.e., group .4G  Therefore, intensifying testing will ex post 
have a negative effect on utility for group 3G . Notice, however, that this group diminishes in 
size if the frequency of testing in the first period rises.  
 




This chapter employed a two-period lifetime optimization model to explain saving by 
a four-stage non-monotonic process partly supporting Bonnel’s (2000) conjecture that the 
HIV affects saving differently in the various stages of the epidemic. The chapter in particular 
considered two issues: First, how aggregate private household saving reacts to changes in 
HIV incidence in the specified four stages of the epidemic. Second, the chapter analyzed the 
social-welfare effects of diagnostic testing for HIV. The period of life in which HIV strikes, 
appears to be an important determinant for both issues.  
 
Regarding saving, if individuals perceive that HIV might predominantly affect them at young 
ages, they will lower their savings for old age since their expected lifetime is shortened. 
However, if individuals start taking into account the fact that HIV might also strike them at 
an older age, they will start to save more in order to be able to purchase the appropriate 
medical treatment later in life. If the HIV contamination rate among the young is not too 
large, the ‘anticipatory-savings effect’ will be the dominant force, and lead to an increase in 
aggregate savings. Aggregate savings might even temporarily rise to a level that is above the 
benchmark case level without HIV. If this occurs, the general-equilibrium effects described by 
Young (2005), which leads to higher wages and higher welfare for future generations, can be 
strengthened if the mortality rate among the young is limited. If the spread of HIV among the 
young intensifies, the effect of decreasing old-age savings dominates the HIV anticipatory-
saving effect in the end. Then the ‘gift of the dying’ (in the words of Young, 2005) no longer 
consists of a larger capital stock associated with higher savings, but an increasing scarcity of 
labor.  
 
Regarding the welfare effects of intensifying HIV testing, the results largely depend on 
whether testing takes place when individuals are young or old. When individuals are young, 
testing resolves (at least partly) the uncertainty of surviving the first period of life. For those 
individuals tested positive, there is no longer a need to save for old-age consumption. These 
individuals are instead able to focus on getting the right medical treatment and thus reallocate 
their disposable income from non-medical to medical consumption. This is obviously utility 
enhancing whenever the disutility of knowing to die prematurely is relatively low. For HIV 
negative individuals, the effects of more frequent testing are not that clear cut. When tested 
negative, they can benefit from consuming the correct mix of regular and medical 
consumption in the first period. However, total consumption in this period will be lower as 
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they are certain to survive the first period and therefore save more for old age. Moreover, the 
total return on their savings, and therefore their old-age income, is lower than for untested 
individuals, because they cannot participate in the insurance scheme. The story is different, 
however, when the frequency of testing during old age is at hand. In that case, for all 
survivors to the second period the uncertainty on their HIV status in the second period will 
be diminished. As a result, higher savings are now more ‘efficient’ in the sense that these 
higher savings can be allocated to the optimal mix of medical and regular consumption.  
 
In conclusion, there is a striking analogy between the effects of HIV on savings and the 
welfare effects of testing for HIV. In both cases, the effects are negative during young age: 
HIV decreases savings and testing does not necessarily increase welfare, as tested individuals 
cannot share in the ‘gift of the dying’ through a longevity insurance scheme. If individuals 
perceive a higher probability of HIV contraction later in life, savings may increase and the 
savings will rise even more if the frequency of testing during old age increases. The higher 
savings then imply a welfare improvement.   
 




Table A5.1: Statistical model of the change in domestic saving rate. 
  Period: 1990-1996 (Bonnel (2000)) 
 Period: 1990-2004 
 Estimate t-statistics Estimate t-statistics
Constant 0.46 0.1 -1.78 -0.26 
Gross domestic savings (1990) -0.28** -2.8 -0.49* -4.57 
Secondary enrolment rate (1990) -0.10** -2.0 -0.02 -0.30 
Growth rate of GDP per capita (1980-90) 86.60** 2.4 168.53*** 3.43 
Log of number of phones (1994) 2.49* 1.8 1.22 1.16 
Log of HIV prevalence rate (1997) -1.18 -1.5 0.56 0.59 
Log of HIV prevalence rate squared -0.61** -2.6 0.19 0.43 
Dummy variable for Southern Africa 10.20** 2.2 1.37 0.19 




Figure A5.1: Estimated number of newly infected persons 






















































Source: Actuarial Society South Africa, 2007 
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6.1  Introduction 
 Part II of this thesis showed that both perceptions of HIV contamination risk and 
HIV status influence saving behavior. This poses the question what the characteristics are of 
individuals that are aware of the high HIV contraction risk. If these individual characteristics 
would mitigate saving behavior, this would limit the effect of the HIV anticipatory saving 
motive. 
 
Risk and time preferences do not only play a central role in major economic decisions, like the 
amount of savings, but may also influence behavior that directly or indirectly affects the 
probability of getting ill at a later point in time. For example, the rapid spread of HIV in 
Southern Africa is often attributed to the fact that people in the region live a more day-to-day 
life compared to people in Europe of North America, which may be reflected by higher time 
preferences. High risk and time preferences make the long-term costs of risky sexual behavior 
relatively low compared to the short-term benefits of sexual pleasure (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.4 for an analytical example). Moreover, people in developing countries face far more risks at 
relatively short time horizons, such as armed conflicts, natural disasters etc., in the event of 
which they will be confronted with large losses (De Weerdt & Dercon, 2006). Living in these 
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risky environments may induce people to be less precautious than people living in less risky 
environments.  
 
Information on risk and time preferences is of obvious value for policy, theory and empirical 
analysis generally. Policy application includes cost-benefit analysis of government programs, 
which often require welfare calculations to be made over uncertain projects whose impacts 
are spread over time. Since the beginning of the epidemic, life expectancy has fallen 
dramatically in the countries hardest hit.1 In South Africa, for example, life expectancy has 
fallen with almost 20 years in the past 20 years (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). This significant 
change in mortality risk over this period may have affected individual risk attitudes and 
discount rates. These changes in risk and time preferences should be taken into account in 
welfare assessments of public policy reform. 
 
This chapter estimates individual risk and time preferences in South Africa in order to test 
whether there are identifiable segments of the population, where individual risk and time 
preferences vary with the perceived risk of getting infected with HIV. It also analyzes whether 
sexual behavior is related to individual life expectancy and individual risk and time 
preferences. The analysis uses survey questions and experimental data collected among 
students in South Africa.2 The experimental design closely follows Harrison et al. (2005a) to 
elicit both risk and time preferences from the same respondents. The experimental 
procedures build on the risk aversion experiments of Holt & Laury (2002) and the discount 
rate experiments of Coller & Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002). Multiple price lists 
are used to measure individual risk attitudes and discount rates for a sample of 213 university 
students recruited at two South African universities. This information is related to survey 
questions about socio-demographic, financial and health characteristics.  
 
A comparable study is Chesson et al. (2006) who associate individual discount rates with a 
range of sexual behaviors among a sample in the US. However, contrary to this study, they 
measure individual discount rates by offering subjects hypothetical rewards, instead of real 
monetary rewards. The subjects in this study, therefore, have a higher incentive to reveal their 
true preferences compared to subjects that are offered hypothetical rewards. Chesson et al. 
(2006) find that higher discount rates can be associated with risky sexual behavior. However, 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 2 for more details. 
2 The appendix contains a detailed description of the study.  
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they do not find significant differences in discount rates for individuals infected with HSV-23 
(a sexual transmittable disease). 
 
This chapter finds that subjects who perceive to have a high HIV contamination risk as well 
as HIV positive subjects appear to be less risk-averse (even risk-seeking), compared to other 
subjects. As one would expect, subjects perceiving to be highly at risk display higher discount 
rates compared to all other distinguished groups. Surprisingly, however, subjects who are HIV 
positive appear to display significantly lower discount rates. 
 
The next section describes the experimental design and Section 6.3 provides an overview of 
the experiments. Results from the experiments are discussed in Section 6.4 and conclusions 
are drawn in Section 6.5. 
 
6.2  Valuation tasks 
6.2.1  Risk aversion 
 This section employs a simple experimental measure for risk aversion called a multiple 
price list (MPL), which previously has been used by Holt & Laury (2002) and Harrison et al. 
(2005a). Each subject is presented with a choice between two lotteries, which are called A or 
B. Table 6.1 illustrates the basic payoff matrix presented to the subjects. The first row shows 
that lottery A offered a 10% chance of receiving 50 Rand and a 90% chance of receiving 40 
Rand. The expected value of this lottery, EVA, is shown in the fourth column as 41 Rand, 
although the EV columns were not presented to the subjects. For the exact table the reader is 
referred to Appendix D.1. Similarly, lottery B in the first row has chances of payoffs of 96.25 
Rand and 2.50 Rand, for an expected value (EVB) of 11.88 Rand. Thus the two lotteries have 
a relatively large difference in expected values, in this case 29.13 Rand. As one proceeds down 
the matrix, the expected value of both lotteries increases and the expected value of lottery B 
eventually exceeds the expected value of lottery A. 
 
The subject chooses A or B in each row, and one row is later selected at random for payout 
for that subject. The logic behind this test for risk aversion is that only risk-loving subjects 
would take lottery B in the first row, and only risk-averse subjects would take lottery A in the 
second last row. Arguably, the last row is simply a test that the subject understood the 
                                                 
3 Herpes Simplex Virus type 2. 
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instructions, and has no relevance for risk aversion at all. A risk-neutral subject should switch 
from choosing A to B when the EV of each lottery is about the same, so a risk-neutral subject 
would choose A for the first four rows and B thereafter. 
 
Table 6.1: Payoff table for risk aversion task. 
Decision   Option A   Option B Expected payoff Expected 
payoff 
Open CRRA 
interval if subject 
switches to  
option B
         Option A    Option B Difference   
1   R 50.00 if ball is 1-10   R 96.25 if ball is 1-10 R 41 R 11.88 29.13 -∞, -1.71 
    
R 40.00 if ball is 11-100   R   2.50 if ball is 11-100         
2   R 50.00 if ball is 1-20  R 96.25  if ball is 1-20 R 42 R 21.25 20.75 -1.71, -0.95 
    
R 40.00 if ball is 21-100  R   2.50  if ball is 21-100        
3   R 50.00 if ball is 1-30   R 96.25  if ball is 1-30 R 43 R 30..30 12.38 -0.95, -0.49 
    
R 40.00 if ball is 31-100   R   2.50  if ball is 31-100         
4   R 50.00 if ball is 1-40  R 96.25  if ball is 1-40 R 44 R 40.00 4.00 -0.49, -0.15 
    
R 40.00 if ball is 41-100  R   2.50  if ball is 41-100        
5   R 50.00 if ball is 1-50   R 96.25  if ball is 1-50 R 45 R 49.80 -4.38 -0.15, 0.14 
    
R 40.00 if ball is 51-100   R   2.50  if ball is 51-100         
6   R 50.00 if ball is 1-60  R 96.25  if ball is 1-60 R 46 R 58.75 -12.75 0.14, 0.41 
    
R 40.00 if ball is 61-100  R   2.50  if ball is 61-100        
7   R 50.00 if ball is 1-70   R 96.25  if ball is 1-70 R 47 R 68.13 -21.13 0.41, 0.68 
    
R 40.00 if ball is 71-100   R   2.50  if ball is 71-100         
8   R 50.00 if ball is 1-80  R 96.25  if ball is 1-80 R 48 R 77.50 -29.50 0.68, 0.97 
    
R 40.00 if ball is 81-100  R   2.50  if ball is 81-100        
9   R 50.00 if ball is 1-90   R 96.25  if ball is 1-90 R 49 R 86.88 -37.88 0.97, 1.37 
    
R 40.00 if ball is 91-100   R   2.50  if ball is 91-100         
10   R 50.00 if ball is 1-100  R 96.25  if ball is 1-100 R 50 R 96.25 -46.25 1.37, ∞ 
                  
 
These data may be analyzed using a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) characterization of 
utility, employing an interval regression model.4 The CRRA utility of each lottery prize M is 
                                                 
4 Holt & Laury (2002) use a two-parameter variant of the flexible Expo-Power (EP) utility function, originally 
developed by Saha (1993), which is more general than the CRRA characterization. The EP function nests CRRA 
and CARA. Holt & Laury (2002) estimate this function assuming that every subject has the same risk preference. 
They rely on a “noise parameter” to accommodate differences in risk choices across subjects, but they do not 
allow risk preferences to vary with socio-demographic characteristics as this in the later analysis of this chapter.   













 where γ  is the CRRA coefficient.5 The dependent variable in the 
interval regression model is the CRRA interval that subjects implicitly choose when they 
switch from lottery A to lottery B. For each row of Table 6.1 one can calculate the implied 
bounds on the CRRA coefficient, and these intervals are shown in the final column of this 
table. Thus, for example, a subject who made 5 safe choices and then switched to the risky 
alternatives would have revealed a CRRA interval between 0.14 and 0.41, a subject who made 
7 safe choices would have revealed a CRRA interval between 0.68 and 0.97, and so on.6 
 
The payoffs were in South African Rand (Rand) and the exchange rate was approximately 7.5 
Rand for one Euro at the time of the experiment, so the prizes range from approximately 0.3 
to 12.8 Euro.  
 
6.2.2 Individual discount rates 
 The basic experimental design for eliciting individual discount rates (IDRs) was 
introduced in Coller & Williams (1999) and expanded in Harrison et al. (2002). Subjects in the 
experiments were given payoff tables such as the one illustrated in Table 6.2, with 20 
symmetric intervals. In this example, Option A offered 172 Rand today and Option B paid 
172 + X Rand in six months, where the amount X increased down the table reflecting annual 
effective rates of return ranging from 3% to 60% on the principal of 172 Rand. The payoff 
tables provided the annual effective interest rates for each payment option, and the 
experimental instructions defined these terms by way of example.7 Subjects were asked to 
choose between Option A and B for each of the 20 payoff alternatives, and one decision row 
was selected at random to be paid out at the chosen date. If a risk-neutral subject prefers the 
                                                 
5 With this parameterization, γ =0 denotes risk-neutral behavior, γ >0 denotes risk-aversion, and γ <0 denotes 
risk-loving.  When γ =1, ( ) ln( )U M M= . 
6 Following Rabin (2000), there are some specifications of the expected utility theory for which a finding of risk 
aversion at these levels of income is incoherent. This argument does not apply if expected utility is defined over 
income earned during the experiment, rather than over terminal lifetime wealth. Such specifications are standard 
in experimental economics, as well as in large areas of economic theory such as the analysis of auctions and 
contracts. Cox & Sadiraj (2006) and Harrison et al. (2007, Appendix) review these methodological issues in 
further detail.  
7 Coller & Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002) provided annual and annual effective interest rates to help 
subjects compare lab and field investments opportunities. Subjects may make mistakes in converting dollar 
interest to an interest rate (or vice versa) for the purposes of comparison, and this treatment eliminates that type 
of error. The use of hypothetical or small payments is likely to exacerbate this problem because of the cognitive 
costs associated with the subject’s arbitrage problem; at lower stakes subjects are likely to expend less cognitive 
effort on getting the comparison right.  
Chapter 6: Perceived HIV-Contamination Risk, Risk Aversion and Time Preferences    
 
94 
172 Rand in one month then it can be inferred that his annual discount rate is higher than 
(x=100X/172)%; otherwise, it can be inferred that it is x% or less.8 9 
 
Table 6.2: Payoff table for discount rate task. 
 Decision Annual
Interest rate 
1 R 172 R 174.59 3% A B 
2 R 172 R 177.20 6% A B 
3 R 172 R 179.83 9% A B 
4 R 172 R 182.47 12% A B 
5 R 172 R 185.14 15% A B 
6 R 172 R 187.83 18% A B 
7 R 172 R 190.53 21% A B 
8 R 172 R 193.26 24% A B 
9 R 172 R 196.00 27% A B 
10 R 172 R 198.77 30% A B 
11 R 172 R 201.55 33% A B 
12 R 172 R 204.35 36% A B 
13 R 172 R 207.18 39% A B 
14 R 172 R 210.02 42% A B 
15 R 172 R 212.88 45% A B 
16 R 172 R 215.76 48% A B 
17 R 172 R 218.66 51% A B 
18 R 172 R 221.57 54% A B 
19 R 172 R 224.51 57% A B 
20 R 172 R 227.47 60% A B 
Option A Option B Choice 
To be paid today To be paid in 6 months (Circle A or B)
 
  
The multiple-horizon treatment from Harrison et al. (2002) is used to analyze hyperbolic 
discounting. Subjects are presented with six discount rate tasks, corresponding to six different 
time horizons: 1 month, 4 months, 6 months, 12 months, 18 months, and 24 months.10 
                                                 
8 It is assumed that the subject does not have access to perfect capital markets, as explained in Coller & Williams 
(1999, p.110) and Harrison et al. (2002, p.1607ff.). This assumption is plausible, but also subject to checks from 
responses to the financial questionnaire that each subject was asked to complete. For example, less than 10% of 
the subjects report to have a line of credit and among the subjects who report to have line of credit or a saving 
account, over 50% could not give an estimate of the interest rate they paid or received. Moreover, the standard 
deviations of the interest rates of those who could give an estimate are remarkably large. The effects of allowing 
for field borrowing and lending opportunities on the elicited discount rates for risk-neutral subjects are discussed 
by Coller & Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2004) discuss the general implications of allowing for extra-
experimental trading opportunities on inferences from experimental responses. 
9 If subjects prefer the early payment for any interest rate, then the discount rate (in annual terms) of these 
subjects is assumed to be 63%. 
10 The design mimics the format used by Holt & Laury (2002) in their risk-aversion experiments: in that case the 
rows reflected different probabilities of each prize, and in this case the rows reflect different annual effective 
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Subjects were randomly allocated across two treatments that vary the delay to the early 
income option. In one set of tasks subjects are provided one “instant income” option and one 
future income option.11 In another set of tasks subjects are provided two future income 
options. Following Harrison et al. (2002) a delay of one month is used for the early income 
option in all tasks. For example, subjects were offered 172 Rand in one month and 172 + X 
Rand in 6 months, so that the revealed discount rate is interpreted as applying to a time 
horizon of 5 months. This avoids the potential problem of the subject facing extra risk with 
the future income option, as compared to the “instant” income option. If the delayed option 
were to involve such additional risk, then the revealed discount rate would include a risk 
premium.  
  
Each subject responded to all six discount rate tasks, and one task and one row were chosen 
at random to be played out. Future payments to subjects were guaranteed by Tilburg 
University and made by postdated checks that they could be cashed in at any Standard Bank 
branch in South Africa. Finally, each subject was given a 10% chance to receive actual 
payment. Thus, each subject faced a 10% chance of receiving payment in the risk preference 
task as well as a 10% chance in the time preference task. 
 
6.3 The Experiments 
A total of 213 students were recruited from Northwest University (NWU) and 
University of Pretoria (PU), conducted in two rounds, and spread across twelve sessions. 
Eleven sessions were conducted at Northwest University with eight sessions at Mafikeng 
campus and three sessions at Potchefstroom campus. One session was conducted at the 
University of Pretoria. To be able to have a substantial group of HIV positive students in the 
sample, the first round of experiments (in November 2005) was supplemented with two 
additional sessions conducted in HIV support group meetings (in October 2006). There were 
however no significant differences between Mafikeng HIV positive students from the HIV 
support session and those not from the HIV support group session for the main variables 
considered (see for more details Appendix A.1). 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
rates of return. This similarity of format was exploit in the use of trainers in the RA task as a generic substitute 
for trainers in DR rate task. 
11 The “instant income” option was paid out by a check and could be cashed in at any time after the experiment. 
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Table 6.3: Sessions and number of subjects. 
 
 No. of Sessions No. of nonwhite SA No. of white SA Total no. 
of subjects
Campus All No-FED All No-FED All No-FED  
Mafikeng 8 3 147 63 - - 147 
Potchefstroom 3 1 24 3 32 14 56 
Pretoria 1 0 10 - - - 10 
Total no. of subjects   181 66 32 14 213 
 
Table 6.3 gives a summary of the sessions. Ages varied from 18 to 36 with an average of 22.6 
years, and 54% were male. The sample consisted of 15% white and 85% nonwhite students at 
the two universities. Each subject was paid 30 Rand for participating in the experiment and 
they earned on average of 65 Rand in the valuation tasks.  
 
The experiment was divided in five parts. Part I consisted of a questionnaire collecting 
subjects’ socio-demographic characteristics. Part VI consisted of another questionnaire, which 
elicits information on the subject’s financial market instruments, and probes the subject for 
information on their expectations about their future economic conditions and their own 
future financial position. The questionnaire in Part V asked questions on personal health 
including HIV status, sexual behavior and beliefs on HIV contamination risk exposure and 
personal life expectancy.12 All questionnaires are reproduced in Appendix E. Since the survey 
contains highly sensitive questions, much effort was put in safeguarding the respondents 
anonymity. For example, questionnaires were collected by letting the subjects put their forms 
in a closed box.  Appendix A.4 lists the measures taken. 
 
Part II consisted of the risk aversion (RA) task, and Part III presented subjects with the six 
discount rate (DR) tasks. The RA task incorporates the incentive structure as described 
earlier. After subjects completed the task, several random outcomes were generated in order 
to determine subject payments. For all subjects, one of the decision rows in that task was 
chosen. To maintain anonymity the random draws were performed without announcing to 
                                                 
12Asking questions on individual sexual behavior and HIV status is of course sensitive and one might expect that 
individuals are not willing to answers such questions. The non-response was, however, very limited. It should be 
noted here that before the experiments were conducted, approval had to be obtained from the so-called ethical 
committee of NWU. The original set-up planned to offer the students a HIV test afterwards, but unfortunately, 
no approval was given for this. The results are therefore only based on perceived HIV contamination risk and 
self-reported HIV-status. 
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which subjects it would apply. Another random draw determined whether subjects were to 
receive the high payment or the low payment. Finally, each individual rolled a 10-sided die 
with numbers from 0 up to 9. Any subject who drew a roll of “0” received actual payment 
according to that final outcome. All payments were made at the end of the experiment.  
 
A significant amount of time was spent training subjects on the task and the randomization 
procedures in Part II of the experiment. Subjects were given handouts containing examples of 
the MPL. The training exercise explained the logic of the MPL and a single trainer task was 
conducted in which payments were in the form of candies. Also in this training part, all 
random draws were generated and candies were given to each subject who received a roll of 
“0”. 
 
Finally, the six DR tasks, covering the six time horizons were conducted. Because these tasks 
also used the MPL format, with the same randomization procedures as the RA task, it was 
not necessary to repeat the training exercises. For a precise description of the experimental 
study, the interested reader is referred to Appendix A and C for the experimental script. 
 
6.4  Results 
This section describes differences in risk and time preferences in South Africa across 
different groups based on individual characteristics. In particular, it investigates whether HIV 
positive individuals and individuals who perceive themselves likely to get infected with HIV, 
have different risk attitudes and discount rates than other groups of the population. The 
section provides an overview of some of the preliminary results. All subjects made choices 
using the MPL instrument, with one RA task and six DR tasks creating a panel consisting of 7 
observations per subject.  
 
6.4.1 Risk aversion 
The measurement of risk aversion in this chapter is situated in the context of a 
financial decision (i.e. choosing between lotteries). However, it has been noted in the 
literature that the willingness to take risks can vary from domain to domain (see Dohmen, et 
al. 2005). So, if individuals are willing to take a lot of risks in the financial domain, it does not 
imply that they will take the same amount of risk in the health domain. Strikingly, however, 
this section shows that in the risk-aversion experiments those individuals who perceive to 
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have a high-perceived risk of getting HIV contaminated are also willing to choose the risky 
lottery relatively often. This gives some confidence that the measure of risk is not too context 
specific to generate conclusions in the area of sexual behavior. 
 
Table 6.4 provides the mean and standard deviation of the elicited CRRA coefficient, using 
the raw midpoint of the elicited interval. For this specification of CRRA, a value of 0 denotes 
risk-neutrality, negative values indicate risk-loving, and positive values indicate risk-aversion. 
Some subjects chose option B in the final row of the payoff table, which indicates that they 
did not understand the instructions, those 37 observations are therefore excluded from the 
risk attitude analysis. The sample based on 176 observations shows moderate risk aversion. 
The mean CRRA coefficient is 0.15 and the standard deviation is 0.63. This estimate is 
consistent with comparable estimates obtained in Colombia using college students and an 
MPL design, by Harrison et al. (2005c). However, the estimate is considerably lower than 
comparable estimates obtained in the US by Holt & Laury (2002) and Harrison et al. (2005d) 
and in Denmark by Harrison et al. (2005a).  
 
Subjects may switch back and forth, as they move down the rows of the MPL. It is quite 
possible that this switching behavior is the result of the subject being indifferent between the 
options. The implication here is that, in the absence of an explicit indifference option, one 
could simply apply a “fatter” interval to represent the subject’s risk preferences, defined by 
the first row that the subject switched at and the last row that at which the subject switched. 
A relatively high share of the subjects (60% of the 176 subjects) switched more than once as 
they moved down the rows of the MPL. The mean CRRA coefficient is 0.50 for the 
remaining 70 subjects that only switched once, and the standard deviation of the estimate is 
0.81.13 Appendix A.6 elaborates on this finding showing that multiple switching can be 
explained by indifferent behavior, although some part might also be explained by lack of 
skills. Offering an indifferent option would provide more insight in the switching behavior. 
Looking at individual characteristics, a mean CRRA coefficient of 0.56 among white students 
and 0.05 among nonwhite students is found, with a standard deviation of 0.68 and 0.59, 
respectively.  
 
                                                 
13 A risk-aversion coefficient of 0.50 for these subjects is quite similar to the coefficients found by Holt & Laury 
(2002) (γ =0.66, US) and Harrison et al. (2005b) (γ =0.54, average CRRA elicited in Ethiopia, Uganda, and 
India). However, taking into account all subjects the average CRRA coefficient is much lower than these 
previous studies. 
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Table 6.4: Elicited CRRA values (midpoint of raw responses from MPL). 
 Nonwhite White Single switch  All 




12       0.24 (0.48) 
132     0.04 (0.59) 
19      0.64 (0.78) 
13      0.44 (0.53) 
24       0.63 (0.70) 
46       0.42 (0.85) 
31       0.48 (0.70) 
145     0.07 (0.59) 
p-value14            0.16          0.23            0.42            0.00 
Use of condom (128 subjects report that they are sexually active) 
Regularly  106     0.02 (0.55) 6       0.51 (0.56) 30       0.36 (0.87) 112     0.04 (0.56) 
Not regularly  14      0.14 (0.63) 2       0.83 (0.77) 5         1.11 (0.47)  16      0.23 (0.66) 
p-value            0.90          0.51            0.04           0.53 
HIV status 
HIV positive 20      -0.20 (0.63) 0            (-) 6        -0.48     (-) 20      -0.20 (0.63) 
HIV negative 43       0.24 (0.66) 16      0.67 (0.81) 30       0.76 (0.73) 59       0.35 (0.71) 
Never tested 74       0.04 (0.52) 16      0.44 (0.52) 34       0.43 (0.72) 90       0.11 (0.54) 
P-value           0.26          0.15           0.00           0.02 
Perceived HIV contamination risk (HIV positive subjects are not included) 
No risk at all  32       0.12 (0.54) 10      0.54 (0.45) 21       0.47 (0.60) 42       0.22 (0.54) 
Small 55       0.17 (0.63) 20      0.49 (0.77) 35       0.63 (0.78) 75       0.25 (0.68) 
Moderate 19       0.10 (0.60) 2        1.37 (0.00) 6         0.99 (0.84) 21       0.22 (0.69) 
High 18     -0.17 (0.23) 0            (-) 2       -0.16 (0.22) 18      -0.17 (0.23) 
Not high 106     0.14 (0.59) 32      0.56 (0.68) 62       0.61 (0.73) 138     0.24 (0.63) 
p-value           0.02              (-)         -0.09          0.01 
Personal life expectancy, expected age of death 
<55  26      -0.07 (0.49) 0           (-) 4        -0.02 (1.28) 26      -0.07 (0.49) 
56-75 56      -0.05 (0.58) 20     0.62 (0.56) 32       0.41 (0.83) 76       0.13 (0.65) 
>75 62       0.20 (0.59) 12     0.45 (0.87) 34       0.63 (0.71)  74       0.24 (0.64)  
p-value           0.10             0.71             0.39           0.17 
All 144     0.05 (0.59) 32      0.56  (0.68) 70       0.50 (0.81) 176     0.15 (0.63) 
 
Although infection takes place through vertical transmission and through the health care 
system, most infections take place through risky sexual behavior. Therefore, one of the core 
questions of this chapter is whether there exists a relationship between sexual behavior and 
risk behavior. The elicited CRRA coefficients suggest that subjects who have not yet had their 
sexual debut are more risk-averse than subjects who already had experience with sexual 
intercourse. The mean CRRA coefficient is significantly different for these two groups and is 
0.48 for subjects with no sexual experience and 0.07 for those with some experience (p-
value=0.00). However, no significant relation for condom use was found. Most of the 
sexually active subjects use condoms regularly and they are on average less risk-averse than 
those subjects who do not use condoms on a regular basis. The mean CRRA coefficient is 
                                                 
14 Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. 
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0.04 for those subjects who regularly use condoms and it is 0.23 for the other sexually active 
subjects, with a standard deviation of 0.56 and 0.66, respectively. It seems that being sexually 
active is more a token of risk-seeking behavior than using condoms or not. However, the 
dichotomous characteristics of the group that does not use condoms and are sexually active 
individuals might explain this finding: it consists of both persons being faithful to one partner 
and of persons having multiple. Unfortunately, the data does not allow to tests for possible 
differences in risk attitude between these two groups. Furthermore, the results are based on 
self-reported sexual behavior, such that socially accepted answers might be given with respect 
to condom use.  
 
Ever having been pregnant, or ever having impregnated someone, is another indication of 
having had unprotected sex. These subjects might therefore be expected to be less risk-averse. 
On the other hand, children in developing countries are often seen as a type of income 
security, such that subjects that have ever been pregnant might display more risk-averse 
behavior as well. The first reasoning seems to apply only to male, but not to female subjects. 
Male subjects who have ever impregnated someone (n=13) have a risk-aversion coefficient of 
γ =–0.07, while males who have never made someone pregnant (n=82) have a significantly 
higher risk-aversion coefficient ( γ =0.16). For women, however, these figures are γ =0.19 and 
γ =0.16, respectively, which are not statistically significant different from each other. Female 
pregnancy thus seems to be less clearly related to risk behavior than male ‘pregnancy’. 
 
The next panel in the table shows the results for subjects grouped according to their self-
reported HIV status. Among the RA sample twenty subjects15 (11%) report to have been 
tested HIV positive16, while 59 subjects (34%) state to have been tested HIV negative. More 
than half of all subjects report never to have undergone a HIV test. Notice that no white 
subject reports to have been tested HIV positive. The subjects seem to be largely aware of the 
HIV contraction risk. For instance, from the answers to the survey questions it appears that 
more than half of the subjects estimate the contraction risk of HIV to be high for other 
                                                 
15 Although 23 subjects reported to be HIV positive, three of these were responding inconsistently on the risk-
aversion tasks and are thus excluded from the analyses. These 3 subjects are however, included in the discount 
rate analysis in the next section. 
16It might be mentioned that the found HIV prevalence rate of 11% is not too far from the rate found by others. 
For example, taking blood samples Pettifor et al. (2004) found a prevalence rate of 14% among the South 
African youth (20-24 years old). 
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students. Furthermore, 79% of the subjects ranked HIV/AIDS as number one cause of death 
in the North West Province. 
 
Another key question is whether HIV status is related to risk behavior. Subjects who have 
tested positive for HIV appear to be risk-loving with a mean CRRA coefficient of −0.20 and 
a standard deviation of 0.63.17 Subjects who prefer not to answer the question on HIV status, 
display similar risk-loving behavior (γ =–0.20). Subjects who have tested negative for HIV are 
risk-averse with a mean coefficient of 0.35 (standard deviation of 0.71), while those subjects 
who have never taken an HIV test have a mean CRRA coefficient of 0.11 with a standard 
deviation of 0.54. Comparing the CRRA of those who had ever got tested either positive or 
negative (0.21, N=79) and those who never got tested (0.11, N=90) shows that testing 
attracts a disproportionately large number of risk-averse HIV negative subjects.18 None of the 
white students have reported a positive test result and they seem to be less likely to take a 
HIV test compared to nonwhite students. The white students in the sample perceive the HIV 
contamination risk as small compared to the nonwhite students, which may explain why white 
students are more reluctant to take a HIV test. Risk attitudes appear to be correlated with 
perceived high risk exposure: the mean CRRA coefficient is −0.17 for those subjects who 
perceive the contamination risk as high, whereas this coefficient is 0.24 for the other subjects. 
However, no substantial difference in risk aversion is found between those perceiving to have 
no, small or moderate HIV contamination risk.  
 
Finally, the last panel in the Table 6.4 displays the relation between risk attitudes and personal 
life expectancy. Subjects with a relatively short expected lifetime are expected to be less risk-
averse than subjects with a longer expected lifetime. Indeed, subjects who believe they will die 
before the age of 55 are risk-loving with a mean CRRA coefficient of −0.07 and a standard 
deviation of 0.49, while subjects who believe they will die after the age of 75 have a mean 
coefficient of 0.24 (standard deviation of 0.64). If risk preferences are associated with sexual 
behavior, these results would suggest that subjects are aware of the lifetime reducing 
consequences of their behavior. 
                                                 
17 In the sample 23 subjects are tested HIV positive, which corresponds to a prevalence rate of 11%. Three of 
these subjects are excluded in Table 6.4 because they chose option A in the last row of the MPL for the RA task, 
but they are included in the analysis of time preferences. The health-related data is self-reported, but the HIV 
prevalence rate in the sample is similar to other studies based on blood samples (e.g. Pettifor et al. (2004)).  
18 Note that when considering only the first round of experiments, which consists of a random sample of tested 
and untested subjects, this difference is larger (CRRA tested=0.32) and significant at 10% level (p-value=0.06). 
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Overall, the raw midpoint estimates of the CRRA coefficient show a close association with 
being sexually active and the subjective perceived risk of getting or being HIV infected. 
Subjects who are sexually active, who perceive to have a high risk of HIV contamination and 
subjects who are HIV positive are on average significantly less risk-averse than other subjects. 
Moreover, subjects with these preferences seem to understand the lifetime reducing 
consequences of their associated behavior. 
 
Table 6.5: Statistical model of risk-aversion responses. 
Variable19 Estimate Standard Error 
Constant  0.15 0.68 
Experimenter  0.28 0.22 
Female -0.08 0.16 
Age -0.04 0.02 
White SA  0.76 0.24*** 
Urban  0.04 0.16 
Smoke -0.12 0.20 
Lived in informal dwelling -0.09 0.22 
Prob. Of obtaining loan is small  0.07 0.16 
Financially worse off than 2 years ago  0.09 0.18 
Tested HIV positive  0.09 0.28 
Tested HIV negative  0.31 0.17* 
Prefer not to reveal status -0.01 0.07 
Perceives HIV risk as high -0.54 0.24** 
No sexual intercourse  0.01 0.23 
No regular condom use  0.42 0.30 
Life expectancy < 55 years -0.01 0.24 
Ranks HIV nr1  0.10 0.28 
Ranks HIV nr2 -0.08 0.35 




Table 6.5 displays the interval regression model that explains the elicited CRRA values on 
several of the responses to the questionnaires. The statistical model supports the earlier 
finding on the raw data that subjects who have reported to be tested HIV negative are 
significantly more risk-averse compared to those subjects who have not been tested. The 
coefficient value is 0.31 with a p-value of 0.06. Subjects that perceive the risk of HIV 
contamination as high are less risk-averse, with a significant coefficient value of –0.54 (p-
                                                 
19 Appendix  B.1 contains a description of the variables. 
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value=0.03). The significant effect of sexual experience on the risk-aversion coefficient 
disappears, however. Finally, white students appear to be significantly more risk-averse than 
nonwhite students. The coefficient value is 0.76 and the significance level is less than 0.01.20  
 
 
6.4.2  Discount rate 
Table 6.6 reports the elicited discount rates across the six time horizons, using the 
mid-point of the interval selected.21 Again, in this task a remarkably large proportion of 
subjects (43%) switched more than once in the MPLs offered to the subjects, however this 
proportion is substantially less than in the RA tasks. The upper panel shows that the elicited 
mean individual discount rate (DR) is approximately constant across the six time horizons 
when the early reward is paid out immediately. The mean DR value is 46.23% for the 1-
month horizon with a standard deviation of 22.72%, while the mean DR value is 46.61% for 
the 24-months horizon with a standard deviation of 22.01%. However, the discount rate falls 
over time when looking at the responses from the treatment where both rewards are delayed 
in time. The middle panel of the table shows that the elicited mean DR value falls from 
39.81% for the 1-month horizon to a mean DR value of 34.05% for the 24-months horizon. 
Hence, the results suggest that individual discount rates are constant over time when the FED 
treatment is not applied, whereas it is falling over time when the FED treatment is applied. 
The data is pooled over the two treatments in the lower panel of the table, where a fall in the 
elicited discount rates can be observed as the time horizon increases.  
 
These elicited values of the individual discount rates are higher than those reported in earlier 
studies using similar experimental designs. For example, Harrison et al. (2002) find that the 
estimated mean DR is 28.1% using a representative sample of the adult Danish population 
and six time horizons that vary between 1-month and 36-months. The estimates are also 
somewhat higher than the estimated rates found in Coller & Williams (1999), who report a 
median of 17.7% using a sample of college students at the University of South Carolina and a 
time horizon of 60 days. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Tanner et al. (2005) find a similar result in their cross-cultural study, i.e. subjects from more collective culture 
groups and low-income locations display higher risk tolerance. 
21 The value of the discount rate is calculated by taking the midpoint of the interval in which the subject 
switches. If the subject switches more than once, then the coefficient is taken to be equal to the midpoint of the 
interval over which the subject is indifferent. 
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Table 6.6: Elicited discount rates and horizon (midpoint of raw responses from MPL). 
  2 month 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months
NFED 
N (valid) 79 78 80 78 79 79
Mean 46.23 47.61 46.83 46.01 47.02 46.61
Std 22.72 19.56 18.76 21.12 21.32 22.01
FED 
N (valid) 132 131 130 128 130 130
Mean 39.81 38.09 38.38 37.60 35.34 34.05
Std 21.27 19.45 20.00 20.11 20.43 19.89
Difference 6.42 9.52 8.45 8.41 11.68 12.56
p-value 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
All 
N (valid) 211 209 210 206 209 209
Missing 2 4 3 7 4 4
Mean 42.21 41.64 41.60 40.79 39.88 38.80
Std 22.00 19.99 19.92 20.87 21.46 21.55
 
The results show evidence for quasi-hyperbolic discounting for all six time horizons, i.e. 
subjects that completed the FED task have substantial lower discount rates than subjects that 
were assigned the nFED task. Note that this difference becomes larger when time horizons 
are lengthened, ranging from (6.4-12.6 percentage points).  Harrison et al. (2005a) discuss that 
this result might be explained by transaction costs or distrust towards the experimenters. 
Because in both tasks students were paid by issuing a postdated check the results are not 
likely generated by a difference in transaction costs. 
 
Table 6.7 provides the mean and standard deviation of the elicited discount rates across a few 
selected individual characteristics. The results in this table are based on the responses to the 
24-months time horizon and show that white students in the sample on average have a higher 
discount rate than nonwhite students. The mean elicited DR is 42.5% for white students (with 
a standard deviation of 21.2%) and 38.1% for nonwhite students (with a standard deviation of 
21.6%). The elicited discount rates also suggest that subjects who are sexually active are less 
patient in monetary matters than subjects who are not sexually active. The mean elicited DR 
is 35.4% for subjects with no sexual experience and 39.5% for those with some experience. 
Among the students with sexual experience the elicited DR is 37.6% for those subjects who 
regularly use condoms and 50.6% for those subjects who do not use condoms regularly. 
Hence, there appears to be a strong correlation between individual discount rates and the use 
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of contraceptives; subjects who regularly use condoms are considerably more patient than 
those subjects who do not seem to use contraceptives.  
 
Table 6.7: Elicited discount rates ( ρ ) and personal characteristics  
(midpoint of raw responses MPL). 
 Nonwhite White Single switch All 
 N          ρ (std) N        ρ (std) N          ρ (std) N         ρ (std) 
Experience with sexual intercourse 
No    16    31.0 (14.8) 19      39.1 (22.2) 24      38.4 (21.2) 35      35.4 (19.3) 
Yes 160    39.3 (22.4) 13      47.4 (19.3) 48      38.3 (25.4) 173    39.5 (22.0) 
p-value           0.22                 0.18          0.38           0.22 
Condom use (only for those who reported to be sexually active) 
Regularly  130     36.6 (21.3) 11     49.8 (18.7) 43      37.1 (26.6) 136     37.6 (21.7) 
Not regularly 15       52.8 (23.9)  2      34.4 (23.7)  5       45.9 (30.6) 17       50.6 (24.0) 
p-value            0.04          0.24            0.00           0.07 
HIV status 
HIV positive 23      25.7 (22.2) 0            (-) 6       43.9   (25.3) 23      25.7 (22.2) 
HIV negative 52      40.5 (19.9) 16      45.2 (20.8) 30     42.1   (24.1) 68      41.6 (20.0) 
Never tested 90      40.2 (22.2) 16      39.8 (21.9) 36     34.3   (23.7) 106    40.1 (22.1) 
Not stated 10      36.2 (18.1) 0           (-) 0                 (-) 10      36.2 (18.1) 
p-value           0.03           0.56          0.06           0.02 
Perception of HIV contamination risk
No risk at all  42       36.5 (21.2) 10      46.0 (25.5) 24       32.0 (25.0) 52      38.4 (22.2) 
Small 63       41.2 (20.2) 20      41.3 (19.3) 35       41.0 (22.4) 83      41.3 (19.9) 
Moderate 24       38.2 (23.1) 2        36.4 (26.7) 5         37.2 (28.0) 26      38.1 (22.8) 
High 24       44.6 (20.8) 0            (-) 2         54.5 (32.2) 24      44.6 (20.8) 
Not high 129     39.2 (21.1) 32      42.4 (21.2) 64       37.3 (23.8) 161    39.8  (21.6) 
P-value            0.45              (-)           0.03          0.26 
Life expectancy: expected age of dying
<55  28      36.3 (27.3) 0         (-) 3       29.5  (37.9) 28     36.3 (27.3) 
56-75 72      38.7 (19.5)  20      45.1 (21.6) 34     41.1  (22.5) 92     40.1 (20.0) 
>75 77      38.3 (21.5) 12       38.0 (20.6) 35     36.5  (24.6) 89     38.3 (21.3) 
p-value           0.25            0.21          0.40          0.14 
Total 177  38.13 (21.62) 32       42.5 (21.2) 120  40.51 (27.15) 209  38.80 (21.55) 
 
The next panel of the table shows that subjects who have tested positive for HIV have 
substantially lower discount rates than subjects who have tested negative. The mean DR is 
25.7% for subjects who have tested seropositive (with a standard deviation of 22.2%) and 
41.6% for subjects who have tested negative (with a standard deviation of 20.0%). 
Considering the positive relation found between the discount rate and sexual behavior, this is 
a remarkable result. Although there does not appear to be a strong correlation between 
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discount rates and perceived HIV contamination risk, students that perceive to be highly at 
risk do display a higher discount rate.  
 
Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of the revealed discount rates, disaggregated according to 
the subjects’ own perceived HIV contamination risk. It appears that among the subjects who 
consider to have no HIV contamination risk at all, a relatively large percentage has the lowest 
discount rate, while, on the other hand, among subjects who perceive to have a high 
contamination risk a relatively large percentage has the highest discount rate. Panel d. and e., 
however, show a strikingly different pattern: while almost 25% of the subjects who perceive 
to be highly exposed to contracting HIV choose the early payment option, this was 13% for 
the HIV positive subjects whereas 35% choose to wait as long as possible. If the group that 
perceives to be highly exposed to contracting HIV would also actually be more at risk than the 
other groups, these results suggest that a positive diagnosis influences the individual discount 
rate. Finally, no linear relation is found between the DR and personal life expectancy.24 
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f. Discount rates (prefers not to answer)
 
                                                 
24 Note that this result may be driven by the large group of HIV positive subjects in the “low-life expectancy” 
group. Excluding these subjects from the analysis does show a negative relation of the discount rate over life 
expectancy. 




Table 6.8 reports the results from a panel interval regression model, controlling for horizon 
and individual characteristics. These elicited rates are predictions for each individual from the 
estimated statistical model. This model uses panel data since each subject provided six interval 
responses, one for each horizon. The regression estimates show that all horizons have lower 
discount rates than the reference horizon, which is one month. The 24-months discount rate 
is approximately 4.9 percentage points lower than the 1-month discount rate, and the estimate 
has a p-value of 0.05. Also the FED treatment has a statistically significant effect on the 
elicited discount rate. The coefficient estimate is –7.24 with a p-value of less than 0.01, and 
this result confirms the observation from the raw data presented in Table 6.6.25  
 
Looking at the impact of HIV status on the elicited individual discount rate, subjects who 
have tested positive on average appear to have a significant lower discount rate than those 
subjects who have never been tested. Having tested positive reduces the average discount rate 
by 14.34 percentage points (p-value less than 0.01), while having tested negative increases the 
average discount rate by 4.20 (p-value=0.02). These results are contrary to the a priori beliefs 
about the likely effects individual discount rates have on HIV infection and vice versa: High 
risk and time preferences make the long-term costs of risky sexual behavior relatively low 
compared to the short-term benefits of sexual pleasure and the reduced lifetime would lower 
the value individuals place on future benefits. The data, however, show that people who are 
infected with HIV have longer time horizons in financial matters than subjects who are not 
infected with the disease. There may be a sample selection issue, since all the subjects are 
university students. Hence, the subjects have already expressed interest in making a long-term 
investment in education and that may spill over to the estimated discount rates. Therefore, a 
different result may be found if similar experiments are conducted with subjects that are more 
representative of the adult population in South Africa. The “HIV anticipatory savings motive” 
introduced in the first part of this thesis may provide another explanation for the relatively 
low discount rates of HIV positive students: HIV positive subjects may anticipate the 
additional spending or drop in income they will likely face at the time they become AIDS-
sick. In case they would not have enough resources to fully anticipate these expected illness 
costs, they may use the experiments as an opportunity to supplement their current savings 
and are therefore more willing to place a higher weight on the future benefits offered in the 
                                                 
25 Coller & Williams (1999) also find a negative effect on the elicited individual discount rates from the FED 
treatment, but the estimated coefficient is not significant at conventional levels.  
Chapter 6: Perceived HIV-Contamination Risk, Risk Aversion and Time Preferences    
 
108 
DR tasks. Chapter 7 will analyze the low DR of the HIV positive group in more detail. 
Finally, the statistical results show that sexually inexperienced subjects also are more patient in 
financial matters than subjects who already have had their sexual debut, which confirms the 
finding by Chesson et al. (2006).  
 
Table 6.8. Statistical model of discount rate responses. 
Discount rate Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 58.29 7.38
Horizon 4 months -1.91 2.59 
Horizon 6 months -1.70 2.56 
Horizon 12 months -3.93 2.54 
Horizon 18 months -4.26 2.54* 
Horizon 24 months -4.93 2.52** 
FED  -7.24 1.70*** 
Midpoint RA -0.54 0.93 
Experimenter 10.29 2.26*** 
Female -4.92 1.67*** 
Age -0.43 0.24* 
White SA 5.66 2.50** 
Urban -0.08 1.67 
Smoke -2.12 1.99 
Lived in informal dwelling -2.50 2.32 
Prob. of obtaining loan is small 4.54 1.58*** 
Financially worse off than 2 years ago -2.38 1.80 
Tested HIV positive -14.34 2.77*** 
Tested HIV negative 4.20 1.74** 
Prefer not to reveal status 0.61 0.69 
Perceives HIV risk as high 1.03 2.51 
No sexual intercourse -5.09 2.47** 
No regular condom use 12.00 2.75*** 
Life expectancy < 55 years -3.44 2.31 
Ranks HIV nr1 -9.09 2.86*** 
Ranks HIV nr2 -11.84 3.54*** 
Panel interval regression, with the discount rate interval as the dependent  
variable, based on 1176 observations. 
 
Turning to the estimates of individual characteristics, women appear to be more patient than 
men. The estimated coefficient is –4.92 with a p-value of less than 0.01. This result is 
noteworthy since no previous study has reported a sex effect with respect to individual 
discount rates. Furthermore, relatively older students display lower discount rates than 
younger students. White students require a higher interest rate to invest in the lab instrument 
provided to them. This result contrast with Coller & Williams (1999) who find that nonwhite 
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students have nearly 21 percentage points higher discount rates than those revealed by 
whites.26 Students are likely to be credit constrained and the results indicate that subjects with 
a small chance of obtaining a loan at the bank have higher individual discount rates. The 
coefficient estimate is 4.54 and has a p-value of less than 0.01.  
 
6.4  Conclusion  
This chapter elicited individual risk attitudes and discount rates from a convenient 
sample of students recruited at two universities in South Africa using monetary rewards. The 
elicited risk and time preferences differ across different groups based on perceived HIV 
contamination risk, HIV status, and sexual behavior.  
 
Compared to previous studies using multiple price lists this study finds a remarkably large 
proportion of subjects that switch more than once in one of the tasks. Switching appeared 
more often in the risk aversion tasks than in the discount rate tasks. Computerized 
experiments forcing one switching-point would avoid the switching behavior, however, would 
not reveal subject’s true preferences if no option is provided for being indifferent. 
 
On average, the data show relatively large risk-tolerance and discount rates compared to those 
found by, e.g., Harrison et al. (2005a). Besides, this chapter finds evidence for hyperbolic 
discounting, i.e. the elicited discount rates were decreasing over longer time horizons, 
showing that time preferences appear not to be constant. Furthermore, removing the front-
end delay makes the subjects less willing to accept delayed payment, which confirms quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. 
 
The subjects appear to be largely aware of the general HIV infection risk in South Africa. 
However only 13% considered themselves to be highly at risk and even 28% did not perceive to 
be exposed to HIV at all. Subjects who did consider to be highly prone to getting infected by 
HIV, are significantly less risk-averse, and tend to be less patient in the discount rate 
experiments. If these preferences carry over to their actual sexual behavior, as Chesson et al. 
(2006) and this study suggests, they complicate HIV prevention, since ignorance alone would 
not cause the further spread of HIV. 
  
                                                 
26 One possible explanation for this result might be that as the payoffs used are, in real terms, much lower for 
whites than for nonwhites, the former group might find it less worthwhile to save on such low stakes. 
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HIV positive subjects appear to have significantly lower discount rates compared to subjects 
with negative test results. This finding is remarkable given the facts that most infections take 
place via unprotected sexual intercourse, and that high discount rates are associated with risky 
sexual behavior. However, all the subjects in the sample are university students. These 
students have already committed to making an investment in education, which suggests that 
the HIV infected subjects in the sample may have a relatively low discount rate. Another 
explanation could be found in the HIV anticipatory saving motive as described in the 
previous chapters. Being unable to anticipate the high future illness costs, subjects might have 
seen the experiments as an opportunity to supplement their savings.  
 
Subjects that have been tested HIV-negative are significantly more risk-averse than subjects 
who have never been tested. HIV-testing seems thus to attract a disproportionately large 
number of risk-averse subjects. Although not significant at conventional levels, the results 
suggest that subjects that are sexually experienced are less risk-averse and display higher 
discount rates than subjects that do not have sexual experience. However, sexually active 
subjects who do not use condoms regularly did not display significantly different risk 
attitudes. They did display significantly higher discount rates than sexually active subjects who 
regularly do use condoms. Since unsafe sex appears to be partly an economic explicable 
choice related to individual risk and time preferences, HIV prevention focusing on providing 


















7.1  Introduction 
This chapter analyses the relation between perceived health status and intertemporal 
choice. Data is used from experiments with real monetary rewards conducted among students 
in South Africa to estimate risk and time preferences. These experiments are based on 
multiple price lists developed by Coller & Williams (1999), Holt & Laury (2002), and Harrison 
et al. (2002, 2005a). Using the same experimental data, Chapter 6 showed that both HIV 
positive agents and participants engaging in risky behavior are less risk-averse. However, 
although the latter group display higher discount rates, HIV positive agents seem to have 
substantially lower discount rates compared to the other students in the sample, indicating 
longer time horizons in spite of their lowered life expectancy. This chapter in particular 
studies this paradoxical finding. In doing so, some of the initial findings of the previous 
chapter will be revisited, such that this chapter can be read independently from Chapter 6. 
  
HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death among young adults in Africa. Much of the 
international effort to help has focused on improving access to ARV treatment. Even in 
relatively developed South Africa, only 21% of those in need of ARV treatment have access 
to it (WHO, 2006); for the largest part of Africa access to treatment is even more restricted. 
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But with 3 million people getting infected by HIV each year in Sub-Saharan Africa alone 
(WHO, 2006), prevention too has to play a crucial role if the disease is ever to be brought 
under control. Risky sexual behavior (promiscuity, unprotected sex, etc.) significantly 
increases the probability of infection. Therefore, knowledge of why people engage in such 
practices in spite of the potentially very serious consequences they may lead to, is crucial for 
the design of effective prevention programs. If it is ignorance, education should be the main 
focus of such programs. But if people persevere with unsafe sex simply because they are less 
risk-averse or value the future less than those that do not, education may well be insufficient.  
 
Risk aversion and time preference are likely to have an impact: unsafe sex increases the risk of 
getting infected, so the more risk-averse one is, the more one should be willing to take 
precautions to reduce infection risks. Equally, unsafe sex trades off current benefits 
(presumably) against future costs; thus the more the future is discounted, the less the weight 
one attaches to avoiding those costs. (Chapter 3, Section 3.4 provides an analytical example.) 
If those engaging in risky sexual behavior tend to be less risk-averse or discount the future 
more heavily, education on the possibly disastrous consequences of unsafe sex may not be 
enough and other methods need to be developed to get people to refrain from risky sexual 
behavior.  
 
There is extensive literature linking HIV infection to socio-demographic characteristics. For 
example, Pettifor et al. (2004) and Harris & Van Aardt (2007) find that HIV infection is 
higher among young single, tertiary educated, and low socio-economic class persons. 
Literature that associates sexual behavior with quantified risk and time preferences scarcely 
exists. Using hypothetical questions and survey data in the US, Chesson et al. (2006) show 
that time preferences are significantly associated with a range of sexual behaviors and 
experiences, like ever having sex, having sex before the age 16 years, and past or current 
pregnancies. However, they do not find significant differences in discount rates for 
individuals infected with HSV-21 (a sexual transmittable disease). Moreover, the use of 
hypothetical questions has become controversial as a way to elicit preference parameters, 
supported by, for example, Holt & Laury (2002) who find significantly different answers 
between hypothetical and real experiments with high pay-offs. 
 
                                                 
1 Herpes simplex virus type 2. 
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Therefore, in this study data is used generated from trials using actual monetary rewards, 
conducted among students in South Africa, to investigate the relation between risky sexual 
behavior and risk and time preferences. In these trials, students were asked to make a series of 
choices between alternatives with different risk characteristics and timing of (real monetary) 
rewards. They were also asked to provide extensive information about their health status, 
economic circumstances, and sexual behavior. 
 
Both HIV positive students and students, who perceive to be highly at risk of contracting the 
virus, appear to be less risk-averse. However, as also showed in Chapter 6, with respect to the 
raw estimates of time preferences a paradoxical result emerges: Although there is evidence of 
a positive correlation between risky sexual behavior and discount rates, people who are 
actually HIV infected seem to have much lower discount rates than those who are not. More 
thorough analysis shows that this result is due to the implicit assumption made by most 
researchers in this field, that only the pure rate of time preference features in the pricing of 
future benefits. This chapter shows that once other factors than just the pure rate of time 
preference are incorporated in the pricing of future benefits, this seeming anomaly disappears 
and the results do conform to prior expectations. Differential expectations about mortality 
rates, risk attitude, and future disposable income levels turn out to be major explanatory 
factors of differences in valuing future events and explain most of the puzzling results on 
rates of time preference earlier research have obtained.  
 
Similarly, this chapter also shows that conclusions on hyperbolic discounting become biased 
when failing to incorporate the other factors mentioned in the analysis of intertemporal 
choice. On uncorrected data, the hypothesis of hyperbolic discounting is accepted, but once 
differential expectations on mortality rates, risk preferences and future levels of disposable 
income are incorporated, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides the theoretical framework for 
eliciting risk and time preferences. Section 7.3 presents the experimental method and the 
results assuming that only the pure rate of time preference influences the pricing of future 
benefits, which leads to the seeming paradox on HIV status and discount rates. Section 7.4 
introduces mortality, risk attitude and differential expectations about future consumption 
levels into the analysis and tests for hyperbolic discounting. Section 7.5 concludes.    
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7.2 Eliciting risk and time preferences: a standard approach 
Assume that expected utility theory (EUT) holds for choices over risky alternatives 
and that subjects have a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function defined over 















where ( )tU M  is the utility of monetary outcome tM  at time t and where γ  is the CRRA 
coefficient. For 1γ = , this function is defined as ( ) ln( )t tU M M= , for 0γ = , the agent is 
risk-neutral, for 0γ >  the agent is risk-averse, and for 0γ <  the agent is risk-seeking. 
Furthermore, assume that discounting is exponential. Consider two certain monetary 
outcomes (M) at time t and at time t+k. An agent is indifferent between these two outcomes 
if the following equation holds: 
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( )tU M  is again the utility of monetary outcome tM  at time t as specified in Equation (7.1). k 
is the horizon for late delivery of monetary outcome t kM + . ( )D k  is the discount function, 
which can be interpreted as the relative weight an agent attaches to utility of t kM +  at time 
t k+  compared to utility of tM  at time t , and ρ  the pure rate of time preference.
2 If agents 
are risk-neutral (i.e. 0γ = ), Equation (7.2) can be written as follows: 
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If agents value two monetary outcomes tM  and t kM +  equally, the implicit value of ρ  can be 
derived for which Equation (7.3) indeed holds as equality. In line with earlier literature 
(Harrison et al. (2002) and Coller & Williams (1999)) and has been done in Chapter 6, also 
                                                 
2 The pure rate of time preference measures the preference for immediate utility over delayed utility. 
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this chapter initially simplifies the procedure by assuming risk neutrality to derive the implicit 
value of ρ , but relaxes this assumption later on. 
  
7.3 Experimental data  
For the analysis, data is used from experiments conducted among students of the 
North West University and the University of Pretoria in South Africa. The experimental 
procedures are documented in detail in Appendix A and build on the risk aversion (RA) tasks 
of Holt & Laury (2002) and on the discount rate (DR) tasks of Coller & Williams (1999), and 




In short, each student was asked to complete one RA task and six DR tasks (see Appendix D 
for the specific tasks). Each task involved a series of binary choices, in the RA task 10 and in 
the DR tasks 20 per task. In the RA task, subjects were asked to choose between two risky 
lotteries, where the probability of winning the higher price increased along the table. The 
point at which subjects switch from the less risky to the more risky option was used to deduce 
the subject’s risk preference parameter. In the six DR tasks, subjects were asked to choose 
between two certain outcomes: a present and a future payment. The various DR tasks differed 
in the timing of the future payment: the delay increased from 1 to 3, 5, 11, 17, and finally 23 
months. If not specified differently, this chapter studies the elicited discount rates from the 
longest time horizon, i.e. the DR task in which the delayed payment option was 23 months. 
Also in the DR tasks, the point at which the subject switches puts a bound on his discount 
rate. For each individual, the unconditional discount rate is estimated by taking the average 
discount rate when a subject switches from choosing the current to the future payment 
option. If subjects switch more than once between the two options, the discount rate is 
assumed to be equal to the midpoint of the interval over which the subject is indifferent.  
 
Treatments 
Because there is empirical evidence that agents are more impatient about immediate delays 
than they are about future delays of the same length (Coller & Williams, 1999), the timing of 
the present option was varied between treatments. 38% of the subjects was asked to choose 
between receiving an amount today or in the future (called no Front-End-Delay (nFED)). 
The other subjects were asked to choose between two future options (called Front-End-Delay 
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(FED): the first payment option was 1 month, and the other, 2, 4, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months, 
such that the length between the treatments remained the same in both sets of experiments. 
This allows us to test for (quasi)-Hyperbolic-Discounting. 
 
Motivating participants 
Real incentives were used to motivate participants. In addition to the fixed participation fee of 
30 Rand (1 Rand equals about 0.14 USD in the year of the experiments), all subjects had a 
10% chance of being selected for actual payment according to the choice they made in each 
of the two tasks. On average participants could earn 65 Rand in the valuation of the task. This 
performance-based, random lottery real incentive system is nowadays used by most 
researchers as incentive structure for individual choice experiments (Holt & Laury, 2002).3 
Subjects selected for additional payment in the DR task, received a postdated check issued by 
Tilburg University, which could be cashed at any Standard Bank in South Africa any time 
after the specified date.       
 
Questionnaires/sample characteristics 
Subjects were asked to fill out three different questionnaires: a socio-demographic, a financial 
and a health questionnaire.4 Among other health related issues, subjects were asked to report 
on their HIV status, and on how they perceive their chances of getting HIV infected during 
their lifetime. In the latter, they were asked to choose between: no risk at all (1), small (2), 
moderate (3), and high (4). This chapter analyzes differences in risk and time preferences 
among 5 groups: the first four are based on the subject’s self-reported perceived HIV 
contamination risk, group 5 consists of subjects who have actually contracted HIV. 
 
Participants 
The total sample includes 213 subjects, 53.5% males, and 46.5% females. 85.0% of the 
respondents are nonwhite and 15.0% are white South African students. The age-range among 
white participants is smaller compared to nonwhite participants, ranging between 19-24 and 
18-36 respectively, with a mean age of 21.1 years for white participants and 22.9 years for 
nonwhite participants. The overall reported HIV prevalence rate among the sample is 9.8%5. 
                                                 
3 The main advantage of this system is that it avoids income effects such as Thaler & Johnson’s (1990) house 
money effect. It has been shown empirically that players do not interpret choice tasks rewarded with the random 
lottery incentive system as one grand overall lottery (Cubitt et al. 1998, Starmer & Sugden 1991). 
4 See Appendix E. 
5 Note that in the first round of experiments alone, this percentage would be 3.0%. 
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Another 4.7% of the subjects indicated to prefer not to report their HIV status or to answer 
the question about whether or not they had ever been tested for the virus. This prevalence 
rate is comparable with the average prevalence rate (9.9%) among the youth in the North 
West province (Pettifor et al., 2004), but the observed prevalence rate is high considering their 
finding that among the youth that are HIV positive only 10% is also aware of their status. The 
reported perceived contamination risk varied among the sample. For instance, 10.4% of the 
respondents perceived their HIV contamination risk as high, and 23.3% indicated that they 
would face no risk at all to contract the virus. The largest proportion (44.8%) answered to 
have a small and 11.6% reported to have a moderate risk of contracting HIV during their 
lifetime.6 
 
Sample selection criteria 
From the 213 subjects, 1 subject did not reveal his perception of HIV contamination risk, 4 
subjects did not completely fill out the DR task, 14 subjects did not reveal their expected age 
of death, and 36 participants did not answer consistently7 in the RA task. Removing these 
subjects from the sample leaves 163 subjects for the analysis.8 The discount rates elicited from 
the 163 subjects considered, do not significantly differ from those elicited from the subjects 
removed from the sample (p-value9=0.68).10 
 
Results I: attitude towards risk  
Using the switching-point in the RA tasks to elicit the risk-aversion parameter, a CRRA 
coefficient (γ ) of 0.16 is found, which is rather low compared to the student population of 
the subjects in Holt & Laury (2002) (γ =0.66, USA), or Harrison et al. (2005b) (γ =0.5411).  
However, Tanner et al. (2005) found even on average lower values in their cross-cultural 
study for Niger (ranging between –0.15 and 0.14). It is intriguing that studies estimating risk 
preferences from asset prices using CAPM find much higher values than are obtained in all 
these experimental studies, this study included (see for example Cochrane (2001)). 
 
                                                 
6 Appendix A.5 contains detailed information on the characteristics of the participants. 
7 With “not consistently” is meant that subjects choose the small prize when both options were sure (i.e. option 
A in decision row 10, in Table D1 of Appendix D). 
8 Note that the sample used in this chapter is smaller than the sample used in the previous chapter. The reason 
for this is that the analyses in this chapter make use of the self-reported expected lifetime which was not 
available for all subjects. 
9 Based on Mann-Whitney test. 
10 For more details on the sample selection, see Appendix A.6.  
11 γ =0.54 is the average risk aversion coefficient elicited in Ethiopia, Uganda, and India. 
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Table 7.1 shows that the CRRA coefficient is statistically different for the five groups based 
on HIV status and perceived HIV contamination risk (p-value=0.02). The results also suggest 
a negative relation between perceived HIV contraction risk and risk aversion. A simple 
regression gives a slope coefficient of –0.13 with p-value 0.03. In fact for the two highest 
groups, γ  is actually negative on average, indicating risk-loving or a convex utility function.  
 
Table 7.1: CRRA coefficients (γ ). 
Perceived HIV contraction risk   N γ Std. Dev. 
Group 1: no risk at all 38 0.24 0.56 
Group 2: small 73 0.26 0.68 
Group 3: moderate 19 0.18 0.67 
Group 4: high 17 -0.17 0.24 
Group 5: HIV+ 16 -0.20 0.70 
All 163 0.16 0.64 
 
Results II: rate of time preference  
The mean (annualized) discount rate implied by subjects’ choices for the longest time horizon 
is 39.23%, although there is substantial variation around the mean (see Table 7.2). This 
section interprets this value as an estimate of the pure rate of time preference. This estimate is 
much higher than, for example, real market borrowing rates in South Africa, which were 
around 2.3%12 at the time when the experiment was conducted. 
 
Table 7.2: Discount rate, ρ  (in %).13 
Perceived HIV contraction risk N ρ  Std. Dev. 
Group 1: no risk at all 38 40.73 22.39 
Group 2: small 73 41.37 20.20 
Group 3: moderate 19 39.96 22.80 
Group 4: high 17 44.29 20.69 
Group 5: HIV+ 16 19.63 21.81 
All 163 39.23 21.98 
 
                                                 
12 Based on inflation and prime rates 2005, source: EcoWin. 
13 These estimates differ slightly from Chapter 6, because 163 instead of 176 subjects are used due to the 
additional sample selection criteria that are required for the analyses in this chapter.  
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Analyzing the results for different groups separately produces a surprising result. Although 
Table 7.1 showed a clear negative relation between risk aversion and the risk grouping of 
contracting HIV, the relation found between discount rate and the risk group of those who 
actually contracted HIV does not seem to conform with expectations at all (see Table 7.2). 
Thus, experimental data seems to reject that seropositive agents have higher discount rates. In 
fact, the opposite relation holds: HIV positive agents have significantly lower discount rates 
(Δ=–21.73, p-value=0.0006, where Δ equals the difference between HIV positive agents and 
all other agents). Table 7.2 and Figure 7.1, however, do show an admittedly weak positive link 
between risk exposure and discount rates among the groups that have not yet actually 
contracted the virus: discount rates of agents that perceive to be highly at risk of getting 
infected are higher than those of agents that perceive not to be highly at risk. Drawing a 
regression line through the data points of the first four groups only, weakly confirms the 
expected positive relation between the rate of time preference and perceived HIV contraction 
risk. A regression yields a slope coefficient of +0.93, but with a high p-value (0.37). Including 
the fifth data point of HIV positive subjects leads to a distinct negative slope although also 
not significantly (–3.93, p-value=0.26).14 The discount rate of this group seems to be an 
outlier in the expected positive relation between discount rate and perceived contamination 
risk.  















no risk at all small moderate high HIV+
p e rc eiv ed H IV
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We are thus left with a puzzle: The relation between coefficients of risk aversion and risk 
exposure do conform to the expectations, but the results on the rate of time preference do 
                                                 
14 Removing however any other of the 4 data points leads to a distinct negative slope. 
15 Regression line through the first four data points, i.e. excluding the HIV+ group. 
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not. While there seems to be a weak positive link between increasing risk exposure and 
discount rates, including HIV positive agents reverses that link. HIV positive subjects actually 
show significantly lower discount rates. This is remarkable because considering sexual 
behavior, the results in the data point in a different direction. For instance, sexually active 
agents display higher discount rates ( ρ (sex)=40.07 (n=133) vs. ρ (no sex)=35.47 (n=30), p-
value=0.15), be it that the difference is not statistically significant.16 Furthermore, agents that 
are sexually active and do not take preventive measures, i.e. who reported to not regularly use 
condoms, have a significantly higher discount rate ( ρ (no condom)=51.71 (n=14) vs. 
ρ (condom)=38.07 (n=106), p-value=0.0617). Since these behavioral variables are positively 
correlated with the risk of contracting HIV, why do we not find this relation for HIV positive 
agents in the data? 
 
7.4 Explaining the paradox 
The results on discount rates and risk classes obtained so far seem paradoxical. 
However, the assumption that the pure rate of time preference is the only factor entering the 
pricing of future benefits is extremely limiting and very likely biases the results. This section 
first considers differential mortality risk as an additional factor entering the relevant discount 
rate and then various ways of incorporating anticipated changes in marginal utility of 
consumption over time. The results will change significantly once these additional factors are 
taken into account. 
 
7.4.1  Correcting for mortality risk 
An individual cannot derive utility from consumption in a certain period unless he has 
survived the preceding periods. Therefore, uncertainty of survival leads households to 
discount the future more heavily (Yaari, 1965). HIV obviously decreases actual life expectancy 
of HIV positive agents. Especially in developing countries where the availability of medicines 
is insufficient, being HIV infected means premature death.18 Variation in mortality risk may 
                                                 
16 Excluding the HIV+ group the difference is statistically significant ρ (sex)=42.87 (n=117) vs. ρ (no 
sex)=35.47 (n=30), p-value=0.04. 
17 Excluding the HIV+ group this difference is not significant: ρ (no condom)=51.71 (n=14) vs. 
ρ (condom)=41.20 (n=91), p-value=0.15. However, Chapter 6 shows using a panel interval regression that after 
correcting for individual characteristics, both sexually active and sexually active no-condom users have 
significantly higher discount rates (see Table 6.8)  
18 In South Africa 21% of people with advanced HIV infection receives antiretroviral therapy (WHO, World 
Health Statistics 2006). Median time from seroconversion (clinical latency) to AIDS in east Africa is estimated to 
be 9.4 years. The median survival time after the progression to AIDS is 9.2 months (Morgan et al., 2002).  
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therefore explain differences in the implied individual discount rate among different risk 
groups.  
 
Suppose agents have an annual survival probability p. Then the probability of surviving k 
periods ahead equals k tt kS p
−
+ = . Equation (7.4) then shows the mortality risk inclusive 
discount rate ( ucρ ) an agent will use in period t to price her well-being in period t+k, where 









+⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
 (7.4) 
 
Substituting the survival function in (7.4) and solving for the pure rate of time preference, 
gives: 
 (1 ) 1uc pρ ρ= + −  (7.5) 
 
For the specific sample of people considered p is unknown, but the health questionnaire did 
include the question “how long do you expect to live?” from which the expected time until death 
was elicited. Under the simplifying assumption of a constant annual survival probability, there 
is a simple relation between survival probability p and the expected time until death, ( )DE T , 
so that p can be calculated (see Annex 7.1): 
 







=  (7.6) 
 
Since p is increasing in ( )DE T , the unconditional discount rate, presented in Table 7.2, is 
biased upwards if interpreted as an estimate of the pure rate of time preference, as was done 
in Section 7.3. Not correcting for mortality risk will therefore create a bias in the results when 
comparing groups with different perceptions of HIV contamination risk, since they are likely 
to have different expected survival times. 
 
Table 7.3 shows that the expected time until death indeed varies across the five groups and is 
decreasing in perceived risk exposure (corr=– 0.32 , p-value=0.0000). Average expected time 
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until death at the time of the experiment is 49.12. The difference is highly significant across 
the five groups based on the Kruskal-Wallis test (p-value=0.0001). HIV positive subjects 
estimate the time until death on average 30.31 years from now, which is substantially lower 
(by 22.19 years) than the expected lifetime of the group who thinks to have no risk at all to 
contract the virus during their lifetime. This shows awareness of the lifetime reducing 
consequences of HIV infection. 
 
Table 7.3: Expected time until death, 0( )DE T . 
Perceived HIV contraction risk N 0( )DE T  Std. Dev. α  
Group 1: no risk at all 38 52.50 18.47 0 
Group 2: small 73 52.29 16.08 0.01 
Group 3: moderate 19 48.58 18.57 0.18 
Group 4: high 17 46.24 15.88 0.28 
Group 5: HIV+ 16 30.31 11.60 1 
All 163 49.12 17.65 0.15 
 
Assuming that group 1 has no risk of contracting the virus, indicated by 1α =0, and 
considering the fact that group 5 is infected with probability 5α =1, the expected lifetime of 
the other 3 groups can be expressed by Equation (7.7) and the corresponding infection 
probabilities, αi , of these groups can be elicited. Both the infection probability of the 
moderate group ( 3α =0.18) and the weighted average (α =0.15) are close to the adult 
prevalence rate of South Africa, which was 18.8% (UNAIDS, 2006) at the time the 
experiments were conducted.   
 
 0 0 1 0 5( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )D Gi i D G i D GE T E T E Tα α= − +  (7.7) 
 
However, although the subjects seem to consider HIV infection risk in their expectations of 
lifetime, it appears that for 3 out of the 5 groups subjects not having medical insurance on 
average estimated their lifetime higher than those with medical insurance. Apparently, these 
groups do underestimate the consequences of infection on expected lifetime without 
appropriate treatment. 
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Based on the individual expected remaining lifetime the survival probability p is calculated and 
the correction for mortality is applied in estimating time preferences using Equation (7.5). 
Table 7.4 shows that correcting for mortality decreases the estimate of the rate of time 
preference on average by 1.15 percentage points. The correction differs across the five 
groups; even though p is the lowest for the HIV positive group, the correction for this group 
is the lowest due to their relatively low “raw” discount rate. Correcting for mortality, 
however, reduces the discrepancy between the estimated discount rate of those subjects that 
perceive to be highly at risk and seropositive subjects (0.28 percentage points). In countries 
with large differences in mortality risk, as in high HIV prevalence countries like South Africa 
where 18.8% of the adult population is infected (UNAIDS, 2006), not correcting for mortality 
in eliciting individual discount rates thus biases estimates for time preferences and distort the 
comparison between groups in society based on them. On the horizons considered, however, 
the corrections are not large compared to the underlying estimates and the counterintuitive 
result for HIV positive agents is still there. 
 
Table 7.4: Rate of time preference before ( ucρ ) and after ( ρ )  
correction discount rates for differential mortality rates. 
Perceived HIV contraction risk N Mean Std. Dev. 
Group 1: no risk at all    
ucρ  38 40.73 22.39 
ρ  38 39.17 22.34 
ucρ – ρ   1.56  
Group 2: small    
ucρ  73 41.37 20.20 
ρ  73 40.36 19.83 
ucρ – ρ   1.01  
Group 3: moderate    
ucρ  19 39.96 22.80 
ρ  19 38.95 22.14 
ucρ – ρ   1.01  




Perceived HIV contraction risk N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
 
7.4.2 Relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality  
Table 7.1, including estimates for risk preferences, may point part of the way to a 
solution to the puzzle: so far the calculation of the rate of time preference assumed risk 
neutrality, but this table shows that risk tolerance differs across groups and is significantly 
higher among high-risk groups. Besides, Andersen et al. (2005) show that joint elicitation of 
the CCRA coefficient and discount rate, substantially lower discount rates compared to 
eliciting the two separately. Under the expected utility framework used here, the same 
parameter measuring risk aversion also measures (the inverse of) the intertemporal 
substitution elasticity. Assuming risk neutrality (linear utility), therefore, could have biased the 
elicited discount rate for these agents and the differences between the five risk exposure 
classes.  
 
Combining Equations (7.2) and (7.4) leads to the following estimate for the rate of time 














⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (7.8) 
Group 4: high    
ucρ  17 44.29 20.69 
ρ  17 43.09 20.07 
ucρ – ρ   1.19  
Group 5: HIV+    
ucρ  16 19.63 21.81 
ρ  16 18.72 20.63 
ucρ – ρ   0.91  
All    
ucρ  163 39.23 21.98 
ρ  163 38.08 21.56 
ucρ – ρ   1.15  
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Assuming that the intertemporal substitution parameter (inverse of the intertemporal rate of 
substitution) is equal to the risk parameter obtained from the static risk experiment19, ρ  can 
be calculated. Note however that, while 0γ <  is possible in the context of risk, 0γ <  is not 
an admissible value in the context of intertemporal choice. For one thing, it would imply that 
the first order conditions determining intertemporal choice correspond to a welfare minimum 
instead of a welfare maximum. Therefore, this part of the analysis is restricted to individuals 
with 0γ > , which means removing 73 risk-seeking subjects from the sample. The discount 
rate for the group with 0γ <  is not significantly different from the value obtained for the 
group with 0γ ≥  (p-value =0.18), whether the correction for mortality risk is applied or not. 
 
Table 7.5: Discount rates corrected for mortality only ( )Mρ   
and for mortality and risk attitude ( )ρ . Sample with 0γ ≥ . 
Perceived HIV contraction risk N Mean Std. Dev. 
Group 1: no risk at all  
γ  23 0.58 0.43 
Mρ  23 37.15 24.13 
ρ  23 19.36 17.31 
Mρ – ρ  17.79  
Group 2: Small  
γ  46 0.64 0.50 
Mρ  46 42.49 20.71 
ρ  46 21.76 22.04 
Mρ – ρ  20.73  
Group 3: Moderate  
γ  8 0.79 0.59 
Mρ  8 49.15 27.12 
ρ  8 24.64 29.87 
Mρ – ρ  24.50  
                                                 
19 As is always the case within the expected utility framework. 




Perceived HIV contraction risk N Mean Std. Dev. 
Group 4: High  
γ  4 0.16 0.11 
Mρ  4 56.51 21.71 
ρ  4 50.98 24.63 
Mρ – ρ  5.54  
Group 5: HIV+  
γ  9 0.25 0.26 
Mρ  9 18.01 17.31 
ρ  9 14.59 14.65 
Mρ – ρ  3.42  
All  
γ  90 0.58 0.48 
Mρ  90 39.89 23.14 
ρ  90 21.99 21.81 
Mρ – ρ  17.91  
 
Table 7.5 shows that the correction for the “lower-risk group”, i.e. the first three groups, is 
substantial: 20.24 percentage points, which is in line with Andersen et al. (2005), who finds an 
average reduction of 15.1 percentage points among the Danish population. Furthermore, 
correcting for utility curvature widens the gap between the group of agents that perceive to be 
highly at risk of contracting HIV and the other agents, i.e. their discount rate turns out to be 
relatively high. Finally, it brings the implied rate of time preference of HIV positive agents 
closer to the lower-risk group. Table 7.5 shows that correcting for risk attitude decreases the 
estimate of time preference for HIV positive agents with 3.42 percentage points. For the 
other group this difference is much higher, and ranges between 5.54–24.50 percentage points.   
 
Figure 7.2 shows the average discount rates before (DM) and after correction for risk attitude 
(DRA) for the 5 different groups. Both sets of points have also been corrected for differential 
mortality expectations. The figure illustrates the importance of incorporating risk preferences 
in estimating time preferences. Figure 7.2 does show a trend upwards. The average discount 
rates for seropositive agents, however, is still lower compared to uninfected subjects, although 
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not significantly anymore (p-value=0.32). This correction again reduced the discrepancy 
between the HIV positive group and the group that perceives to be highly at risk (2.12 
percentage points), but this difference remains significant (p-value=0.02). 
 
Figure 7.2: Discount rates corrected for mortality (DM) and  
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In summary, the data show that after correcting for mortality and curvature of the 
intertemporal utility function, agents that perceive to be more at risk of contracting HIV, do 
display significantly higher rates of time preference as well as lower coefficients of risk 
aversion.  Nevertheless, HIV positive agents still display lower discount rates than those who 
have not (yet?) contracted the disease. However, this difference is not statistically different 
anymore. 
 
7.4.3  Discount rate and future income decline  
Another possible explanation for the relatively low discount rate for HIV positive 
subjects (as also suggested in Chapter 6) could be that their expected future budget constraint 
is expected to be relatively tight compared to other subjects. The analysis so far assumed that 
the monetary benefits M accrued on top of a basically unchanging consumption level. But due 
to their (known) illness, expenditures will rise for the HIV positive group, and income will 
most likely fall (see Chapter 3 for a more extensive discussion). In that case, significant 
differences in marginal utility may occur between the two points of time over which the 
                                                 
20 Regression line through data points of the implied discount rate corrected for mortality and risk attitude 
(DRA). 
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experiment was conducted.21 If anticipated differences in future marginal utility are not fully 
eliminated by higher savings, the imputed discount rate will be lower than the true degree of 
time preference.  
 










, '( ) 0>U C , 
 ''( ) 0<U C . Using future marginal utility over current marginal utility to make future goods 
comparable to current goods, an estimate for the implied discount rate ρ  is obtained as 
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where t kq + , the relative future consumption level (see Annex 7.3 for the analytical derivation). 
Assuming a nonnegative intertemporal substitution parameter, γ , the implied discount rate 
ρ  is decreasing in both qt+k and γ: Further assume that the relative price of future 
consumption is different for HIV positive agents, but equal for all agents in each risk group.  
 
Of course, qt+k cannot be observed directly. But, experimental results for students with and 
without medical insurance are available. If anticipated future medical costs are the reason for 
anticipating lower future consumption, it can be assumed that qt+k=1 for those with medical 
insurance, since they will have their medical bills covered.22 The uninsured HIV positive 
group (NI) realistically enough estimated their own time until death 6.5 years lower than the 
insured HIV positive group (I) ( 0 ( )
I
DE T =37.5 vs. 0 ( )
NI
DE T =31.0, p-value=0.38). Surprisingly, 
uninsured HIV positive subjects are on average slightly more risk-averse, although not 
significantly (γ I =0.14 vs. γ NI =0.29, p-value=0.65). Not infected uninsured subjects, 
                                                 
21 Olson & Baily (1981) already stress that differences in marginal utility over time should be excluded from the 
definition of pure time preference. 
22 Note that qt+k, defined as the relative future consumption level, does not contain the possible expected income 
decline due to HIV infection. No data are however available to correct for an expected fall in income.  
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however, do display significantly higher risk aversion (γ I =0.73 vs. γ NI =0.53, p-value=0.04). 
In the total sample, 32.1% of the subjects were having medical insurance. Among nonwhites, 
the percentage was significantly less, 22.2% vs. 87.5%. The experimental data indeed show 
that HIV positive subjects having medical insurance (30.4% of the sample) have substantially 
higher discount rates than uninsured HIV positive subjects:23  
 
Iρ =29.82 vs. NIρ =10.24, p-value=0.14 
 
This difference enables estimating the anticipated decline in consumption q. Assuming that 
uninsured have the same pure rate of time preference as insured participants, one can derive 
an estimate of the anticipated decline in consumption, q, from the difference in observed 

















where , { , }ρ ∈i i I NI  is the discount rate corrected for mortality differences and curvature of 
the utility function, for respectively insured and uninsured subjects (cf Equation (7.8)).  
 
This procedure yields an estimate of ˆNIq =0.66, which is, interestingly enough, very close to 
the findings of Steinberg et al. (2002). They empirically show that in South Africa, HIV 
households spend a significant part of households’ expenditures on medical treatment, on 
average 34%. This corresponds to the same q-value of 66%. Using the same dataset Chapter 4 
empirically showed that HIV+ students save more than respondents who are not infected, 
and those without insurance more than those with insurance. Apparently they do not save 
enough, however, to fully arbitrage expected marginal utility differences. 24  
 
Incorporating this anticipated decline in future consumption for uninsured HIV positive 
participants increases the estimated rate of time preference of HIV positive subjects by 14.64 
                                                 
23 These discount rates are already corrected for mortality and risk attitude as described in the previous 
subsections. 
24 The q-value for the other groups could not be computed, because of the anomaly found that the discount rate 
for the uninsured in group 2 to 4 is lower and the expected life time of the uninsured of group 2 and 4 is higher 
than for the medically insured in these groups. 
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percentage points compared to the discount rate with corrections for mortality only. The rate 
of time preference for both the seropositive group and the high-risk group are now higher 
than those obtained for the lower risk groups.  
 
The discount rate for the high-risk group is in fact strikingly higher than the rates found for 
all groups, even (though insignificant) the one for the HIV positive group. This may be 
explained by the fact that the HIV positive group probably does not exclusively consists of 
people who belonged to the high-risk group before their infection. Less risky behavior lowers 
the chance of getting infected, but not to zero, since there are various other ways of 
transmission which may not be related to risky behavior, and anyhow less risky behavior 
reduces risk but does not always reduce it to zero. After this correction, the implied discount 
rate of the seropositive group now fits in a pattern of time preference rising with perceived 
risk exposure. Figure 7.3 shows the average discount rates before (DRA) and after the 
correction for marginal utility (DMU). The slope becomes steeper (+5.01), although it 
remains insignificant (p-value=0.26). 
 
Figure 7.3: Discount rate corrected for mortality, risk attitude (DRA),  
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To summarize, uninsured HIV positive subjects seem to consider the fall in future marginal 
utility due to expected illness costs when prizing future benefits. Correcting their discount 
rate for differences in mortality risk, risk attitude, and the difference in anticipated future 
marginal utility substantially increases the estimated rate of time preference of HIV positive 
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subjects. These corrections reverse the earlier result that found them having a significantly 
lower rate of time preference than the other groups. After corrections, that is not the case 
anymore. 
 
7.4.4  Correcting for quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
There is evidence that people, when choosing between options having both short-run 
and long-run consequences, tend to overvalue short-run consequences and downplay long 
term costs, for example in unprotected sex (O’Donoughue & Rabin (2000)). The 
experimental data also allow for testing this hypothesis of quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
because subjects were randomly assigned the choice between two alternative testing scenarios, 
differing only because of a time shift of one month in all the choices offered.25  
 
There is another reason to check for quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The subjects within each 
group were randomly assigned to the delay treatment, so in principle the difference in task 
should not have a significant effect when comparing average discount rates between groups, 
as done so far. However, the assignment procedure had as unfortunate outcome that in both 
the HIV positive group and the high-risk group, only one respondent was assigned the 
treatment with immediate gratification. Analysis of group averages, and in particular the 
results for these two groups, could therefore still be biased by a quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
effect, if there is any, since the delayed option (FED) experiments were overrepresented in 
that group.  
 
An analysis of the means of the “raw” data (implicit rates of time preferences not corrected 
for differential mortality risk or curvature of the utility function) seemingly supports the 
hyperbolic discounting hypothesis. Chapter 6 finds that on average respondents were more 
impatient when choosing between immediate and postponed gratification than when 
choosing between two delayed gratifications, holding the time span constant. Based on the 
slightly smaller data set in this chapter, for the longest time horizon experiments (23 months) 
the difference in the mean discount rate is 12.49 percentage points and is also statistically 
significant: the Mann-Whitney test indicates that the two sample are not drawn from the same 
distribution (p-value=0.02).  
 
                                                 
25 The analysis is again restricted to subjects with a nonnegative risk parameter. 
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However, replicating the analysis after correcting for both mortality and curvature of the utility 
function as described in Subsection 7.4.2 changes the results. The difference between 
estimated rates of time preference of the group with and without delayed gratification then 
turns out to become both much smaller and insignificant (Δ=3.40, p-value=0.71). Apparently, 
ignoring mortality risk and curvature of utility in the calculation of time preference biases the 
test for quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Testing within each risk group, using the specification 
of the quasi-hyperbolic discount functions suggested by O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999) does 
not lead to different conclusions: quasi-hyperbolic discounting is rejected for all subgroups. 
 
The conclusion seems clear: Although on direct estimates of discount rates, the test for quasi-
hyperbolic discounting is accepted, that result evaporates once corrections for between-
group-differences in mortality, attitudes towards risk, and anticipated future consumption 
decline are incorporated in the estimation of the discount rate ρ . It is therefore not necessary 
to further correct the estimates of time preference for the treatment effect in analyzing the 
relation between time preference and perceived HIV contraction risk. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This paper studies whether risky behavior leading to increased HIV contraction risk 
can be explained by risk and time preferences. Since unsafe sex increases the risk of getting 
infected, intuitively the more risk-averse one is, the more one should be willing to take 
precautions to reduce infection risks. Equally, unsafe sex trades off current benefits against 
future costs; thus the more one discounts the future, the less weight one attaches to avoiding 
those costs.  
 
Using raw data from economic experiments with real monetary rewards, this chapter finds 
that risk aversion is significantly and negatively related to perceptions of HIV contraction risk. 
However, no such relation is found for raw estimates of time preferences. While risky sexual 
behavior is correlated with higher discount rates, HIV positive respondents seemingly but 
paradoxically displayed significantly more patient behavior in choosing between present and 
future payment options than all other groups considered. 
 
However, the assumption that the pure rate of time preference is the only factor entering the 
pricing of future benefits, though commonly made in the experimental literature, is limiting 
and biased the results. Therefore, this paper considered other factors entering the relevant 
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discount rate when estimating time preferences. Incorporating differences in perceived 
mortality risk, risk attitude and anticipated changes in marginal utility of consumption over 
time, reverses the initial finding that HIV positive respondents would have significantly lower 
discount rates than the other groups. The applied corrections decreased the discrepancy 
between the discount rates of the high-risk group and the HIV positive group by 17.9 
percentage points and is no longer statistically different. The estimates now show the 
expected distinct positive relation between discounting and perceived exposure to contracting 
HIV. Applying the corrections thus seems to solve the paradox. 
 
The experimental data also allowed the estimation of the decline in future consumption levels 
that HIV infected respondents expect. This estimate is similar to what Steinberg et al. (2002) 
report on the share of medical expenses in total consumption of HIV affected households. 
Although Chapter 4 finds higher saving rates among HIV positive respondents than in the 
rest of the sample, HIV positive respondents apparently do not save enough to significantly 
offset anticipated future declines in consumption opportunities. 
 
This chapter thus shows that superficial analysis of time preferences, i.e. without correcting 
for other factors relevant in the pricing of future benefits, can be very misleading when 
comparing different risk groups in society. In particular, it shows the importance of 
differences in expected mortality, risk attitude and expected increases in marginal utility of 
consumption over time. The relevance of this work should be clear given the current trend of 
conducting experiments in the field. 
 
In conclusion, risk and time preference not only have an impact on risky sexual behavior, but 
they are also related to perceptions of HIV contraction risk. In addition, estimations for the 
average infection probabilities based on perceptions of remaining lifetime are close to the 
actual HIV prevalence rate in South Africa at the time the experiments were conducted. 
Moreover, Chapter 6 also showed that awareness in the student sample is high. The 
experimental data thus suggest that the respondents do not continue to practice with unsafe 
sex because of ignorance, but because they are less risk-averse and value the future less than 
those that do not. Accordingly, prevention focused on education alone is likely to be 
insufficient.  
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However, even accepting that risky behavior reflects risk preferences and low rate of time 
preference rather than ignorance about risk factors, their behavior may still be privately 
suboptimal if they underestimate the total expected illness costs. Since for three out of the 
five risk groups the average expected lifetime is higher for the medically uninsured sub-
samples, this indeed suggests that although individuals are aware of HIV contraction risk 
itself, they seem to underestimate the consequences of HIV infection, such as the costs and 
need for medical treatment. Therefore, providing information about the actual illness costs 
might be another useful action to deter individuals from risky sexual behavior. Another 
option would be to try to change individuals’ preferences, but that strategy would invalidate 
the assumptions of normative analysis where preferences are considered as given. 
 
Finally, since there are high social costs attached to HIV/AIDS, intervention seems justified 
even if individuals are fully informed and act privately optimal. Considering the high time 
preferences found in this chapter, offering monetary incentives might be necessary to tilt the 
intertemporal tradeoff implicit in choosing to practice unsafe sex towards the safe sex option. 
An example of such an incentive would be free distribution of condoms, as part of the 
campaign to prevent the further spread of HIV. Clearly this measure alone is unlikely to be 
enough, since the students in the sample already had easy access to free condoms at the 
campus. 
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Annex 7.1: Corrections for mortality 
Suppose agents have an annual survival probability k tt kS p
−
+ =  of surviving period t+k, where 
p is the probability of surviving to the next period. Equation (7.11) then shows the relative 
weight an agent attaches in period t to her well-being in period t+k corrected for mortality 
from which agents’ unconditional discount rate ucρ , i.e. not conditioned on the survival rate, 









+⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
 (7.11) 
 
where ρ  the discount rate conditional on his survival function t kS + . Assuming constant 
survival probability, the probability of dying in year k is ( ) (1 )kf k p p= −  such that from the 
expected time of death measured at time 0, ( )i D i iE T Lex Age
∧
= − , the probability of survival 
to the next period, p can be solved  using the general formula of Equation (7.12) for a 

















































Substituting (7.13) in (7.11) and solving for the conditional discount rate, provides the 
discount rate conditional on the discrete survival function, specified in Equation (7.14).  
 
 (1 ) 1uc pρ ρ= + −  (7.14) 
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Annex 7.2: Corrections for risk attitude  
Consider two certain monetary outcome Mt  and Mt+k at time t and t+k. An individual is 
indifferent between these two monetary outcomes if Equation (7.15) holds. 
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In this specification, the initial assumption that individuals are risk-neutral in intertemporal 





. Combining Equation (7.15) and (7.11) 
results in the Equation (7.16): 
 
1 11
1 (1 ) 1
t t t k t k
k




















⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
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Annex 7.3: Corrections for differences in anticipated future consumption levels (for 
HIV positive group only) 
 











, where 1'( ) 0,  ''( ) 0 if 0U C C U C Cγ γγ γ− − −= > = − < > .  
Assuming that, for people who are actually infected by HIV positive, the impact on marginal 
utility of anticipated consumption decline is substantially larger than the impact of differences 
in monetary rewards, the latter can be ignored and a standard expression for the consumption 
discount factor (CDF) can be used to compare current and future award benefits: 
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Using (18) in the equation indicating when agents are indifferent between an award at t and an 
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in which t kq +  the relative future consumption level, ρ  is the discount rate. Solving for ρ  

















Assuming a nonnegative intertemporal substitution parameter γ , ρ  is decreasing in both qt+k 
and γ: 
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Assuming that the relative price of future consumption is different for HIV positive agents, 
but equal for all agents in each group, ρ  can be estimated if the value of t kq +  is known. 
Assuming in addition that differences in the relative future consumption level between 
insured (I) and not insured (NI) HIV positive individuals are only caused by expenditures for 
medical consumption and that insured and uninsured HIV positive agents have the same pure 
rate of time preference, ˆNIq  in Equation (22)  would provide an estimate for the relative 
future consumption level of uninsured HIV positive individuals with respect to insured HIV 
positive individuals: 
 1
(1 ) 1 
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obsρ  is the average of the for mortality and risk attitude corrected discount rate of 
insured HIV positive subjects as defined in Equation (7.17) and ρ
NI
obs  is the for mortality 
corrected discount rate as defined in Equation  (7.14). 
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Annex 7.4:  Summary tables  
 
Table A7.1: Definitions and slopes of regression lines (group 1 to 4 in brackets). 
 Definition of discount rate Slope (all) Slope ( 0γ ≥ )
  all p-value 0γ ≥  p-value




















DMU Discount rate conditioned on survival, risk attitude (group 1 
to 4), and differences in marginal utility for group 5 based 
on discount rate of insured HIV+ subjects (q=0.55)  






Table A7.2: Differences in discount rate for group 4 and 5. Sample 0γ ≥ . 
 D DM DRA DMU
 
Group 4 58.33 56.51 50.98 50.98 
Group 5 18.62 18.01 14.59 29.23 
 Δ 39.71 38.51 36.38 21.75 
p-value 0.0008 0.0009 0.02 0.13 
 Δ reduction  1.20 2.12 14.64 
Total reduction    17.9 
 
                                                 
26 Slope of regression line, when considering only group 1 to 4. 

















8.1  Summary 
After its discovery in the late 1970s, the AIDS epidemic has continued to exceed all 
expectations in terms of both size and impact. In 2005, an estimated 39.5 million people are 
living with HIV worldwide and over 25 million had already died of AIDS related diseases. 
Swaziland leads the ostensibly limitless world rankings, having over one third of its adult 
population infected. It is undisputable that households carrying an HIV infected person or 
that have lost the main income earner due to AIDS are coping with the most severe 
consequences of the disease. They are not only forced to face the health and psychological 
aspects of the disease, like physical decay, strong medication with demanding complicated 
regimes, caring for the AIDS-sick family member, stigmatization, and grief after demise, but 
in these difficult circumstances they must also overcome severe problems of an economic 
nature. The disease prevents fulltime work and limits continued labor market participation. In 
developing countries, where a large part of the population already lives in poverty, and where 
well-functioning social security systems rarely exist, this often implies a fall in an already 
meager income together with significant increases in indispensable medical care expenses. 
This dissertation studied how households cope with this changed economic situation. It 
addressed the question of whether the sketched situation forces households to take financial 
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precautions, like additional saving, before infection takes place or before the increased expenses 
and reduced income actually arise. In other words, are households adapting their economic 
behavior to be able to limit the economic impact of HIV? 
 
In the hardest hit countries, clearly it is not only HIV affected households that carry the 
burden of the epidemic. Whole societies are disrupted. Companies, for example, are exposed 
to high absence rates, and reduced productivity caused by physical and emotional stress, 
reducing the effectiveness of investments. Governments are confronted with an increased 
need for expenditures on health and social benefits, while at the same time the tax base is 
eroded. In these circumstances, households can only reckon on limited government support. 
Moreover, it is expected that economic growth is dampened, which further decreases the 
possibilities of governments to support these households. Surprisingly, macro- empirical 
studies measuring the economic impact of HIV/AIDS find ambiguous results. These 
divergent findings ask for an explanation. Micro-level research, currently rather unexplored, 
could provide insight into the following questions. Are current studies based on different, 
among which also wrong, assumptions? Is HIV/AIDS only affecting isolated parts of society, 
while other parts benefit, such that the aggregate impact is limited? Or do adaptation 
mechanisms exist at the micro level that limit the expected negative economic impact at the 
macro level? 
 
This dissertation aimed to contribute to the exploration of the latter question, that is, are 
microeconomic processes or behavioral changes taking place that reduce the dreaded 
macroeconomic impact of the epidemic? Could these processes and behaviors be stimulated? 
The research focused on the question of how the AIDS epidemic influences the economic 
choices of households over time and studied their saving behavior in particular. The literature 
discussion in Chapter 3 showed that the economic consequences for families with an infected 
household member are large. In countries where few are covered by medical insurance and 
many live in poverty, this raised the question of what specific strategies households could 
employ to cope with a possible health shock like HIV/AIDS. Additional saving, for example, 
enables households to pay for better medical care, resulting in more continued labor market 
participation. Households would in this case not only be better able to bear the economic 
consequences of an HIV infection, but the side-effect of continued labor market participation 
would be a reduction in the negative impact on economic growth. This argument posed the 
main research question of this study: Do individuals anticipate the economic costs related to 
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possible HIV infection by incrementing savings? In answering this core question, this study 
followed different routes, using theoretical, empirical, as well as experimental methods. This 
dissertation not only analyzed the economic behavior of HIV infected people, like many 
existing micro-empirical studies, it especially focused on the behavior of individuals who are 
not (yet) infected. After all, the perception alone of the risk of contracting HIV during one’s 
lifetime may influence economic behavior. Therefore this study also addressed the issue of 
whether individuals who perceive themselves to be at risk actually are at risk by analyzing 
their sexual behavior. Part I of this thesis expounded the main ideas behind this research, 
provided the main facts on the disease, and presented an overview of the related literature. 
 
For the theoretical framework, this dissertation used a two-period lifecycle model, which 
assumes that individuals smooth consumption over the lifecycle. HIV/AIDS influences this 
process both directly and indirectly; directly, through the negative impact on productivity 
when infected, resulting in lower income, and indirectly, through an increase in mortality risk 
and expenditures on medical treatment, which are necessary to keep the disease under 
control. This study analyzed these indirect effects in particular. Although the insights found in 
the literature on HIV/AIDS and intertemporal choice include the effects of reduced 
longevity, how perceptions of both mortality and illness risk and its attended health costs 
influence these choices is rather unexplored. In any case, saving behavior is underrepresented 
in the studies on the economics of HIV/AIDS, given that it is saving behavior that is one of 
the means by which households can independently cope with income shocks, such as the 
ones caused by HIV/AIDS. People can namely save in many ways, both formally and 
informally, which could thus be an alternative in countries with limited or inaccessible 
financial and medical insurance markets. Of course, saving is only possible when income is 
above the subsistence level. 
 
For the empirical and experimental framework, an experimental study was conducted among 
students in South Africa. The study was exclusively designed to examine the research 
questions addressed in this dissertation. South Africa has been facing high HIV prevalence 
rates for many years, which enabled evaluating possible individuals’ responses accordingly. 
Data on individual characteristics, financial and sexual behavior was supplemented with 
estimates of the individual risk and time preferences. Risk aversion was measured by offering 
the respondents a list with ten choices between two possible lotteries. One lottery was riskier 
than the other, and the chance of payment of the price of the risky lottery increased over the 
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ten choices. Having a certain level of risk tolerance, the respondent chose at a certain moment 
for the riskier lottery if the expected payoff was large enough. The exact point of transition 
determined the individual level of risk aversion. For the measurement of time preferences, a 
similar method was applied. The respondent was asked to choose between a certain amount 
to be received in the present or a higher amount in the future, for example one year later. The 
list included twenty different choices where the future amount was increasing. When the 
future amount was high enough, the respondent switched to the future amount. The moment 
of transition provided a measure for the individual time preference. Monetary incentives were 
used to observe true behavior. 
 
8.2  Conclusions 
This thesis found evidence that the AIDS epidemic influences the individual saving 
behavior of both infected and uninfected individuals. It thus seems to be the case that 
households adapt their economic behavior to be able to limit the economic impact of 
HIV/AIDS. These microeconomic behavioral changes may be a reason for the findings of 
both a limited impact and divergent effects of HIV/AIDS prevalence on economic growth. 
 
8.2.1  Part II: Theoretical model 
Chapter 4 showed both theoretically and empirically that saving behavior is influenced 
in at least two opposing ways: on the one hand increased mortality risk lowers the amount 
individuals save, and on the other hand HIV infection or perceived infection risk increases 
their savings. Although HIV infection substantially reduces life expectancy, the data showed 
that the positive effect of the perceived infection risk or of being seropositive dominates. 
Additionally, savings of medically insured individuals that perceived a significant HIV 
contraction risk were enhanced as well. This finding indicates that the respondents not only 
anticipated the medical costs, but also foresaw other types of income shocks (for example, an 
expected fall in income due to reduced productivity). The empirical results of Chapter 4 
suggest that in a society where the population is confronted daily with diverse aspects of the 
AIDS epidemic, individuals adapt their saving behavior to the uncertainties that the epidemic 
engenders, like premature mortality, medical costs, and a fall in income. In this thesis, the 
phenomenon that individuals in societies confronted with HIV anticipate possible HIV 
infection by raising the amount of savings is called the “HIV anticipatory saving motive”. 
Obviously savings are only enhanced whenever individuals are aware of the illness risk and 
the additional related costs they might face. 
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Chapter 4, however, did not show how the epidemic influences the aggregate savings of a 
country. As was just mentioned, awareness of the contamination risk and the consequent 
costs is the clue to an increase in savings. This does not only vary from person to person, but 
is also related to the stage of the epidemic. In an early stage, when HIV incidence is low, there 
is little awareness and savings will thus be influenced differently than in later stages in which 
every member of society is confronted daily with the disease or its consequences. Therefore, 
Chapter 5 considered how aggregate savings evolve over the different stages of the epidemic. 
The chapter extended the two-period lifecycle model of Chapter 4 by incorporating 
differences in the level of awareness and in doing so it distinguished between people based on 
their test status. The extended model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the 
different stages of the AIDS epidemic and country’s aggregate savings. In an early stage of the 
epidemic, when the disease is relatively unknown, seropositive-tested individuals will have less 
of an incentive to save, because the increased mortality risk decreases the expected utility of 
consumption at old-age. In such a stage, aggregate savings in a country are expected to fall. 
This is exactly in line with the negative effect that Bonnel (2000) found in his cross-country 
study making use of data from the early stage of the epidemic. Savings only start to increase 
when individuals start anticipating both the contamination risk as well as the economic 
consequences of the disease. The model showed that in this stage, savings could even increase 
relative to the pre–epidemic level. The awareness-process was modeled by varying the 
intensity of diagnostic testing. Only when this intensity and the utility of medical 
consumption compared to regular consumption were high enough, then savings in a country 
hit by HIV/AIDS would rise. In view of the necessity for medication, the second condition 
was easily met. In this model it was assumed that infected people die prematurely, making 
HIV positive tested people spread their income over a shorter period of time and start 
dissaving relatively early. That is why the model predicted that savings would decline again in 
a very extensive epidemic, when a relatively large part of the population carries the virus. The 
increased mortality risk amplified this reduction. 
 
The negative impact on savings in the first period arose from incomplete information. Since 
the model predicts that savings increase when the testing intensity is increased, this could be a 
policy instrument for stimulating individuals to anticipate possible infection. For that reason 
Chapter 5 also analyzed whether expanding diagnostic testing would not only increase 
savings, but would also improve welfare. Raising the testing intensity in a later phase of life 
would indeed lead to an improvement in social welfare. Awareness of HIV status, both 
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positive and negative, enabled individuals to efficiently distribute income over their lifetime 
and allowed HIV positive individuals to buy the appropriate medical consumption. Also 
expanding testing facilities in an early phase of life enabled individuals to distribute income 
more efficiently. Seropositive-tested individuals did not need to unnecessarily save for 
consumption at old-age. On the other hand, the chapter incorporated additional effects of 
HIV status knowledge. In particular, being diagnosed as HIV positive could lead to non-
economic negative consequences, such as the fear of dying, or being stigmatized. If these 
negative side-effects are strong enough, extending testing intensity could possibly affect 
welfare negatively. Because the model postulated a “longevity” insurance in which individuals 
that are tested HIV negative could not participate, simply because disbursement would 
otherwise have occurred with certainty, the welfare effect of extending diagnostic testing for 
HIV negative individuals in an early phase of life appeared to be ambiguous. Although 
negatively tested individuals did not face mortality risk in the first period of life, enabling 
them to efficiently distribute income, their income in the second period of life was relatively 
low. This was due to the fact that they could not benefit from the disbursement of the 
longevity insurance that they would have had received if they had remained untested. 
Nevertheless, this chapter also showed that people dissave when mortality increases and save 
additionally if the HIV contamination rate is large. Moreover, it showed that diagnostic 
testing could be welfare improving. 
 
8.2.2  Part III: Experimental approach 
The influence of the HIV anticipatory saving motive in a country depends on the 
perceived HIV contraction risk, as was introduced in the first part of this thesis. However, it 
also depends on individual risk and time preferences. Moreover, the latter two may be related 
to the actual HIV contamination risk. Risk-averse individuals may take financial precautions 
more easily than risk-loving individuals. Additionally, individuals that are more forward-
looking will be more inclined to anticipate the costs of illness that may come up in a later 
stage of life. Risk and time preferences influence sexual behavior as well, which further 
complicates the relation with saving behavior. Chapter 6 analyzed these relations using the 
experimental data that was collected among students in South Africa. 
 
The empirical results showed that sexually-experienced participants are considerably more 
risk-tolerant than participants lacking sexual experience. The data, however, did not show a 
relation between risk attitude and condom use. Considering risk attitude sec, having sexual 
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experience in countries with a high HIV prevalence rate seemed to be a venture in itself. That 
is, risk-averse participants appeared to view abstinence as an alternative to using condoms in 
preventing the contraction of the virus, while risk attitude did not materialize in the choice 
whether or not to use condoms. Participants that were tested HIV negative appeared to 
exhibit more risk-averse behavior. The diagnosis thus seemed to reflect their risk behavior. 
Participants that had never been tested, exhibited on average less risk-tolerant behavior 
compared to those that had been tested. Consequently, the results of this study showed that 
offering voluntary testing is likely to attract a disproportionately large percentage of (HIV 
negative) risk-avoiders. 
 
The literature showed that HIV infection entails great expenses in the future. These costs, 
however, are relatively small for people with a high rate of time preference, in other words for 
people who are more present-oriented. Therefore, one might expect that individuals with a 
high rate of time preference would exhibit riskier sexual behavior than people with low time 
preferences. Indeed, Chapter 6 showed that after correcting for socio-economic background 
and HIV awareness, both sexually experienced individuals and individuals that reported to 
have unsafe sex displayed significantly higher discount rates. Hence, unsafe sex appeared to 
be partly an economically explicable choice belonging to individual risk and time preference.  
 
Both HIV positive participants, as well as participants with high-perceived contamination 
risk, the so-called “high-risk group”, displayed considerably less risk-averse behavior. 
Assuming that their risk behavior is translated into their sexual behavior, this would subscribe 
to their perceptions of HIV contraction risk. Moreover, this high-risk group appeared to have 
characteristic individual risk and time preferences that mitigate the HIV anticipatory saving 
motive: specifically the group that should anticipate HIV infection more will proportionally do 
so to a lesser extent. Although the high-risk group is more present-oriented, the HIV positive 
group appeared to be more future-oriented than all other considered groups, i.e. the estimated 
mean rate of time preference was significantly lower. This is a remarkable result for two 
reasons: first, the data showed that higher discount rates are related to risky sexual behavior. 
Besides, expected lifetime is eminently shorter, which would stimulate present-oriented 
behavior. Due to the lack of panel data, behavioral changes could not be evaluated. However, 
based on the perceptions of HIV contraction risk, these initial results did suggest that time 
preferences change after becoming diagnosed as HIV positive. 
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The striking finding of Chapter 6 was further analyzed in Chapter 7. The assumption that the 
pure rate of time preference is the only factor entering the pricing of future benefits was 
dropped and time preferences were estimated again while correcting for differences in 
mortality and risk attitude. After integrating these other factors, which proportionally reduced 
the estimations for the rate of time preferences of the other groups, HIV positive participants 
on average still displayed a significantly lower discount rate compared to the high-risk group. 
However, their discount rate was no longer significantly lower than the low-risk groups.  
 
Further analysis of the data showed that seropositive participants having medical insurance 
displayed higher time preferences than uninsured seropositive participants did. Chapter 7 
explained this result by arguing that the measured individual discount rate also includes 
perceptions of future consumption levels. Under this assumption, the expected consumption 
level for HIV positive individuals over a two-year period was calculated resulting in an 
estimate of 66% of the current consumption level. This finding, solely based on experimental 
data, corresponds to the decline that Steinberg et al. (2000) had measured in their empirical 
research among HIV households in South Africa. The HIV anticipatory saving motive of the 
HIV positive group does thus not only appear to reveal itself in the total amount they save, 
but also in the measured discount rate of those that were uninsured. Apparently, they did not 
save enough to offset the expected decline in future consumption level and used the 
experiments as an opportunity to supplement their current savings.  
 
Although the uninsured HIV positive group considered the expected decline in consumption 
level in valuing future benefits, the high-risk group did not seem to consider this decline. It 
could possibly be that their savings were already sufficient to anticipate the expected illness 
costs. However, since they seemed to underestimate the lifetime prolonging impact of 
medicines, it is more likely that they also underestimated the economic consequences. They 
did, however, consider their life expectancy realistically lower than the low-risk groups. In 
general, HIV awareness in the sample was high; more than half of the students considered 
HIV contraction risk for other students to be high and almost 80% ranked HIV/AIDS as the 
number one cause of death in their province. Moreover, estimations for the average infection 
probabilities based on perceptions of remaining lifetime were close to the actual HIV 
prevalence rate in South Africa. Improving awareness of the economic consequences seems 
to be a natural next step. 
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After applying the last correction, the discount rate of the HIV positive group was no longer 
statistically different from the high-risk group. Furthermore, the corrected estimations 
showed the expected distinct positive relation between perceived exposure to contracting 
HIV and time preferences. HIV infection thus changes the pricing of future benefits, in other 
words the discount rate, but not, as was initially suggested by the raw estimates, the individual 
rate of time preference.  
 
Considering the high social costs attached to HIV/AIDS, intervention seems justified even if 
individuals are fully informed and act privately normal. Since risky sexual behavior is 
associated with high risk and time preferences, changing these preferences could contribute to 
preventing the further spread of HIV. This is not at all easy, since risk and time preferences 
are notably developed during early childhood (Maital & Maital, 1977), and this strategy would 
cross the threshold between normative and positive analysis. However, given individual’s risk 
and time preferences, prevention focused on increasing knowledge of the total expected costs 
of risky sexual behavior could already limit risky sexual behavior. Furthermore, offering 
monetary incentives might be necessary to tilt the intertemporal tradeoff implicit in choosing 
to practice unsafe sex towards the safe sex option. For example, free distribution of condoms, 
that lower the present costs of safe sex, could be a useful tool in prevention campaigns. 
 
8.2.3  Methodological issues 
Although not core questions of this thesis, some methodological issues were 
addressed. Firstly, the experimental methods resulted in a relatively high frequency of multiple 
switching compared to previous studies conducted in western countries. The switching 
appeared more often in the risk-aversion tasks. Part of the switching could be explained by 
individual preferences, being indifferent over a certain interval of options, but another part 
was likely due to misunderstanding the tasks. Computerized experiments measuring risk and 
time preferences often force one switching-point. This study suggests that real preferences 
cannot be revealed when no option of being indifferent between the two alternatives is 
offered. 
 
Secondly, Chapter 7 showed that conclusions based on discount rates estimates which fail to 
incorporate other factors than the pure rate of time preference may be biased. Not only did 
the discount rate of HIV positive participants not turn out to be an outlier in relation to risk 
exposure after correction, but the evidence for quasi-hyperbolic discounting that was found in 
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Chapter 6 based on uncorrected discount rates is also rejected after correcting for mortality 
and risk behavior. 
 
8.3  Future research 
This study answers some questions, but raises some as well. The study finds evidence 
for the HIV anticipatory saving motive. Awareness of HIV contraction risk appears to 
augment anticipatory behavior. Two additional questions could, however, be raised in this 
respect: do households also sufficiently anticipate both direct and indirect costs of HIV 
infection? In other words, is the increase in their savings enough to cover the total costs of 
infection? And secondly, is the HIV anticipatory saving motive based on actual risk exposure 
or is this motive anxiety related? The answer to the first question may be negative for the 
uninsured HIV positive group. The lower discount rates for this group suggest that their 
savings are not high enough to offset the expected decline in future consumption level. For 
the insured HIV positive group and the other risk groups it was not possible to evaluate 
whether they saved enough with the available data. Following the economic behavior of 
individuals over more periods by using panel data could provide an answer to this question. 
The second question could be answered by taking blood samples that could be screened for 
HIV in follow-ups of this type of experimental research. In this way, it would be possible to 
identify whether those who perceive themselves to be highly at risk do in fact contract HIV 
more often than others. Moreover, this information would be more reliable than self-reported 
sexual behavior and health status. 
 
Another question is raised by the finding that although on average people that perceive to be 
highly at risk of contracting the virus during their lifetime take financial precautions, still over 
one third reported to neither have medical insurance nor save. Do these subjects that do not 
take precautions not consider the economic costs of an HIV infection? Or does their budget 
not allow them to save or have medical insurance? A deeper analysis of their economic 
profiles would help to answer this question. A similar question is invited by the fact that 
among the savers that perceive to be highly exposed to HIV contraction risk only one third 
had medical insurance. Further analysis could show whether or not they save instead of 
buying medical insurance, and why this may be the case. Do people prefer savings because of 
their flexibility? Savings can be used as insurance against many types of income shocks, not 
only increased medical costs. Or is the preference for savings caused by a lack of trust or 
quality in local insurance providers? Or is insuring simply too expensive? 




With regard to the theoretical part of this study, future research is encouraged to extend the 
presented theoretical models by incorporating endogenous relations and to improve modeling 
the effects of HIV/AIDS on intertemporal choice. The theoretical two-period lifecycle 
models in Part II, for example, do not include the direct effects of an HIV infection on 
income. Furthermore, the current models include only two periods. Extending these models 
to more periods or making the model continuous would allow the incorporation of the effects 
of medicines on productivity and the prolongation of lifetime. 
 
Concerning methodological issues, including an indifference option in the experimental tasks, 
would improve measuring the preferences of subjects. Omitting the indifference option 
complicates distinguishing between inability and indifference, when subjects exhibit multiple 
switching. In follow-ups it would therefore be interesting to analyze the effect of including 
such an indifference option in the experimental tasks. Moreover, the expected bias resulting 
from forcing one switching-point should be measured. If switching appears to be largely due 
to misunderstanding, new methods of measuring risk and time preferences should be 
developed for less educated samples. 
 
The empirical and experimental results in this study were based on a study among students 
only. There are three reasons why further extending the research to field subjects is necessary. 
First, although it was possible to correct for a wide range of socio-economic variables it is 
important to test the HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis among groups having different 
educational backgrounds, since it is relevant to know to whether the results can be applied to 
the South African population in general. In doing so it would be important to address the 
methodological issues mentioned above. Second, both adaptation mechanisms and risk and 
time preferences may not only vary with the level of HIV prevalence but also across 
countries, requiring measuring possible differences across countries. Third, it is important to 
evaluate whether the empirical and experimental findings on HIV positive participants in this 
thesis are biased for characteristics that are related to not dropping-out of school when 
diagnosed HIV positive. Besides these reasons, it would be of interest to analyze whether 
seropositive individuals attending HIV support groups and receiving counseling behave 
differently than HIV positive subjects who do not have such support. Councilors may have 
played an important role in stimulating the anticipatory behavior of infected students.  
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8.4  Policy recommendations 
Based on the main findings of this thesis, and complying with the limitations of this 
research addressed in the previous section, I cautiously recommend some policy measures to 
be taken. 
 
People that are aware of the AIDS epidemic include both the mortality risk and the increase 
in the expected illness costs in their saving behavior. Among high-risk and HIV positive 
groups, this leads on balance to an increase in individual savings. This increase enlarges the 
possibilities for these households to face up to the financial consequences of an HIV 
infection. Saving does not only increase the accessibility for medical treatment. Medical 
treatment also prolongs labor force participation, dampening the negative impact on 
economic growth. People that are not sufficiently aware of the contamination risk will 
insufficiently anticipate the economic risks. These people should thus be informed of the 
risks they face. There are two possible measures: Intensifying testing, while at the same time 
carefully dealing with the stigmatization of HIV positive individuals. Since the results of this 
study showed that offering voluntary testing attracts a disproportionately large percentage of 
(HIV negative) risk-avoiders, it is recommended to cater to risk-loving behavior in campaigns 
to recruit people to get tested. Secondly, next to informing people about AIDS and the 
prevention possibilities in the usual prevention campaigns, campaigns that include a strong 
emphasis on the actual contamination risk and economic consequences are advised. 
 
Risky sexual behavior appears to be an economic choice which depends on individual risk and 
time preferences. Risk and time preferences that correspond to risky sexual behavior in 
particular have a negative impact on the HIV anticipatory saving motive. Here the results 
show that people, who actually should save, will do so to a less extent. It might therefore 
seem straightforward to aim at changing people’s risk and time preferences. This strategy, 
however, would demand a completely different approach than the usual ones and might not 
be easy to implement. Moreover, this strategy would invalidate the assumptions of normative 
analysis where preferences are considered as given. Changing risk and time preferences 
would, however, have two important effects: it would limit risky sexual behavior, which 
would reduce the further spread of HIV, and in addition it would stimulate the “HIV 
anticipating saving motive”, so that people that do contract the virus after all are better able 
to cope with the economic consequences. Based on the results of this study, at least 
considering development of prevention aimed at influencing these characteristics is therefore 
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strongly recommended. Another option is the offering of monetary incentives that reduce 
risky sexual behavior or stimulate safe sex by, for example, the free distribution of condoms. 
This would also mitigate the further spread of the virus, but this is clearly not enough since 
the students in the sample already had easy access to free condoms at the campus. Finally, 
educating people about the true risk of infection and future illness costs would enable them to 
make an optimal choice in accordance with their preferences.  
 
Medical costs and income shocks are less prominent in western countries with well-
functioning social safety nets and the majority of people having medical insurance. In these 
countries, saving for HIV related costs is less necessary and the HIV anticipatory savings 
motive will probably be less present. However, this research may still contribute to HIV 
prevention in these areas as well. This study showed that high risk and time preferences are 
related to sexual behavior. We should be careful in extrapolating findings based on research 
among students in South Africa to people in Western countries, since economic behavior is at 
least partly culturally determined. Still, focusing prevention campaigns more on individuals 
with these characteristic risk and time preferences may also help reduce the number of 
infections in these countries. Since HIV infected people in western countries receive relatively 
more extensive and costly treatment compared to the treatment in developing countries, this 
might lead to a substantial reduction in the medical costs for society, even though HIV is less 
prevalent. 
 
This study is one of the first attempts to measure the effect of HIV/AIDS on intertemporal 
choices. Although many research questions still need to be addressed, it provides some 
valuable insights which can be useful for designing policies for both preventing the further 
spread of HIV and improving the economic situation of both HIV affected households and 
society as a whole. 
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A.1  Introduction 
The empirical results in this dissertation are based on an experimental study that was 
exclusively designed to study the research questions addressed in the introduction. This 
appendix describes the data and the series of experiments, which were conducted among 
students in 2005 and 2006 in South Africa. 
 
Research location 
To obtain a better understanding of how individuals’ intertemporal choices like saving 
decisions change when individuals are exposed to mortality risk and HIV contraction risk, it 
was necessary to conduct this research in a country with a high level of HIV prevalence. 
South Africa was for several reasons suitable for this research: First, it has been facing high 
HIV prevalence rates for many years. In a well-established epidemic, individuals are more 
likely to consider the risk of contracting the virus, which enabled us to evaluate individuals’ 
economic response accordingly. Second, English is the second language for most South 
Africans. This reduces misinterpretations of the questionnaires. Furthermore, the research 
could be carried out without the help of translators and interpreters. Third, South Africa has a 
relatively well-performing financial market. This was a prerequisite for the incentive payment 
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structure of the experiments (explained in Section A.2). Since financial instruments are 
available for a large part of the population this improved the general understanding of the 
questions and experimental tasks as well.  
 
The actual research took place at both Pretoria University (PU) and Northwest University 
(NWU), situated in respectively the province Gauteng and North West Province of South 
Africa. In the latter, the research was conducted among students from both Mafikeng campus 
and Potchefstroom campus, two different campuses of NWU. The first series of experiments 
(in November 2005) were conducted at NWU only. The second round (in October 2006) 
took place at both universities.  
 
Ethical approval 
The ethical committee of NWU gave ethical approval for this research. Every participant has 
signed an informed consent form in which he officially agreed to participate in the research. 
The original set-up of this research included a HIV test after the session, however, because of 
ethical reasons; the committee did not give approval for doing this. The results on HIV status 
are therefore based on self-reported status only. As a result, possible differences in the 
parameters of this study between HIV positive subjects that are aware of their positive status 
and those who are not could not be evaluated. Neither could it be studied to what group HIV 




Students were the target group, which is for practical reasons often the case in experimental 
research. Although the experimental methods had extensively been tested among both 
students and field subjects, they have not often been applied at the African continent. To be 
cautious, the method is therefore applied to well-educated individuals, i.e. students. 
Conclusions based on the empirical results in this thesis can therefore not be straight away 
applied to the South African population in general and should thus be interpreted with care.  
 
The initial intention was to conduct experiments at Mafikeng campus only, since this campus 
consists of mainly black South African students. Pettifor et al. (2004) showed that among this 
ethnical group, HIV prevalence rates are significantly larger, so that a wider spread sample 
over the categories of perceived HIV contamination risk could be expected. Potchefstroom 
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campus functions as the control group, where 24 black and 32 white South Africans 
participated. The results show no significant differences between black South African 
students at Potchefstroom campus and Mafikeng campus for the main variables of interest i.e. 
risk aversion (RA), discount rate (D), life expectancy (LEX), and saving behavior.1 
 
The second round of the experiments was conducted among HIV positive subjects only, 
which were recruited from the HIV supports groups at both PU and NWU. Although I am 
aware of the fact that this way of recruiting might lead to a selection bias, I choose to follow 
this procedure in order to obtain a substantial group of HIV positive subjects in the sample. 
The major variables do not significantly differ between the HIV positive subjects in the first 
round and in the second round at Mafikeng campus.2 
 
A.2  Experimental set-up 
Experimental team 
The experimental team consisted in alphabetical order of Marten van Garderen, Judith 
Lammers, Morten Igel Lau, Martine Smit, and Harrie Verbon. Both Judith Lammers and 
Marta Serra Garcia were responsible for the data processing. 
 
Recruitment of students 
In the first round of the experiments, students were recruited using promotional flyers and 
posters at both campuses. Figure A.1 contains an example of these promotional flyers, which 
invited students to participate in an experiment on economic decision-making. To avoid a 
selection bias, the students were not provided with other information on the experiments, 
neither were they informed that this research was linked to HIV research. Subjects were paid 
on average a comparable hourly student wage, to reduce a possible selection bias towards 
income.  
                                                 
1 P-value RA=0.45, p-value D=0.64, and p-value LEX=0.26. To measure saving behavior, subjects were asked 
whether they saved (p-value S=0.98), and whether they had a savings account (p-value SACC=0.94). 
Interestingly, students at Potchefstroom who did save, saved a significantly higher amount (p-value SAM=0.05). 
This result is however not income driven, as the two groups do not significantly differ in this respect (p-value 
own income=0.79, p-value income group parents=0.47. They did also not significantly live more often in 
informal dwellings (p-value=0.95). All based on the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test. 
2 P-value RA=0.83, p-value D=0.30, p-value LEX=0.77, p-value S=0.64, p-value SACC=0.32, p-value 
SAM=0.59 based on the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test. 
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Figure A.1: Promotional flyer (Potchefstroom campus). 
 
Invitation to participate in an economic 
experiment, have a learning experience and 
earn cash money, all at the same time! 
 
We are looking for students at Potchefstroom campus who want to 
participate in an experiment on economic decision-making. These 
experiments are conducted under the responsibility of researchers 
from Tilburg University, The Netherlands. Sessions are scheduled 
on Friday November 11th and they will last for 2,5 hours 
approximately. Session 1 starts at 9:00 and session 2 at 13:00 in 
G26 in building E3.  You can sign up for only one of these 
sessions. 
There is no need to prepare: the workings of the experiment will be 
explained at the beginning of the experimental session.  
 
All participants are guaranteed a R 30 participation fee, but you 
could make additional earnings based on the decisions you make. 
Payments vary between R 30 and R 526. Studies like these are 
performed at many universities around the world, and on average 
participants in such studies earn R 95. Be aware that differences 
across participants may be great, so you could make much more or 
much less than that. Nevertheless, you will never make less than R 
30, the guaranteed fee.  
 
Interested? Then sign up for one of the experimental sessions in 





In the first round, students were signed up in ten different sessions. Each session was 
conducted in lecture rooms with the number of students ranging from 15 to 28. The first 
seven sessions have been conducted at Mafikeng campus and the other three at 
Potchefstroom campus. The second round of experiments took place at locations where the 
HIV support groups regularly meet. Only one of the HIV support group attendances decided 
not to participate. Table A.1 provides more details on the sessions. 
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Table A.1: Session information. 






FED      nFED 
1 Wed, Nov 02-05 09:00 Judith Mafikeng 20 25 80% 20 - 
2 Thu, Nov 03-05 13:00 Morten Mafikeng 22 27 81% 22 - 
3 Fri, Nov 04-05 09:00 Judith Mafikeng 20 26 77% - 20 
4 Fri, Nov 04-05 13:00 Morten Mafikeng 15 27 56% - 15 
5 Mo, Nov 07-05 13:00 Judith Mafikeng 20 33 61% 20 - 
6 Tue, Nov 08-05 09:00 Judith Mafikeng 16 33 48% 16 - 
7 Tue, Nov 08-05 13:00 Judith Mafikeng 28 45 62% - 28 
8 Fri, Nov 11-05 09:00 Judith Potchefstroom 17 25 68% - 17 
9 Fri, Nov 11-05 13:00 Judith Potchefstroom 20 29 69% 20 - 
10 Mo, Nov 14-05 11:00 Judith Potchefstroom 19 23 83% 19 - 
11 Tue, Oct 24-06 17:00 Judith Mafikeng 6 - - 6 - 
12 Wed, Oct 25-06 12:00 Judith Pretoria 10 - - 10 - 
   Total 10 197 293 68% 117 80 
   Mafikeng 8 141 216 66% 84 63 
   Potchefstroom 3 56 77 73% 39 17 
   Pretoria 1 10 - - 10  
 
Experimental procedure 
The experimental sessions were organized as follows: Before each session started, subjects 
had to hand in a signed informed consent form corresponding to the rules and regulation of 
NWU. Next, subjects picked an ID number randomly from an envelope, which they had to 
write on every part of the experiment. This number was used to keep track of who answered 
which questions, so that anonymity could be guaranteed. Subjects had to take place in rows 
with one seat in between to give them sufficient privacy in answering the questions.  
 
The sessions began by welcoming the subjects and reminding them that they were to be paid  
30 Rand3 for their participation as long as they stayed for the entire session. Under this 
condition, subjects were given the opportunity to leave, but nobody did. The instructions for 
the experiment were provided on paper, and subjects read them, while the experimenter read 
them aloud. The experimenter used a script (included in Appendix C) including the 
instructions for the complete session, which was identical for all 12 sessions. The 
experimenter emphasized that there were no right or wrong answers. 
 
For the randomization procedures in the experiment, a six-sided die, a ten-sided die, and a 
bingo cage containing 100 balls were used. The experimenter asked a volunteer to inspect the 
bingo cage and put all 100 balls, numbered from 1 to 100, in the bingo cage.  
 
                                                 
3 At the time of the experiment the exchange was: Rand (R), R 1 ≈ 0.14 USD  
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The total experiment was conducted in five parts of which three different questionnaires and 
two experimental tasks. Appendix D and E contain respectively the experimental tasks and 
the questionnaires. The first part of the experiment concerned a questionnaire regarding 
socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, race etc. Part II of the experiment 
consists of a risk aversion task including an example to practice. Part III constituted of six 
discount rate tasks. Section A.3 of this appendix will explain Part II and III in more detail. 
Part IV consisted of a questionnaire concerning questions related to the subject’s saving and 
borrowing behavior, and subjects’ expectations about their future economic conditions, and 
of the country as a whole. Part V consists of questions related to health, which was scheduled 
at the end of the experiment so that subjects would not link the experiments to HIV research 
while answering the first four parts. This last questionnaire aimed at eliciting subjects’ 
perceptions of life expectancy and HIV contraction risk, sexual behavior, and HIV status. 
Furthermore, the respondents were asked whether they had medical insurance.   
 
Motivating Participants 
In addition to a show-up fee of 30 Rand, performance-based real incentives were used to 
motivate participants based on the random lottery incentive system, the nowadays almost 
exclusively used incentive system for individual choice experiments (Holt & Laury, 2002). The 
main advantage of this system is that it avoids income effects such as Thaler & Johnson’s 
(1990) house money effect4, while it has been shown empirically that it is indeed incentive 
compatible, that is, agents do not interpret choice tasks rewarded with the random lottery 
incentive system as one grand overall lottery (Cubitt et al. 1998, Starmer & Sugden 1991). 
Since the task reported here was part of a larger experiment that all involved outright choices 
between two options, the probability that one of the chosen options would be played out for 
real was low. To be specific, in Part II and III each subject had a 10% chance of receiving 
some additional money in addition to the participation fee. On average participants could 
earn 65 Rand in the valuation task. While the participation fee and the additional money 
earned in Part II were paid cash, the additional payment in Part III, was paid by handing over 
a postdated check issued by Tilburg University, which could be cashed at any Standard Bank 
in South Africa any time after the specified date. 
 
                                                 
4 The premise that people are more willing to take risks with money they obtained easily or unexpectedly. 
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A.3  Experimental tasks 
The experimental tasks are based on the risk aversion experiments of Binswanger 
(1980), Holt & Laury (2002) and Harrison et al. (2005a) and the discount rate experiments of 
Coller & Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002). The amounts used in the different 
experimental tasks are based on Harrison et al. (2002, 2005a), corrected for the South African 
living standard.  
 
Part II 
In Part II, subjects were presented with a menu of choices that permits measurement of the 
degree of risk aversion using a so-called multiple-price list (MPL) design based on Holt & Laury 
(2002) and Harrison et al. (2005a). Each subject was asked to make a choice between two 
lotteries, which are called option A and option B. See column 2 and 3 in the table below. 
 
Table A.2: The ten paired lottery choice decisions. 
Decision          Option A         Option B Expected Expected payoff 
       Payoff Difference 
1   R 50.00 if ball is 1-10   R 96.25 if ball is 1-10 41 11.88 29.13 
   R 40.00 if ball is 11-100   R   2.50 if ball is 11-100    
2   R 50.00 if ball is 1-20  R 96.25  if ball is 1-20 42 21.25 20.75 
   R 40.00 if ball is 21-100  R   2.50  if ball is 21-100    
3   R 50.00 if ball is 1-30   R 96.25  if ball is 1-30 43 30.63 12.38 
   R 40.00 if ball is 31-100   R   2.50  if ball is 31-100    
4   R 50.00 if ball is 1-40  R 96.25  if ball is 1-40 44 40.00 4.00 
   R 40.00 if ball is 41-100  R   2.50  if ball is 41-100    
5   R 50.00 if ball is 1-50   R 96.25  if ball is 1-50 45 49.38 -4.38 
   R 40.00 if ball is 51-100   R   2.50  if ball is 51-100    
6   R 50.00 if ball is 1-60  R 96.25  if ball is 1-60 46 58.75 -12.75 
   R 40.00 if ball is 61-100  R   2.50  if ball is 61-100    
7   R 50.00 if ball is 1-70   R 96.25  if ball is 1-70 47 68.13 -21.13 
   R 40.00 if ball is 71-100   R   2.50  if ball is 71-100    
8   R 50.00 if ball is 1-80  R 96.25  if ball is 1-80 48 77.50 -29.50 
   R 40.00 if ball is 81-100  R   2.50  if ball is 81-100    
9   R 50.00 if ball is 1-90   R 96.25  if ball is 1-90 49 86.88 -37.88 
   R 40.00 if ball is 91-100   R   2.50  if ball is 91-100    
10   R 50.00 if ball is 1-100  R 96.25  if ball is 1-100 50 96.25 -46.25 
                
 
The first decision row shows that option A entails a lottery, which offers a 10% chance of 
receiving 50 Rand and a 90% chance of receiving 40 Rand. The expected value of this option 
is 41 Rand and is shown in the fourth column of the table. The last two columns of Table 
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A.2, however, was not presented to the subjects. Similarly, option B in the first row has 
chances of payoffs of 96.25 Rand and 2.50 Rand, which corresponds to an expected value of 
11.88 Rand. The expected value of the lottery of option A is 29.13 Rand higher than option 
B. Thus, only an extreme risk-seeker would choose option B. Appendix D contains the actual 
tables of the experiment. 
 
All other decisions in the table are similar, except moving down the table, the chances of 
receiving the higher payoff for each option increase. When the probability of the high-payoff 
outcome increases enough, the subject should cross over to option B. A risk-neutral subject 
would choose four times option A before switching to option B. In the bottom row, even the 
most risk-averse subject should switch to option B, since this option yields a sure payoff of 
96.25 Rand. 
Table A.3: Selection of decision rows by 
bingo ball draw (Part II). 




1 and 10 1 
11 and 20 2 
21 and 30 3 
31 and 40 4 
41 and 50 5 
51 and 60 6 
61 and 70 7 
71 and 80 8 
81 and 90 9 
91 and 100 10 
 
After all subjects completed the task, the experimenter generated some random draws to 
determine the possible additional payment of this task. First, for all subjects together, he drew 
a ball to select one decision row from the table using the bingo cage. Table A.3, showing 
which ball selects the corresponding decision row, was used for clarification of the selection 
process. 
 
A second draw determined whether subjects were to receive the high or the low payment. At 
this point all subjects knew whether they were playing lottery A or lottery B and what amount 
they would receive if they were selected to receive the additional payment. Finally, every 
subject rolled a ten-sided die in a lid. Only those subjects who drew a “0” received the 
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additional payment, which value thus depended both on the random draws and on subjects’ 
choice made in the selected row. All draws were registered and payments were made in 
private at the end of the session.   
 
To illustrate the specific procedures, subjects could practice with this type of task, the random 
draws, and the registration of these draws by doing an example (see Table D.1 in Appendix 
D). Also in this case, the subjects were paid according to their choices. In the example, 
however, the amounts were indicated in the number of sweets and thus subjects were paid in 
number of sweets when selected for additional payment. 
 





















In Part III, subjects were presented with a different type of MPL to measure individual time 
preferences. Participants were asked to make 20 outright choices in six different tables 
Decision Annual
Interest rate
1 R 172 R 182.60 3% A B
2 R 172 R 193.76 6% A B
3 R 172 R 205.51 9% A B
4 R 172 R 217.88 12% A B
5 R 172 R 230.90 15% A B
6 R 172 R 244.60 18% A B
7 R 172 R 259.00 21% A B
8 R 172 R 274.14 24% A B
9 R 172 R 290.05 27% A B
10 R 172 R 306.76 30% A B
11 R 172 R 324.30 33% A B
12 R 172 R 342.72 36% A B
13 R 172 R 362.05 39% A B
14 R 172 R 382.32 42% A B
15 R 172 R 403.58 45% A B
16 R 172 R 425.87 48% A B
17 R 172 R 449.22 51% A B
18 R 172 R 473.69 54% A B
19 R 172 R 499.32 57% A B
20 R 172 R 526.15 60% A B
Option B
To be paid in 24 months
Option A
To be paid in 1 month (Circle A or B)
Your choice
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between two options, called option A and option B, by simply encircling the preferred option 
on a sheet of paper. The options were presented in a table format similar to Table A.4 
reproduced above, as to make the task as easy and transparent as possible. The tables are 
based on the MPLs used in Harrison et al. (2002), which were adjusted to the South African 
living standard. Both options yielded monetary prizes at specified dates. More specifically, 
option A yielded 172 Rand in X months, while option B yielded an amount of 172+Y Rand 
in Z months. The amount 172+Y Rand that option B yielded increased after each choice, 
starting at 172+Y=172.43 Rand (see Appendix D, Problem 1). Within each table, the amount 
(Y) increased down the table over 20 different decision rows reflecting annual market interest 
rates from 3% to 60%, like in Table A.4 where Z is equal to 24 months. Thus, option B 
became more and more attractive after each choice. Decision row 10 provides the subject 
with a choice between option A, which pays 172 Rand today, and option B, which pays  
306.76 Rand over 24 months, which reflects an if annual interest rate of 30%. In addition, 
participants received information about the annual interest rate that reflected the different 
prizes offered by option B, similar to Coller & Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002). In 
this way, subjects were provided with the field opportunities, which enabled them to compare 
these with the laboratory experiment. Subjects were provided with six different problems, 
were the number of months, Z, increased from 2 to 24, covering six different time horizons 
(Z=2, 4, 6, 12, 18, and 24).  
 
For any given subject, the point at which they switch from choosing the present income 
option A to taking the future income option B, provides a boundary on the discount rate. If 
an individual choose option A, for all X up to 27%, and then switches to the future income 
option B, it can be deduced that his discount rate over Z months lies between 27% and 30%. 
Although, indeed some precision is lost by this interval procedure, the simple presentation of 
the MPL is likely to minimize confusion compared to more precise, but more complicated or 
computerized procedures.   
 
In this part, each subject had again, a 10% chance to receive an additional sum of money. 
How much they received depended partly on chance and partly on the choice, the subjects 
made in the six different problems. After all six problems of the discount rate tasks were filled 
out; the experimenter asked one of the subjects to throw a six-sided die to select the problem 
to be paid out. Next, he performed a random draw with the bingo cage, which selected the 
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decision row. Finally, subjects again threw a ten-sided die. Payments were made, if the subject 
threw a “0”. 
 
Before the subjects began to work on the six tables the experimenter carefully explained how  
subjects would be paid in this part of the experiment. Subjects that were selected to receive 
the additional payment in this part of the experiment received a postdated check, which could 
only be cashed after the specified date.  
 
Treatment 
There is empirical evidence that agents are more impatient about immediate delays than they 
are about future delays of the same length (Coller & Williams 1999). This effect is stronger in 
“hot” behaviors like sexual behavior (see Chapter 3). Therefore, the timing of the prizes of 
both options varied between the treatments. More specifically, in one treatment, called FED 
(Front-End Delay), subjects had to choose between two future payment options, i.e. option A 
always yielding a prize that would be paid in one month, and option B yielding a prize that 
would be paid in Z months. In the other treatment, called nFED (no Front-End Delay), 
option A always yielded an immediate prize instead while option B yielded a prize that would 
be paid in Z – 1 months. To be specific, in four out of twelve sessions, subjects were asked to 
choose between a present and a future payment option instead of two future payment options 
(see Table A.1). The time horizon between the treatments over the six different problems was 
kept the same.  
 
To avoid the potential problem of subjects facing transaction costs with the future income 
option, which they would not have with the present income option, the present income 
option was paid with the same postdated checks. Moreover, if despite this attempt to ensure 
full credibility in paying out the subjects, the subjective probability of receiving the future 
payment is less than 100%, the fact that both payment options are in the future (although the 
first in the very near future), should minimize any differences in perceived risk between the 
two payment options. So, by offering subjects in both payment options a check avoided the 
problem of additional transaction costs and minimized the credibility problems.  
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A.4  Questionnaires 
Since there are variations in responses in the two experimental tasks across subjects, it 
is of interest to analyze whether these response variations can be captured by observable 
characteristics. A wide range of characteristics of each subject was collected in three different 
questionnaires, all included in Appendix E: 
 
1. Socio-Demographic questionnaire (Part I) 
2. Financial questionnaire (Part IV) 
3. Health questionnaire (Part V) 
 
The first two questionnaires, notably the financial questionnaire, are based on the study of 
Harrison et al. (2002). They were adjusted and supplied with questions from the South 
African Census 2001. Harrison et al. (2002) did not have a health questionnaire in their study, 
and thus the health questionnaire needed to be developed. Part of the questions, however, 
were based on Pettifor et al. (2004), who studied sexual behavior among the youth in South 
Africa. Experts in the field of HIV in South Africa, development economics, and 
experimental economics reviewed the questionnaires thoroughly. 
 
Socio-demographic questionnaires 
The socio-demographic questionnaire contains both questions on individual current 
characteristics and background characteristics like age, gender, field of study etc. Besides, 
questions were asked about the current household situation, like household composition, 
income, housing etc. Because the current household situation of students may not be a good 
representation of the socio-demographic background of students, in addition, questions were 
asked about the family situation when the students were 15 years old, including employment 
status and educational level of the parents. 
 
In order to be able to control for altruistic behavior and to check their willingness to save in 
the discount rates tasks, subjects were asked moreover to indicate what they were planning to 
do with the money of they would win 650 Rand. 
 
Financial questionnaire 
The financial questionnaire contained questions on what financial instruments participants 
use, such as whether they save or not, the current balance on their savings account, and what 
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market rates of interest they face. This information was in the first place used to elicit 
financial behavior, so that the relation between this behavior and the perceived HIV 
contraction risk or HIV status could be analyzed. Second, the information was used to allow 
for the possibility that responses in the discount rate task are censored by the market rates. A 
rational subject should never choose to postpone payment in the experiment at interest rates, 
lower than those she can receive in the external market. Furthermore, subjects may attempt to 
arbitrage between the lab experiment and the field, so that the discount rates revealed in the 
lab experiment may not reflect their actual time preference of money.5 Due to a lack of 
response on the interest that the participants face in the financial market, corrections for 
censored responses were not sensible. Because only few subjects did report on the interest 
rates they face, so that knowledge on the arbitrage possibilities was very low, reducing the 
occurrence of censored responses. 
  
Risk aversion and time preferences may vary with past and expected future income as well as 
with the economic conditions of a country. To be able to correct for the past and future 
expected financial position, subjects were asked to report this for the same time horizons as 
in the six discount rate problems (see Appendix E, questions VI.11-17). 
 
Health questionnaire 
Economic theory shows that lifetime choices heavily depend on life expectancy and health 
(see Chapter 3). To obtain a better understanding in to what extent populations in countries 
affected by HIV are also aware of the increase in illness and mortality risk, the health 
questionnaire included among other health related issues the following three questions: 
 
 
 “How old do you think, you will become?” ______years             (question V.4) 
 
                                                 
5 Consider, for example, a subject with the discount rate of 9%. In the absence of field substitutes of the lab 
incentives, it is expected that this object chooses to invest in the lab instrument (choose option B) as long as the 
return is 9% or higher. Suppose the subject can save in the field at the interest rate of 12%. This subject would 
be better off investing in the field in this refusing the lab investment option even though her true discount rate is 
9%. The problem is asymmetric for subjects with a discount rate high than the true rate of borrowing in the 
field. 





“What do you think your chances are of getting HIV/AIDS?”  (question V.10A) 







“Have you ever been tested for HIV?”                                           (question V.14) 
01 Yes, my status was HIV positive 
02 Yes, my status was HIV negative 
03 No, I have never been tested 
04 I prefer not to answer this question 
 
 
The first question provides the individual expected lifespan of the respondents. The latter two 
questions enabled to classify students by perceived HIV contamination risk and HIV status. It 
is important that the answers to the first two questions are self-reported perceptions of both 
life expectancy and HIV contraction risk. Assuming that students truthfully reported on these 
perceptions, this is exactly the information that is needed for this study. Namely, these 
perceptions would influence economic behavior and not the actual individual life expectancy and 
HIV contamination risk. 
 
Sensitivity issues/data limitations 
Since this research contains highly sensitive questions, there are some limitations in the 
dataset. The collected data reported in this thesis, represents information provided by the 
subjects themselves. Answers might be biased towards socially excepted answers, especially in 
case the information is rather sensitive, like the questions about sexual behavior and HIV 
status. In order to assure anonymity as much as possible the following ten measures were 
applied: 
 
1. The subjects were sitting in queues and at least one seat left in between. 
2. Students were not interviewed, but they had to read and fill out the questions by 
themselves.  
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3. All students randomly took a personal ID number, so that their answers could not be 
linked to their names. 
4. In the instructions, it was emphasized that the experiment was anonymous. 
5. The questionnaires were designed in a way that, except for the ID number, the first 
page was blank. 
6. On forehand, the experimenter made absolutely clear that he would collect the 
questionnaires by letting the students put the questionnaire in a closed box. 
7. In highly sensitive questions, objects were given the option to select “I prefer not to 
answer this question”.  
8. Students were not allowed to talk, when filling out the questionnaires and 
experimental tasks. 
9. The experimenter avoided walking through the lecture room, while students were 
filling out the questionnaires. 
10. Participants were paid out in private. 
 
A.5  Sample characteristics 
This section provides a general description on the characteristics of the sample. 
Appendix B contains the tables with the main descriptive statistics both for the whole sample 
(Tables B1–B3) and classified by perceived HIV contamination risk (Tables B4–B6).  
 
Socio demographic data 
A total of N=213 students (114 males and 99 females) from a wide range of disciplines 
recruited at the Northwest University and the University of Pretoria in South Africa 
participated in the experiment. In the first round of the experiments, data of 197 subjects was 
collected and in the second round data of 16 subjects. The total sample included 82% black 
South Africans, 15% white, and the remaining 3% was colored. Remarkably, 96% of the HIV 
positive subjects were black South African. The average age was 22.6 years. HIV positive 
subjects were significantly older (25.1 years). Also the group of students who reported to be at 
risk of contracting HIV was on average older (23.4 years).  
 
Most of the respondents were living in urban areas (62%). Among the group who perceives 
to be highly at risk of contracting HIV during their lifetime and the HIV positive group were 
more likely to live in urban areas (68%, 65% vs. 60%). They were also more likely to live in an 
informal dwelling (12%, 9% vs. 2%). Most of the subjects were living in a student residence 
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(44%). While the high-risk group has a significantly lower income, remarkably, the income of 
the HIV positive group is on average higher. A relatively low percentage of the high-risk 
group had a family of their own (4% vs. 9%). 
 
Looking at the socioeconomic background of subjects, the high-risk group and the HIV 
positive group appear to come from families, where the head of the household was more 
likely to be informally employed (25%, 22% vs. 11%) or unemployed (13%, 17% vs. 10%). 
On average nonwhite students were poorer; the income distribution of nonwhite subjects is 
skewed to the left whereas the income distribution of white students is skewed to the right. 
Among those subjects that perceive to be highly at risk, almost one fourth was living in an 
informal dwelling at age 15. A remarkably low percentage of HIV positive subjects was 
studying economics (14% vs. 30%).  
 
Financial data 
The most frequently used financial instrument was a savings account (64% reported to save 
and among this group 77% reported to have an account). However, over 51% of the subjects 
having such an account, reported that they did not know the interest rate they receive on the 
account. Overall knowledge of market rates of interest was low. Moreover, if subjects did 
report an interest rate, the rate varied among the subjects for similar financial instruments. 
For example, the average reported interest on a savings account was 10.73% with a standard 
deviation of 9.76. Although both subjects who perceived to have a high chance of contracting 
HIV and HIV positive subjects saved a larger amount of money on a formal savings account, 
it were the HIV positive subjects who saved most frequently and had such an account. 
Interestingly, between both groups, informal savings occurs significantly less frequently 
compared to the other groups (44% vs. 60%).  
 
Only 15% reported to have a credit card, 9% and 16% for respectively nonwhites and whites. 
To store cards were more popular, 49% of the subjects reported to have such a card. The 
balance owed on these cards was significantly higher among the high-risk group and the HIV 
positive group. Nonwhites appeared to have less arbitrage possibilities since 29% reported to 
have a reasonable chance of at least 75% being approved compared to the 32% of the white. 
Remarkably, on average HIV positive subjects did not report to have a lower probability of 
obtaining a loan. 
 




Reported life expectancy lies between 25 and 120. Nonwhites estimated their life expectancy 
on average 4.5 years lower compared to white subjects. The expected remaining lifetime was 
significantly shorter for both subjects who perceived to be highly at risk of contracting the 
virus and for the HIV positive group. On average, they estimated their expected time until 
death respectively 7 and 17 years shorter. Remarkably, black South African students at 
Potchefstroom campus expected to live significantly longer compared to students at Mafikeng 
campus (48 vs. 55 years, p-value=0.09). 
 
Although 82% of the nonwhites (91% of the white) reported having received any medical 
consultation in the past year, only 23% (90% of the white) reported to have medical 
insurance. 17% of the respondents prefer a traditional or alternative mode of treatment like 
the sangoma, praying etc. Although there was no statistical difference in this respect among 
white and nonwhite subjects, the percentage of both respondents from the high-risk group 
and the HIV positive group was higher (24%, 22% vs. 15%).  
 
Sexual behavior 
17% of the subjects reported to have ever been pregnant or have impregnated someone of 
whom 57% was female. The percentage was much higher among the high-risk group and 
HIV positive respondents (24%, 30% vs. 15%). Pregnancy rates indicate the minimum level 
of unprotected sexual intercourse in the sample. 83% of the respondents is sexually active 
among which 88% report to regularly use condoms, however, 79% reported also to have used 
a condom the last time they had sexual intercourse. Condom use among the high-risk group 
was lower (regular condom use: 81%, last time condom use: 68%). A worrisome percentage 
of HIV positive subjects did not use a condom the last time she had sexual intercourse (14%).  
 
HIV status, testing and perception 
Overall, 81% of the respondents reported HIV/AIDS as major cause of death. None of the 
subjects indicated that other students had no risk at all of contracting the virus during their 
lifetime. Whereas 52% thought that other students were highly at risk only 24% of these 
indicated to be highly at risk themselves. Overall, students from Mafikeng campus indicated 
to be highly at risk more frequently compared to black South African students from 
Potchefstroom campus (17% vs. 11%).  
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More than half of the respondents (51%) had never been tested for HIV. 33% reported to be 
tested HIV negative, and 11% HIV positive. Although subjects were offered the option to 
not reveal their test status, only 5% indicated that they did not prefer to answer that question. 
There was no significant difference in the testing behavior between the two campuses (p-
value=0.20), neither between white and nonwhite students from Potchefstroom campus (p-
value=0.54). Among those subjects who did never got tested, 56% reported to undergo a 
HIV test if it would have been provided. 
 
Financial behavior and risk and time preferences 
When analyzing responses in saving behavior it is important to know what the characteristics 
are of people that do not save or not borrow. The average discount rate corrected for 
mortality and risk attitude among non-savers is almost 5 percentage points higher, indicating 
that non-savers have a stronger preference for the presence. The non-savers are significantly 
less medically insured. Savers having medical insurance, however, do not significantly save a 
higher amount. Although, there is no significant difference in borrowing behavior, the non-
savers estimated the chance of getting approved for a loan lower, this difference is, however, 
not significant (p-value=0.18). No significant relation was found between getting approved 
for a loan and individual discount rate nor between non-borrowers and the chance of getting 
approved for a loan. Non-borrowers did also not display different time preferences. 
 
None of the HIV positive non-savers did save, nor did they have a line of credit, or were 
medically insured. They estimated the chance of getting approved for a loan significantly 
lower (p-value=0.03). It might be the case that these subjects are liquidity constraint. 
Interestingly their discount rates are significantly lower. Subjects that report to give at least 
part of the money away if they would win 650 Rand have significantly lower discount rates (p-
value=0.00). 
 
A.6  Reliability issues 
Sample Selection  
From the 213 subjects, 1 subject did not reveal his perception of HIV contamination risk, 36 
did not answer consistently (C) in the risk aversion task.6, 4 subjects did not completely filled 
out the discount rate task, and 14 subjects did not reveal their expected age of death. The 
                                                 
6 ‘not consistently’ is defined as the behavior that subjects choose the small prize when both options were sure, 
i.e. they choose option A in row 10 of the risk aversion task. 
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sample in Chapter 6 consists of 176 (RA analysis) and 208 (DR analysis) subjects. The sample 
in Chapter 7 consists of 163 subjects. The elicited discount rates for those answering 
consistently and not consistently are not significantly different. This holds for the whole 
group as well as for the groups classified by perceived HIV contamination risk. Chapter 7 
looses a further 73 subjects when correcting for risk behavior in the estimation of the 
discount rate: subjects having a negative risk parameter were excluded, reducing the sample 
size to 90 subjects. The elicited discount rate for subjects, having a negative risk parameter is, 
however, not significantly different from subjects having nonnegative risk parameter. This 
holds for the whole group as well as for the groups classified by perceived HIV 
contamination risk, except for the high-risk group (p-value=0.09). See Table A.5 for more 
details. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this appendix, the main variables show no significant 
differences between the first and second round of the experiment between the HIV positive 
subjects from Mafikeng campus. Neither did the results show significant differences between 
black South African students from Mafikeng and Potchefstroom campuses. With respect to 
the sample selection criteria presented above, no significant differences were found in the 
discount rate among those subjects who answered the risk aversion task inconsistently (p-
value=0.60). Neither if the subjects were classified by perceived HIV contraction risk. 
 
Table A5: Sample selection by perceived HIV contamination risk. 
Perceived HIV 
contraction risk 




No risk at all 42 52 38 23 
Small 75 83 73 46 
Moderate 21 26 19 8 
High 18 24 17 4 
HIV+ 20 23 16 9 
All 176 208 163 90 
 
Self reported status, perceived HIV contraction risk, expected lifetime 
Before the empiric results could be based on self-reported sensitive data like HIV contraction 
risk, and life expectancy, some consistency checks were performed of which some are 
described below. 
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First, the data show a highly significantly expected negative correlation between the expected 
survival time and perceived HIV contamination risk (see Appendix B, Table B.6).7 The 
difference in the remaining lifetime between HIV positive and uninfected subjects is almost 
20 year. No significant difference was found with respect to gender. Based on the self-
reported remaining lifetime, Chapter 7 calculates infection probabilities per risk group (see 
Table 7.3. The estimated infection rate for the moderate-risk group (18%) and the average 
infection probability (15%) are reasonable and close to the adult HIV prevalence rate in South 
Africa at the time the experiments were conducted, which was 18.8%. 
 
Second, the data show a significant expected positive correlation between risk aversion and 
expected remaining lifetime (corr=0.21, p-value=0.01, see also Table 7.4). A negative, though 
insignificant, relation was found between expected remaining lifetime and the number of 
medical consultations per year (also when the HIV positive subjects are excluded from the 
analysis). Furthermore, a positive, though insignificant, relation between perceived HIV 
contamination risk and the number of medical consultations per year is found. 
 
Third, subjects that reported to be highly exposed to contracting the virus were more sexually 
experienced (92%), and had more often been pregnant or impregnated someone. Among the 
sexually active subjects those who perceived to be highly at risk of contracting the virus were 
less likely to use condoms, i.e. 29% did not regularly use a condom and 32% did not use a 
condom the last time they had sexual intercourse. Subjects that perceived to be highly at risk 
thus also seem to have more reason to perceive to be highly at risk. 
 
The results of these checks show that the self-reported status, life expectancy, and perceived 
HIV contamination risk make sense and can be used, though with care, in the analyses in this 
thesis. 
 
Multiple switching  
Compared to previous studies, a remarkably large proportion of subjects switched more than 
once in both tasks, i.e. 67% and, 48% in respectively RA and DR tasks (problem 6), which 
means that after they switched from A to B they switch back (and forward) again. Although 
this might seem inconsistent behavior, it could be explained by the fact that subjects are 
                                                 
7 p-value=0.00, and  p-value=0.00. 
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indifferent over a certain interval: The switching-percentage decreased when the time horizon 
was lengthened.8 In the analysis, however, having a fatter interval for risk aversion and time 
preference could still represent subjects’ preferences.  
 
To avoid this inconsistent behavior, some studies use forced switching-points, which means 
that subject are not allowed to switch back (and forth). This method is often used in 
computerized experiments. Imposing one switching-point, however, will not reveal whether 
subjects are indifferent over the interval between they switch or whether they did not 
understand the task, presented to them. Other methods allow for an additional option 
“indifference”. Unfortunately, this study did not include a possibility of choosing indifference 
in the MPLs, as a result, distinguishing between indifference or not understanding the tasks 
was not possible.  
 
Ability versus indifference 
Compared to the RA tasks, substantial less switching occurs in the DR tasks (16.8 percentage 
points). Because the DR task is easier to comprehend, this would suggest that part of the 
switching in the RA task could be due to misunderstanding the tasks. This section analyzes 
whether switching is due to ability or indifference. Although no quantitative measure for the 
level of subjects, like the average grade is available, the campus where subjects study might 
give some indication. Entrance requirements at Potchefstroom campus are stricter compared 
to Mafikeng campus, i.e. the minimal grade needed for the Matric is lower in Mafikeng 
compared to Potchefstroom. Subjects from Mafikeng campus exhibited this multiple-
switching behavior in the RA task significantly more compared to subjects from 
Potchefstroom campus. However, when comparing the switching behavior among black 
South African subjects the difference becomes much less significant (p-value=0.14).9 
Remarkably, the switching behavior in the DR tasks among black South African subjects does 
not differ between the campuses at all (p-value=0.96). Although switching behavior in the 
DR tasks appears to depend on the subjects’ type of study, this does not hold for the RA task. 
Apparently, a certain type of skills is required for using the current methods. Because the RA 
task is more difficult than the discount rate task, it was hypothesized that switching behavior 
in the discount rate task is mainly due to individual preferences than due to ability. 
                                                 
8 In the six different discount rate tasks the percentage of subjects who switched more than once was 61%, 55%, 
53%, 48%, and 48%, for respectively problem 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
9 Switching behavior appears to be significantly more frequent among black than among white South Africans 
(RA task: p-value=0.00). 
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Additionally, two other measures are used to distinguish between indifference and inability: a 
dummy for subjects who chose option A in the last row of the RA task. These subjects clearly 
did not understand the task assuming that they prefer more money compared to less. The 
second measure, was constructed from questions 11-17 in the financial questionnaire. Some 
students did not understand these types of questions, which were represented in tables like 
the RA and the DR tasks as well. Subjects who did not answer the tables in the financial 
questionnaire correctly do switch more often in the RA task but not more often in the DR 
tasks.  
 
Next to the options being indifferent or not being able to read the MPLs, subjects might also 
not be willing to put effort in understanding the tasks. Incentives were clearly given by 
offering a 10% chance of additional payment corresponding to the subjects’ choices. But if 
subjects already failed to put effort in this payment concept, the multiple switching behavior 
might be partly explained by this effort issue. Table A.6 presents the results of two Simple 
Ordered Probit models that explain the number of switching-points in each task controlling 
for individual characteristics like race, income, campus and study. 
Switching appears to be significantly positively related to risk-tolerance. Subjects that switch 
more often in the RA task appear to be less patient in the DR tasks.10 However, this does not 
hold using the for mortality corrected discount rate. The number of switches in the DR tasks 
is also significantly related to risk-tolerance and impatient behavior in the DR tasks. This 
suggests that switching behavior is characterized by risk-tolerance and impatient behavior. In 
addition, two types of inability could explain switching in the RA task: the inability to read 
tables, and being undergraduate. Note that switching behavior is significantly higher among 
nonwhites. This result might be explained by the fact that the black South African students 
from the sample, who all went to primary school during the apartheid, obtained different kind 
of education, where maybe less attention was given to a certain type of skill needed to 
comprehend the MPLs structure. Switching behavior in the discount rate is driven by other 
individual characteristics than switching behavior in the RA task: Subjects that study 
economics switch significantly less. Furthermore, switching depends on subjects’ income. 
When correcting for individual characteristic, switching is not significantly related to campus. 
In conclusion, since switching is not related to the ability variables like reading tables or year 
                                                 
10 Comparisons are based on for mortality and risk attitude corrected discount rate. See Chapter 7 for the 
specific derivation. 
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of study, a large part of the switching in the DR tasks can be explained by indifference, which 
is also assumed in the analyses of this thesis.  
 
Table A.6: switching behavior (Simple Ordered Probit). 
 Coefficient Std. Err.
No. of switches RA 
Risk aversion (RA) -0.85*** 0.21
Discount rate (DMR6) -0.01*** 0.00
Reads table -0.74** 0.32
White -0.97*** 0.37






No. of switches DR6 
Risk aversion (RA) -0.74*** 0.21
Discount rate (DMR6) -0.01*** 0.00
Reads table 0.03 0.34
White -0.11 0.33

























B.1  Variable definition 
 
Variable name Definition 
Experimental variables  
Midpointra Calculated midpoint of risk aversion interval, elicited from the risk 
aversion task. 
Midpointdr1 Calculated midpoint of discount rate interval, elicited from the discount 
rate task problem 1. 
Midpointdr6 Calculated midpoint of discount rate interval, elicited from the discount 
rate task problem 6. 
Experimenter 1 if Judith Lammers is experimenter, else 0 
Horizon 4 months 1 if time horizon of task is 4 month (same for z=6 to 24 months), 0 else
FED 1 if subject filled out the discount rate tasks which had a front-end-
delay, 0 else 
Read Table 1 if subject could fill in questions on future financial situation, else 0 
 
Socio-demographic variables 
Age Age of the subject 
Female 1 if subject is a female, else 0 
Black South African 1 if subject is black SA, else 0 
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Colored 1 if subject is colored, else 0 
White 1 if subject is white SA, else 0 
Rural 1 if subject lives in rural area, else 0 
Urban 1 if subject lives in urban area, else 0 
Mafikeng 1 if subjects is student at Mafikeng campus, else 0 
Potchefstroom 1 if subjects is student at Potchefstroom campus, else 0 
Studies economics 1 if subjects studies economics, else 0 
Year of Study Year of study in categories 1 to 6 
 
Current household characteristics 
    Married 1 if subject is married, else 0 
    Has own family 1 if subject has a family of its own, else 0 
    Household size Size of the households the subject lives 
    Lives in informal dwelling 1 if subject lives in informal dwelling , else 0 
    Lives in student residence 1 if subject lives in student residence , else 0 
    Own income Income of the subject in categories 1 to 7 
 
Household characteristics at age 15 
Family size Size of the family at age 15 
Family lived in informal  dwelling 1 if subject lived in informal dwelling at age 15, else 0 
Unemployed parents 1 if household head of subject was unemployed at age 15, else 0 
Form employed parents 1 if household head of subject was formally employed at age 15, else 0 
Informally employed parent 1 if household head of subject was informally employed at age 15, else 0
Skilled parents 1 if household head at age 15 has at least tertiary education, else 0 
Income group parents Income group parents:1 for low income group,  2 middle, and 3 high. 
Keep/give if wins money How much the subject would give away if he would win R650, in 
categories 1 (keeps all)to 4 (gives all) 
Saves if wins money What part of the money the subject would save if he would win R650, 
in categories 1 (spend all) to 3 (save more than half of it) 
  
Financial related variables  
Saves 1 if subject saves, else 0 
Saves informal 1 if subject uses informal saving methods, else 0 
Savings account 1 if subject has a savings account, else 0 
Overdraft 1 if individual has an overdraft/line of credit, else 0 
Creditcard 1 if individual has a creditcard, else 0 
Storecard 1 if individual has storecard, else 0 
Studentloan 1 if individual has a studentloan, else 0 
Microloan 1 if individual has a microloan, else 0 
Investment account 1 if individual has a investment account, else 0 
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Poor Chance Loan 1 if perceived probability of getting a loan is 25% or below, else 0 
Financially worse off now (t) 1 if subjects financial position is worse off now compared to t months 
ago, else 0 
South Africa worse off now (t) 1 if South Africa is worse off now compared to t months ago, else 0 
Higher expenses (t) 1 if future expenses will be higher in t months, else 0 
Lower earnings (t) 1 if future earnings will be lower in t months, else 0 
Financially worse off (t) 1 if future financial situation will be worse in t months, else 0 
Unemployment up (t) 1 if unemployment in South Africa will go up in t months, else 0 
Interest rate up (t) 1 if interest rate in South Africa will go up in t months, else 0 
 
Health related variables  
Medical insurance 1 if subjects has medical insurance, else 0 
Alternative medical aid 1 if subject prefers alternative medical aid, else 0 
Life expectancy Subject’s self-reported expected time of death 
Survival Subject’s time till death (Life expectancy –Age) 
Smokes 1 if subjects is a smoker, else 0 
Cigarettes Number of cigarettes subject smokes per day 
Ranks Influenza and Pneumonia 
nr1 
1 if influenza & pneumonia is valued as the main death cause among 
influenza & pneumonia, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, else 0 
Ranks HIV nr1 1 if HIV/AIDS is valued as the main death cause among influenza & 
pneumonia, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, else 0 
Ranks TBC nr1 1 if TBC is valued as the main death cause among influenza & 
pneumonia, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, else 0 
 
Perceived probability Influenzia or pneumonia 
    own Subject’s perceived probability of getting influenza or pneumonia 
    others Subject’s perceived probability that other students get influenza or 
pneumonia 
    compared to others Subject’s perceived probability of getting influenza or pneumonia 
compared to other students 
 
Perceived probability HIV/AIDS 
    own Subject’s perceived probability of getting HIV/AIDS  
    others Subject’s perceived probability that other students get HIV/AIDS 
    compared to others Subject’s perceived probability of getting HIV/AIDS compared to 
other students 
High Perceived HIV 
Contamination Risk 
1 if Perceived HIV is high, else 0 
 
 




Perceived probability TBC  
    own Subject’s perceived probability of getting TBC 
    others Subject’s perceived probability that other students get TBC 




Pregnancy 1 if subject every has been pregnant or impregnated someone 
Sexintercourse 1 if subject has sexual experience, else 0 
Uses condoms 1 if subject regularly uses condoms, else 0 




HIV positive 1 if subject reports to be tested HIV positive, 0 else 
HIV negative 1 if subject is tested HIV negative, else 0 
Not tested 1 if subject has never been tested, else 0 
Wants HIV test 1 if wants to be tested for HIV/AIDS, else 0 
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B.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table B1: Descriptive statistics socio demographic questionnaire 
Variable 
Obs Missing Mean Std. 
Dev.
Min Max
Age 212 1 22.61 3.34 18 36
Female 213 0 0.46 0.50 0 1
Black SA 213 0 0.82 0.39 0 1
Colored 213 0 0.03 0.18 0 1
White 213 0 0.15 0.36 0 1
Rural 213 0 0.34 0.47 0 1
Urban 213 0 0.62 0.49 0 1
Mafikeng 213 0 0.69 0.46 0 1
Potchefstroom 213 0 0.26 0.44 0 1
Studies economics 212 1 0.28 0.45 0 1
Year of study 210 3 2.38 1.07 1 5
Current household characteristics  
    Married 213 0 0.01 0.10 0 1
    Has own family 213 0 0.08 0.27 0 1
    Household size 155 58 5.82 2.81 0 15
    Lives in informal dwelling 213 0 0.04 0.19 0 1
    Lives in student residence 213 0 0.44 0.50 0 1
    Own income 213 0 3.09 1.94 1 7
Household characteristics at age 15  
    Family size 205 8 6.06 2.78 1 19
    Family lived in informal dwelling 213 0 0.14 0.35 0 1
    Unemployed parents 210 3 0.11 0.31 0 1
    Form employed parents 210 3 0.70 0.46 0 1
    Informally employed parent 210 3 0.13 0.34 0 1
    Skilled parents 201 12 0.79 0.41 0 1
    Income group parents 210 3 1.54 0.55 1 3
Keep/give if wins money 208 5 1.75 0.76 1 4
Saves if wins money 204 9 0.82 0.39 0 1
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Table B2: Descriptive statistics financial questionnaire 
Variable N Missing Mean St.d. Min Max
Saves 213 0 0.64 0.48 0 1
   Saves informal 137 0 0.55 0.50 0 1
   Savings account 182 0 0.77 0.42 0 1
     interest 68 72 10.73 9.76 0.05 45
     amount 128 12 2.03 1.38 1 5
Overdraft 213 0 0.10 0.30 0 1
     monthly 21 0 0.43 0.51 0 1
     interest 10 11 13.23 14.66 0 50
     amount 8 13 1.75 1.16 1 4
Creditcard 212 1 0.15 0.35 0 1
     interest 15 16 14.10 11.45 3 40
     amount 23 8 2.65 1.53 1 5
Storecard 213 0 0.49 0.50 0 1
     interest 56 48 12.72 12.05 0 50
     amount 95 9 2.91 1.25 1 5
Studentloan 213 0 0.61 0.49 0 1
     interest 82 47 15.15 16.42 0.5 90
     amount 118 11 5.29 1.12 1 6
Microloan 209 209 0.01 0.12 0 1
     interest 3 0 9.50 5.77 5 16
     amount 3 0 3.33 2.52 1 6
Investment 208 208 0.08 0.27 0 1
     interest 11 5 6.25 3.34 1 13
     amount 16 0 4.25 1.65 1 6
Poor chances loan 207 207 0.51 0.50 0 1
Compared to 1 month ago  
Financially worse off now 212 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
South Africa worse off now 209 4 0.10 0.29 0 1
Compared to 1 month later  
Higher expenses 208 5 0.37 0.48 0 1
Lower earnings 208 5 0.13 0.34 0 1
Financially worse off 207 6 0.16 0.37 0 1
Unemployment in South Africa goes up 207 6 0.22 0.41 0 1
Interest rate in South Africa goes up 207 6 0.23 0.42 0 1
Compared to 2 years ago  
Financially worse off now 211 2 0.23 0.42 0 1
South Africa worse off now 212 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Compared to 2 years later  
Higher expenses 207 6 0.40 0.49 0 1
Lower earnings 208 5 0.05 0.21 0 1
Financially worse off 209 4 0.05 0.22 0 1
Unemployment in South Africa goes up 209 4 0.42 0.49 0 1
Interest rate in South Africa goes up 206 7 0.39 0.49 0 1
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Table B3: Descriptive statistics health questionnaire 
Variable N Missing Mean St.d. Min Max
Medical Insurance 212 1 0.32 0.47 0 1
Alternative medical aid 213 0 0.17 0.38 0 1
Consultations 209 4 2.92 1.91 1 20
Life expectancy 198 15 71.61 17.09 25 120
Survival 198 15 49.10 17.72 4 99
Smokes 212 1 0.21 0.41 0 1
    Cigarettes 44 0 8.49 7.74 0 40
Ranks Influenza and Pneumonia nr1 202 11 0.08 0.28 0 1
Ranks HIV nr1 209 4 0.81 0.39 0 1
Ranks TBC nr1 204 9 0.17 0.37 0 1
Perceived probability Influenza or 
pneumonia  
    own 211 2 2.18 0.79 1 4
    others 211 2 2.67 0.72 0 4
    compared to others 212 1 1.64 0.58 1 3
Perceived probability HIV/AIDS  
    own 212 1 2.35 1.19 1 5
    others 212 1 3.42 0.67 2 4
    compared to others 209 4 1.54 0.73 1 3
Perceived probability TBC  
    own 211 2 2.17 0.94 1 4
    others 212 1 2.75 0.80 1 4
    compared to others 212 1 1.63 0.65 1 3
Pregnancy 212 1 0.17 0.38 0 1
Sexual intercourse 212 1 0.83 0.37 0 1
    Uses condoms 156 57 0.88 0.32 0 1
    Used condom last time 160 53 0.79 0.41 0 1
Test status  
    HIV positive 211 2 0.11 0.31 0 1
    HIV negative 211 2 0.33 0.47 0 1
    Not tested 211 2 0.51 0.50 0 1
    Wants HIV test 206 7 0.67 0.47 0 1
    Prefers not to answer 211 2 0.05 0.21 0 1
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Table B4: Descriptive statistics socio demographic questionnaire classified by  


































































Not at all (52) 21.69 0.46 0.77 0.19 0.37 0.62 0.62 0.38 0.25 2.17 0.02 
Small (84) 22.46 0.42 0.74 0.24 0.31 0.63 0.67 0.33 0.33 2.54 0.00 
Moderate (28)  22.04 0.43 0.86 0.07 0.43 0.50 0.86 0.14 0.29 2.25 0.00 
High (25) 23.40 0.52 1.00 0.00 0.32 0.68 0.92 0.08 0.24 2.40 0.04 
HIV+ (23) 25.13 0.61 0.96 0.00 0.30 0.65 0.48 0.09 0.14 2.45 0.00 








































































































































Not at all (52) 0.10 6.15 0.04 0.52 2.79 5.92 0.13 0.12 0.76 0.10 0.85 
Small (84) 0.07 5.86 0.01 0.49 3.48 6.00 0.11 0.08 0.75 0.11 0.80 
Moderate (28)  0.11 5.32 0.00 0.39 2.96 6.04 0.18 0.11 0.63 0.11 0.70 
High (25) 0.04 5.95 0.12 0.36 2.16 6.77 0.24 0.13 0.58 0.25 0.70 
HIV+ (23) 0.09 5.21 0.09 0.26 3.61 5.95 0.13 0.17 0.61 0.22 0.77 
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Table B5: Descriptive statistics financial questionnaire classified by  
perceived HIV contamination risk 













































































Not at all (52) 1.57 1.86 0.65 0.56 0.73 11.30 2.03 0.08 0.25 10.00 - 
Small (84) 1.60 1.74 0.62 0.58 0.76 10.22 1.90 0.08 0.71 12.38 1.20 
Moderate (28)  1.48 1.52 0.61 0.71 0.84 10.23 1.42 0.14 0.25 21.27 3.00 
High (25) 1.46 1.54 0.64 0.44 0.63 11.59 2.75 0.08 - - - 
HIV+ (23) 1.48 1.91 0.78 0.44 0.91 11.40 2.59 0.17 0.50 4.50 2.50 
      
 























































Not at all (52) 0.17 27.33 2.63 0.52 16.81 2.73 0.65 14.74 5.17   
Small (84) 0.10 7.10 2.00 0.43 10.93 2.82 0.63 9.34 5.23   
Moderate (28)  0.25 15.80 2.67 0.61 12.10 2.75 0.61 23.63 5.53   
High (25) 0.16 10.00 3.00 0.44 14.69 3.00 0.64 26.80 5.25   
HIV+ (23) 0.13 5.00 4.50 0.57 7.80 3.80 0.35 15.00 5.75   
            
 




























































































Not at all 0.02 7.50 6.00 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.44 0.10 
Small 0.01 5.00 1.00 0.07 7.00 5.17 0.51 0.19 0.06 0.35 0.08 
Moderate  0.04 16.00 3.00 0.14 6.43 3.75 0.57 0.36 0.18 0.30 0.19 
High 0.00 - - 0.12 7.50 4.33 0.52 0.20 0.12 0.38 0.20 
HIV+ 0.00 - - 0.10 6.00 4.00 0.45 0.23 0.10 0.32 0.23 
            
 Compared to 1 
month 



































































































































































Not at all 0.14 0.22 0.16 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.06 0.06 0.49 0.38  
Small 0.15 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.46 0.04 0.07 0.44 0.39  
Moderate  0.15 0.11 0.33 0.21 0.25 0.49 0.04 0.07 0.37 0.44  
High 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.12 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.33  
HIV+ 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.23 0.32 0.14 0.00 0.29 0.43  
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Table B6: Descriptive statistics health questionnaire classified  













































































































1   
Not at all (52) 0.31 0.13 2.50 72.91 51.51 0.10 11.40 0.08 0.79 0.08  
Small (84) 0.39 0.15 2.61 74.63 52.12 0.26 8.60 0.05 0.87 0.14  
Moderate (28)  0.18 0.18 2.79 70.81 48.73 0.25 4.14 0.07 0.89 0.11  
High (25) 0.28 0.24 2.76 68.88 45.58 0.20 12.30 0.21 0.72 0.17  
HIV+ (23) 0.30 0.22 5.18 59.06 34.11 0.22 7.40 0.10 0.52 0.55  

































































































Not at all (52) 1.85 2.44 1.52 1.00 3.08 1.27 1.73 2.60 1.50 0.12 0.71 
Small (84) 2.19 2.67 1.60 2.00 3.36 1.27 2.05 2.65 1.46 0.15 0.82 
Moderate (28)  2.54 2.93 2.00 3.00 3.68 1.89 2.39 2.89 1.86 0.18 0.89 
High (25) 2.28 2.72 1.68 4.00 3.96 2.16 2.80 3.00 1.92 0.24 0.92 
HIV+ (23) 2.41 2.86 1.61 5.00 3.52 2.10 2.68 2.96 1.96 0.30 1.00 
            





























































   
Not at all 0.86 0.77 0.33 0.63 0.04 0.69    
Small 0.89 0.81 0.49 0.48 0.02 0.66    
Moderate  0.91 0.83 0.21 0.71 0.07 0.54    
High 0.81 0.68 0.24 0.60 0.16 0.64    
HIV+ 0.95 0.86 - - - -    
 
                                                 
1 Some respondents ranked both HIV/AIDS and TBC as number one cause of death. For some groups, the 
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Appendix D: Experimental Tasks    
 212 
D.1 Risk aversion tasks 
 
ID number: ________                                 Example 
Decision Option A Option B Your Choice
(Circle A or B)
1 6 sweets if ball is 1-10 10 sweets if ball is 1-10 A        B
4 sweets if ball is 11-100 1 sweet if ball is 11-100
2 6 sweets if ball is 1-20 10 sweets if ball is 1-20 A        B
4 sweets if ball is 21-100 1 sweet if ball is 21-100
3 6 sweets if ball is 1-30 10 sweets if ball is 1-30 A        B
4 sweets if ball is 31-100 1 sweet if ball is 31-100
4 6 sweets if ball is 1-40 10 sweets if ball is 1-40 A        B
4 sweets if ball is 41-100 1 sweet if ball is 41-100
5 6 sweets if ball is 1-50 10 sweets if ball is 1-50 A        B
4 sweets if ball is 51-100 1 sweet if ball is 51-100
6 6 sweets if ball is 1-60 10 sweets if ball is 1-60 A        B
4 sweets if ball is 61-100 1 sweet if ball is 61-100
7 6 sweets if ball is 1-70 10 sweets if ball is 1-70 A        B
4 sweets if ball is 71-100 1 sweet if ball is 71-100
8 6 sweets if ball is 1-80 10 sweets if ball is 1-80 A        B
4 sweets if ball is 81-100 1 sweet if ball is 81-100
9 6 sweets if ball is 1-90 10 sweets if ball is 1-90 A        B
4 sweets if ball is 91-100 1 sweet if ball is 91-100
10 6 sweets if ball is 1-100 10 sweets if ball is 1-100 A        B
 
 
Outcomes of random draws for decision problem 
 
BALL NUMBER DECISIVE FOR DECISION ROW: _______ 
 
SELECTED DECISION ROW: ________ 
 
BALL NUMBER DECISIVE FOR PAYMENT: ________ 
 
SELECTED EARNINGS: ________ 
 
RESULT OF 10 SIDED DIE ROLL: ________ 
(0 means you will be paid the amount for this task) 
 





ID number: ________                                     Part II 
 
Decision Option A Option B Your Choice
(Circle A or B)
1 50.00 rand if ball is 1-10 96.25 rand if ball is 1-10 A        B
40.00 rand if ball is 11-100 2.50 rand if ball is 11-100
2 50.00 rand if ball is 1-20 96.25 rand if ball is 1-20 A        B
40.00 rand if ball is 21-100 2.50 rand if ball is 21-100
3 50.00 rand if ball is 1-30 96.25 rand if ball is 1-30 A        B
40.00 rand if ball is 31-100 2.50 rand if ball is 31-100
4 50.00 rand if ball is 1-40 96.25 rand if ball is 1-40 A        B
40.00 rand if ball is 41-100 2.50 rand if ball is 41-100
5 50.00 rand if ball is 1-50 96.25 rand if ball is 1-50 A        B
40.00 rand if ball is 51-100 2.50 rand if ball is 51-100
6 50.00 rand if ball is 1-60 96.25 rand if ball is 1-60 A        B
40.00 rand if ball is 61-100 2.50 rand if ball is 61-100
7 50.00 rand if ball is 1-70 96.25 rand if ball is 1-70 A        B
40.00 rand if ball is 71-100 2.50 rand if ball is 71-100
8 50.00 rand if ball is 1-80 96.25 rand if ball is 1-80 A        B
40.00 rand if ball is 81-100 2.50 rand if ball is 81-100
9 50.00 rand if ball is 1-90 96.25 rand if ball is 1-90 A        B
40.00 rand if ball is 91-100 2.50 rand if ball is 91-100
10 50.00 rand if ball is 1-100 96.25 rand if ball is 1-100 A        B
 
 
Outcomes of random draws for decision problem 
 
BALL NUMBER DECISIVE FOR DECISION ROW: _______ 
 
SELECTED DECISION ROW: ________ 
 
BALL NUMBER DECISIVE FOR PAYMENT: ________ 
 
SELECTED EARNINGS: ________ 
 
RESULT OF 10 SIDED DIE ROLL: ________ 
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D.2 Discount rate tasks 
 





1 R 172 R 172,43 3% A B
2 R 172 R 172,86 6% A B
3 R 172 R 173,28 9% A B
4 R 172 R 173,70 12% A B
5 R 172 R 174,12 15% A B
6 R 172 R 174,54 18% A B
7 R 172 R 174,96 21% A B
8 R 172 R 175,37 24% A B
9 R 172 R 175,79 27% A B
10 R 172 R 176,20 30% A B
11 R 172 R 176,61 33% A B
12 R 172 R 177,01 36% A B
13 R 172 R 177,42 39% A B
14 R 172 R 177,82 42% A B
15 R 172 R 178,22 45% A B
16 R 172 R 178,62 48% A B
17 R 172 R 179,02 51% A B
18 R 172 R 179,42 54% A B
19 R 172 R 179,81 57% A B
20 R 172 R 180,20 60% A B
(Circle A or B)
Your choiceOption A
To be paid in 1 month
Option B

























1 R 172 R 173.72 3% A B
2 R 172 R 175.45 6% A B
3 R 172 R 177.18 9% A B
4 R 172 R 178.91 12% A B
5 R 172 R 180.65 15% A B
6 R 172 R 182.40 18% A B
7 R 172 R 184.14 21% A B
8 R 172 R 185.90 24% A B
9 R 172 R 187.65 27% A B
10 R 172 R 189.41 30% A B
11 R 172 R 191.18 33% A B
12 R 172 R 192.94 36% A B
13 R 172 R 194.72 39% A B
14 R 172 R 196.49 42% A B
15 R 172 R 198.27 45% A B
16 R 172 R 200.06 48% A B
17 R 172 R 201.84 51% A B
18 R 172 R 203.64 54% A B
19 R 172 R 205.43 57% A B
20 R 172 R 207.23 60% A B
Option A Option B
To be paid in 5 monthsTo be paid in 1 month
Your choice

























1 R 172 R 174.59 3% A B
2 R 172 R 177.20 6% A B
3 R 172 R 179.83 9% A B
4 R 172 R 182.47 12% A B
5 R 172 R 185.14 15% A B
6 R 172 R 187.83 18% A B
7 R 172 R 190.53 21% A B
8 R 172 R 193.26 24% A B
9 R 172 R 196.00 27% A B
10 R 172 R 198.77 30% A B
11 R 172 R 201.55 33% A B
12 R 172 R 204.35 36% A B
13 R 172 R 207.18 39% A B
14 R 172 R 210.02 42% A B
15 R 172 R 212.88 45% A B
16 R 172 R 215.76 48% A B
17 R 172 R 218.66 51% A B
18 R 172 R 221.57 54% A B
19 R 172 R 224.51 57% A B
20 R 172 R 227.47 60% A B
Option A
To be paid in 1 month
Option B



























1 R 172 R 177.22 3% A B
2 R 172 R 182.55 6% A B
3 R 172 R 188.01 9% A B
4 R 172 R 193.59 12% A B
5 R 172 R 199.29 15% A B
6 R 172 R 205.11 18% A B
7 R 172 R 211.07 21% A B
8 R 172 R 217.15 24% A B
9 R 172 R 223.36 27% A B
10 R 172 R 229.70 30% A B
11 R 172 R 236.18 33% A B
12 R 172 R 242.79 36% A B
13 R 172 R 249.54 39% A B
14 R 172 R 256.44 42% A B
15 R 172 R 263.47 45% A B
16 R 172 R 270.65 48% A B
17 R 172 R 277.97 51% A B
18 R 172 R 285.44 54% A B
19 R 172 R 293.06 57% A B
20 R 172 R 300.83 60% A B
Option A
To be paid in 1 month
Option B




























1 R 172 R 179.89 3% A B
2 R 172 R 188.07 6% A B
3 R 172 R 196.57 9% A B
4 R 172 R 205.38 12% A B
5 R 172 R 214.51 15% A B
6 R 172 R 223.99 18% A B
7 R 172 R 233.81 21% A B
8 R 172 R 243.99 24% A B
9 R 172 R 254.53 27% A B
10 R 172 R 265.45 30% A B
11 R 172 R 276.76 33% A B
12 R 172 R 288.46 36% A B
13 R 172 R 300.58 39% A B
14 R 172 R 313.11 42% A B
15 R 172 R 326.08 45% A B
16 R 172 R 339.50 48% A B
17 R 172 R 353.37 51% A B
18 R 172 R 367.71 54% A B
19 R 172 R 382.53 57% A B
20 R 172 R 397.85 60% A B
Option A
To be paid in 1 month
Option B
To be paid in 18 months
Your choice



























1 R 172 R 182.60 3% A B
2 R 172 R 193.76 6% A B
3 R 172 R 205.51 9% A B
4 R 172 R 217.88 12% A B
5 R 172 R 230.90 15% A B
6 R 172 R 244.60 18% A B
7 R 172 R 259.00 21% A B
8 R 172 R 274.14 24% A B
9 R 172 R 290.05 27% A B
10 R 172 R 306.76 30% A B
11 R 172 R 324.30 33% A B
12 R 172 R 342.72 36% A B
13 R 172 R 362.05 39% A B
14 R 172 R 382.32 42% A B
15 R 172 R 403.58 45% A B
16 R 172 R 425.87 48% A B
17 R 172 R 449.22 51% A B
18 R 172 R 473.69 54% A B
19 R 172 R 499.32 57% A B
20 R 172 R 526.15 60% A B
Option B
To be paid in 24 months
Option A




Record sheet for Part III 
 
Outcomes of random draws for decision problem 
 
PROBLEM CHOSEN BY DIE: ________ 
 
BALL NUMBER DECISIVE FOR DECISION ROW:                                   ________ 
 
SELECTED DECISION ROW: ________ 
 
SELECTED EARNINGS: ________ 
 
RESULT OF 10 SIDED DIE ROLL: ________ 
(0 means you will be paid the amount for this task) 
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Affected household:  An affected household in the most limited definition is a household that 
consists of at least one infected member. In the broadest definition 
every household in the hardest hit countries are affected since the far-
reaching consequences of the disease in society. In this dissertation, the 
most limited definition is used. 
 
AIDS:    Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. 
 
CD4+ cell count:  Indicator of how healthy the immune system is, indicated in cells per 
mm3, measured by taking blood samples. CD4 positive T-lymphocytes 
(CD4+ cells) are a type of white blood cell. CD4+ cells are also known as 
“helper T cells” because they play an important part in directing the 
immune system to respond to infections. 
 
CRRA: Constant Relative Risk Aversion. 
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Discount rate (DR):  The (annual) rate at which future values are diminished to make them 
comparable to values in the present. 
 
DU: Discount utility. 
 
Expected utility hypothesis: The utility of an agent facing uncertainty is calculated by 
considering utility in each possible state and constructing a weighted 
average. The weights are the agent's estimate of the probability of each 
state. The expected utility is thus an expectation in terms of probability 
theory. 
 
EV:   Expected value. 
 
FED:   Front-End-Delay. 
 
Hardest hit countries:  Countries having HIV prevalence rates of at least 10%. 
 
HD:   Hyperbolic discounting. 
 
HIV:    Human Immunodeficiency Virus. 
 
HIV anticipatory savings hypothesis: the positive relationship between HIV contamination risk 
and individual savings due to the fact that individuals who are aware of 
the HIV contraction risk consider the possible additional future costs 
caused by the illness when deciding how much to save. 
 
HIV incidence:  Percentage of a population that contracted HIV in a certain period.  
 
HIV prevalence:  Percentage of a certain population that is HIV infected.  
 
House money effect: The premise that people are more willing to take risks with money they 
obtained easily or unexpectedly. 
 
Morbidity:   The presence of disease. 
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MPL:    Multiple pricelist.  
 
nFED:   no Front-End-Delay. 
 
NWU:   North West University. 
 
Prospect:   A finite probability distribution over monetary outcomes. 
 
Prudent:  An agent is prudent if and only if the marginal utility of future 
consumption is convex. 
 
PU: Pretoria University. 
 
Risk Aversion (RA): Wanting to avoid risk unless adequately compensated for it. 
 
Time discounting:  Encompasses any reason for caring less about a future consequence 
including factors that diminish the expected utility generates by a future 
consequence such as uncertainty or changing tastes. 
 
Time preference:  Refers to specifically the preference for immediate utility over delayed 
utility. Time preference is the rate at which people are willing to trade 
current benefit (utility) for future benefit. Having low time preference 
means a person is patient and has good self-control, i.e., values the 
future. Having high time preference means a person much prefers 
satisfaction now (being impatient, lacks self-control), and greatly 
discounts the future. 
 
Viral load:   The actual number of viruses in the blood.  
 
Visceral influences:  Visceral factors temporarily increase agents’ valuation of the proximate 
reward, which could bias the discount rate upward.  
 
Worst hit countries:  Countries having HIV prevalence rates of at least 20%. 

















Na de ontdekking van AIDS in 1981, heeft de AIDS-epidemie zowel in omvang als impact 
alle verwachtingen overtroffen. Naar schatting leven er wereldwijd 39,5 miljoen mensen met 
HIV en zijn al ruim 25 miljoen mensen aan AIDS gerelateerde ziekten overleden (UNAIDS, 
2006). Swaziland voert deze ogenschijnlijk onbegrensde wereldranglijst aan: meer dan een 
derde van de volwassen bevolking is inmiddels HIV besmet. Het staat onomstotelijk vast dat 
huishoudens die geconfronteerd worden met een geïnfecteerd familielid, te kampen hebben 
met de meest ernstige consequenties van de ziekte. Zij moeten naast de verschillende 
gezondheids- en psychische problemen zoals lichamelijke achteruitgang, zware veeleisende 
medicatie, verzorging van een AIDS-ziek familielid, stigmatisering, en groot verdriet bij 
verlies, ook vele economische problemen trotseren. De ziekte maakt volledig functioneren 
vaak onmogelijk en heeft op den duur arbeidsongeschiktheid tot gevolg. In 
ontwikkelingslanden waar een groot deel van de bevolking al in armoede leeft en er 
nauwelijks sprake is van een goed functionerend sociaal vangnet, betekent dit vaak een daling 
van het al schamele inkomen, terwijl tegelijkertijd de uitgaven door de hoge kosten aan 
medische zorg toenemen. Vanuit economisch oogpunt is het derhalve van belang om te 
onderzoeken hoe huishoudens met een geïnfecteerd familielid met deze situatie omgaan. 
Dwingt de situatie hen bijvoorbeeld juist om financiële maatregelen te nemen, zoals extra 
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sparen, voordat besmetting heeft plaatsgevonden en de verhoogde uitgaven en het verlaagd 
inkomen aan de orde zijn? Beter gezegd, passen huishoudens hun economisch gedrag aan om 
de economische gevolgen van HIV te kunnen beperken?  
 
In de meeste getroffen gebieden, dragen niet alleen de direct met HIV geconfronteerde 
huishoudens het economische leed. De epidemie leidt daar ook tot een ontwrichting van de 
algehele samenleving. Bedrijven krijgen bijvoorbeeld te maken met veel verzuim, afname in 
de productiviteit van de lichamelijk en/of psychisch belaste arbeidskrachten en dus 
verminderde effectiviteit van investeringen. Overheden worden geconfronteerd met 
verhoogde uitgaven aan zorg en sociale zekerheid, terwijl tegelijkertijd de belastinggrondslag is 
aangetast. Onder deze omstandigheden kunnen huishoudens dus slechts op beperkte steun 
van de overheid rekenen. Bovendien is het te verwachten dat de economische groei zal 
stagneren, wat de mogelijkheden voor overheden om deze huishoudens te ondersteunen 
verder zal beperken. Macro-empirische studies die de impact van HIV op de economische 
groei bestuderen laten echter opmerkelijk uiteenlopende effecten, van negatief tot zelfs 
positief, zien. Deze bevindingen vragen om een verklaring. Empirisch onderzoek op 
microniveau zou inzicht kunnen geven in een antwoord op de volgende vragen. Berusten de 
bestaande studies op verschillende, waaronder ook onjuiste, aannames? Worden slechts 
bepaalde segmenten van de samenleving negatief beïnvloed, terwijl andere er juist beter van 
worden (zoals een van de paradoxen beschreven door Amartya Sen in zijn beroemde boek: 
”Poverty and famines”). Of vinden er aanpassingsmechanismen plaats op microniveau, die de 
verwachte negatieve invloed op de totale economie verkleinen? 
 
Dit proefschrift heeft tot doel een bijdrage te leveren aan een antwoord op de laatste vraag: 
zorgen micro-economische processen of gedragsveranderingen ervoor dat de gevreesde 
impact van HIV op economische groei wordt beperkt? Zouden deze gedragingen 
gestimuleerd kunnen worden? Dit onderzoek spitst zich voornamelijk toe op de vraag hoe de 
AIDS epidemie de economische keuzen van gezinnen beïnvloedt over de tijd en bestudeert 
met name het spaargedrag. Zoals hierboven beschreven, zijn de economische consequenties 
voor gezinnen met een HIV-besmet familielid groot. In landen waar slechts weinigen medisch 
verzekerd zijn en velen in armoede leven is het belangrijk te analyseren welke specifieke 
financiële strategieën zij zouden kunnen aanwenden om een mogelijke schok als HIV/AIDS 
op te kunnen vangen. Door bijvoorbeeld extra te sparen kunnen huishoudens eerder een 
medische behandeling betalen, en als gevolg daarvan ook langer in het arbeidsproces blijven. 
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Dit heeft als bijeffect dat niet alleen huishoudens beter in staat zijn de economische klappen 
van een besmetting op te vangen, maar dat ook de economische groei minder wordt beperkt. 
Dit leidt tot de kernvraag van dit onderzoek: anticiperen mensen op de economische kosten 
die verbonden zijn aan een HIV-besmetting door extra te gaan sparen? Om deze kernvraag te 
beantwoorden, wordt in dit onderzoek gebruik gemaakt van zowel theoretische, empirische 
als experimentele methoden. De analyse spitst zich niet zoals vele bestaande micro-empirische 
studies toe op het economische gedrag van al met HIV geïnfecteerde individuen, maar juist 
ook op het gedrag van individuen die (nog) niet geïnfecteerd zijn. Immers, ook de 
gepercipieerde kans dat men in de toekomst geïnfecteerd kan raken met het virus kan het 
economische gedrag beïnvloeden. Tevens is onderzocht of deze percepties ook 
overeenkomen met het reële risico dat men loopt door de relatie ervan met het seksuele 
gedrag te bestuderen.  
 
Als theoretische kader voor dit onderzoek is een tweeperiode levensloopmodel gebruikt dat 
gebaseerd is op de aanname dat individuen hun consumptie spreiden over hun gehele leven. 
HIV/AIDS beïnvloedt dit proces zowel direct als indirect. Er is sprake van directe 
beïnvloeding van dit proces door de negatieve invloed op het inkomen als gevolg van een 
afname in de productiviteit bij besmetting. Indirect wordt dit proces beïnvloed door de 
afname van de verwachte levensduur en de toename in de medische uitgaven die noodzakelijk 
zijn om de ziekte in toom te houden. Hoewel in de bestaande literatuur over HIV/AIDS en 
intertemporele keuzen wel inzicht wordt verschaft in de effecten van de verkorte levensduur 
(zoals Freire (2004)), is slechts weinig bekend over hoe de gepercipieerde kans op ziek 
worden en de daarmee gepaard gaande verwachte ziektekosten deze keuze beïnvloeden. Er 
bestaan relatief weinig studies over het spaargedrag van huishoudens in ontwikkelingslanden, 
terwijl juist aanpassen van het spaargedrag een van de mogelijkheden is voor huishoudens om 
zelfstandig inkomensschokken, zoals die veroorzaakt worden door een HIV-besmetting, deels 
het hoofd te kunnen bieden. (Natuurlijk is sparen slechts mogelijk bij een inkomen boven het 
bestaansminimum.) Sparen kan namelijk op verschillende manieren, zowel formeel als 
informeel. Sparen zou een uitkomst kunnen zijn in landen met een beperkte financiële of 
weinig toegankelijke ziektekostenverzekeringsmarkt.  
 
Voor het empirische en experimentele kader is onderzoek gedaan onder studenten in Zuid-
Afrika waarbij, naast individuele karakteristieken, het economische en het seksuele gedrag 
bestudeerd is. Deze gegevens zijn aangevuld met schattingen van de individuele risicohouding 
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en tijdsvoorkeuren op basis van economische experimenten. Bij het meten van de 
risicoaversie kreeg de respondent een lijst voorgelegd met tien keuzes tussen twee mogelijke 
loterijen. De ene loterij was riskanter dan de andere, waarbij de kans op uitbetaling van de 
prijs van de riskante loterij toenam over tien keuzes. Bij een zekere mate van risicoaversie zal 
de deelnemer, wanneer de verwachte opbrengst van de riskante loterij hoog genoeg is, op een 
gegeven moment voor de riskante loterij kiezen. Het precieze moment van overgang geeft een 
individuele maat voor risicoaversie. Bij het meten van de tijdsvoorkeuren wordt er eenzelfde 
soort methode toegepast. De respondent wordt gevraagd te kiezen tussen een bepaald bedrag 
te ontvangen in het heden of een hoger bedrag in de toekomst, bijvoorbeeld over een jaar. 
Op de lijst met bedragen waartussen ieder individu gevraagd wordt te kiezen neemt het 
bedrag dat men in de toekomst kan ontvangen telkens toe. Op een gegeven moment is dit 
bedrag zo hoog dat de respondent overgaat op de toekomstige uitbetaling. Het moment van 
overgang geeft derhalve een maat voor de tijdsvoorkeur van ieder individu. Een deel van de 
participanten werd daadwerkelijk betaald voor hun keuzen, om ervoor te zorgen dat de 
vragen naar waarheid werden ingevuld. 
 
De resultaten van dit proefschrift laten zien dat de AIDS-epidemie het spaargedrag van zowel 
geïnfecteerde als niet-geïnfecteerde individuen beïnvloedt. Zo laat hoofdstuk 4 van dit 
onderzoek op basis van zowel theorie als empirische analyse zien dat de AIDS-epidemie het 
spaargedrag op de volgende twee tegengestelde manieren kan beïnvloeden: enerzijds verlaagt 
de toename in de kans op vervroegde sterfte het bedrag dat individuen sparen en anderzijds 
vergroot de kans op ziekte hun besparingen. Hoewel HIV de verwachte levensduur 
aanzienlijk verkort, blijkt uit de data het positieve effect van een verwachte hoge 
besmettingskans op de individuele besparingen te domineren. Dit blijkt ook te gelden voor 
reeds met HIV-geïnfecteerde individuen. Daarnaast blijken medisch verzekerde individuen 
met een hoge gepercipieerde besmettingskans ook meer te sparen, wat doet vermoeden dat 
individuen niet alleen op de medische kosten anticiperen maar ook bijvoorbeeld op de 
verwachte inkomensdaling. Deze resultaten suggereren dat in een maatschappij waarin de 
bevolking dagelijks wordt geconfronteerd met diverse aspecten van de AIDS-epidemie, 
individuen hun spaargedrag aanpassen door de onzekerheden die de epidemie met zich 
meebrengt, zoals vervroegde sterfte, ziektekosten en inkomensdaling. In dit proefschrift 
wordt het verschijnsel dat mensen anticiperen op een mogelijke HIV-besmetting door hun 
besparingen te verhogen, “het HIV-anticiperend spaarmotief” genoemd. Natuurlijk zullen 
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mensen hun besparingen pas vergroten als ze zich ook bewust zijn van zowel de kans op 
besmetting als de bijbehorende kosten.  
 
Hoofdstuk 4 laat echter niet zien hoe de geaggregeerde besparingen in een land worden 
beïnvloed. Zoals gezegd vormt kennis over de besmettingskans en het algemene kostenplaatje 
van een HIV-besmetting de sleutel tot een stijging in de besparingen. Dit varieert niet alleen 
van individu tot individu, maar is ook gerelateerd aan het stadium waarin de epidemie zich 
bevindt. In een vroeg stadium, wanneer de ziekte nog relatief weinig voorkomt, zal het 
bewustzijn laag zijn en zullen de besparingen anders beïnvloed worden dan in het stadium 
waarin eenieder in de samenleving dagelijks met de ziekte of de consequenties ervan in 
aanraking komt. Hoofdstuk 5 bestudeert daarom hoe het verloop van de epidemie de 
besparingen beïnvloedt door in het theoretische tweeperiode levensloopmodel deze 
bewustwording te incorporeren en daarbij onderscheid te maken tussen mensen die wel en 
niet getest zijn op HIV. Het uitgebreide model voorspelt een niet-monotone relatie tussen de 
verschillende stadia van de AIDS-epidemie en de besparingen in een land. In het 
beginstadium van de epidemie, wanneer de ziekte nog nauwelijks bekend is, zullen 
seropositief geteste mensen, minder geneigd zijn te sparen omdat het nut om te sparen voor 
consumptie op latere leeftijd afneemt door de toegenomen sterftekans. In dit stadium zullen 
de totale besparingen in een land naar verwachting dalen. Dit is precies het negatieve effect 
dat Bonnel (2000) vond in zijn landenstudie gebruikmakend van data in de beginperiode van 
de epidemie. Maar als de bevolking zich in een latere fase van de epidemie bewust wordt van 
zowel de besmettingskans als de economische gevolgen van de ziekte, nemen de besparingen 
toe en kunnen die zelfs op een hoger niveau komen dan in de situatie zonder epidemie. Het 
bewustwordingsproces wordt in hoofdstuk 5 gemodelleerd door de testintensiteit. Deze 
testintensiteit staat voor het deel van de bevolking die getest wordt op HIV. Pas als deze 
frequentie hoog genoeg is en ook het nut van medische consumptie ten opzichte van 
reguliere consumptie groot genoeg is, zullen de besparingen in een land stijgen. Gezien de 
noodzaak van medicijngebruik is aan de tweede voorwaarde al snel voldaan. Omdat in dit 
model aangenomen wordt dat mensen met een HIV-besmetting vervroegd zullen overlijden, 
zullen zij hun inkomen over een kortere periode spreiden en relatief vroeg gaan ontsparen. 
Daarom zullen in een vergevorderd stadium van de epidemie, als er een relatief groot deel van 
de bevolking het virus draagt, de besparingen in een land weer gaan dalen. 
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Het negatieve effect op de besparingen in de eerste periode ontstaat door imperfecte 
informatie. Aangezien het model voorspelt dat de besparingen toenemen als de testintensiteit 
wordt verhoogd, zou dit een beleidsmiddel kunnen zijn om huishoudens te laten anticiperen 
op een mogelijke HIV-besmetting. Daarom is onderzocht of het vergroten van de 
testintensiteit zou leiden tot een totale welvaartsverhoging. Vergroting van de testintensiteit in 
een latere periode van het leven zal leiden tot een verhoging van de welvaart. Ook verhoging 
van de testintensiteit in een vroeg stadium van het leven zorgt ervoor dat individuen hun 
inkomen efficiënter kunnen inzetten. HIV-positief getesten hoeven niet meer onnodig te 
sparen voor consumptie op latere leeftijd. Aan de andere kant kan HIV-positief getest worden 
echter ook leiden tot negatieve andere dan economische gevolgen zoals psychische aspecten 
als de angst om dood te gaan, of stigmatisering. Als deze negatieve aspecten de overhand 
hebben, zou het verhogen van de testintensiteit de welvaart mogelijk negatief kunnen 
beïnvloeden. Omdat we in het model een verzekering voor het “risico” voor langleven 
postuleren waarin niet geparticipeerd kan worden door HIV-negatief geteste individuen, 
simpelweg omdat dan met zekerheid uitgekeerd zou worden, is het welvaartseffect van de 
verhoging van de testintensiteit in de vroege periode van het leven voor HIV-negatieven niet 
eenduidig vast te stellen. Alhoewel zij in de eerste periode geen onzekerheid kennen om 
vervroegd te overlijden en dus hun inkomen in de eerste periode van hun leven optimaal 
kunnen inzetten, is hun inkomen in de tweede periode relatief laag. Zij kunnen namelijk niet 
meeprofiteren van de uitkering van de “langlevendheid” verzekering. Ook hoofdstuk 5 laat 
zien dat mensen ontsparen bij een toegenomen sterftekans en extra sparen als de kans op 
HIV-besmetting in de toekomst groot is. Bovendien leidt testen in de meeste gevallen tot een 
welvaartsstijging. 
 
De invloed van het individuele HIV-anticiperend spaarmotief op de totale besparingen in een 
land hangt naast de gepercipieerde besmettingskans ook af van de individuele risicohouding 
en tijdvoorkeuren. Deze laatste twee kunnen bovendien gerelateerd zijn aan het risico om met 
HIV besmet te raken. Risicomijdende mensen zullen eerder voorzorgsmaatregelen nemen dan 
risicozoekende mensen. Ook mensen die meer op de lange termijn georiënteerd zijn, zullen 
eerder anticiperen op de kosten van een ziekte die pas eventueel later aan de orde zijn. 
Risicohouding en tijdvoorkeuren beïnvloeden ook het seksuele gedrag, wat de relatie met de 
besparingen nog verder compliceert. Hoofdstuk 6 bestudeert deze relaties aan de hand van de 
experimentele data verzameld onder studenten in Zuid-Afrika. 
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De resultaten van de experimenten tonen aan dat deelnemers met seksuele ervaring 
beduidend meer risicozoekend gedrag vertonen dan deelnemers zonder die ervaring. Er is 
echter geen relatie tussen condoomgebruik en risicohouding gevonden. Als we geïsoleerd 
kijken naar de risicohouding van mensen, lijkt het hebben van seksuele contacten in een land 
met hoge besmettingspercentages op zichzelf een risicovolle onderneming. Risicomijdende 
personen lijken namelijk onthouding als alternatief te zien voor het gebruik van condooms 
om HIV-besmetting te voorkomen, terwijl de keuze om geen condoom te gebruiken niet 
afhangt van de individuele risicohouding.  
 
Zoals gezegd brengt HIV-besmetting aanzienlijke kosten voor de toekomst met zich mee. 
Mensen met een hoge discontovoet, die meer op het heden georiënteerd zijn, wegen die 
kosten relatief minder zwaar. Het is dan ook te verwachten dat mensen met een hoge 
discontovoet eerder riskant seksueel verdrag vertonen dan mensen met een lage discontovoet. 
Uit hoofdstuk 6 blijkt inderdaad dat, na correctie voor onder andere socio-economische 
achtergrond en kennis van de ziekte, zowel mensen die seksuele contacten hebben als mensen 
die onveilig vrijen een significant hogere discontovoet hebben. Onveilig vrijen blijkt dus voor 
een deel een economische verklaarbare keuze behorende bij de individuele risicohouding en 
tijdvoorkeur. Dit betekent dat er in HIV-preventie naast kennis, ook aandacht dient te komen 
voor deze karakteristieken. Deelnemers die zich hadden laten testen en HIV-negatief waren 
bevonden bleken risicomijdender gedrag te vertonen. De uitslag van de test lijkt hun 
risicohouding te weerspiegelen. Deelnemers die aangaven nooit getest te zijn, vertoonden in 
het algemeen ook risicozoekender gedrag. De resultaten van dit onderzoek laten zien dat het 
faciliteren van testen op vrijwillige basis een onevenredig groot percentage (HIV-negatieve) 
risicomijders aantrekt. In campagnes om mensen te werven om zich vrijwillig te laten testen is 
het daarom aan te bevelen op risicozoekend gedrag in te spelen. 
 
Zowel HIV-positieve deelnemers aan het experiment als deelnemers die de kans op een 
mogelijke HIV-besmetting groot achten, de zogenaamde “risicogroep”, vertonen beduidend 
minder risicomijdend gedrag. Als we aannemen dat hun risicohouding ook vertaald wordt in 
hun seksueel gedrag, dan onderschrijft dit hun gedragingen. Deze risicogroep heeft 
karakteristieke risico- en tijdvoorkeuren die het HIV-anticiperend spaarmotief afremmen. 
Juist de groep die dus op een HIV-besmetting zou moeten anticiperen, zal dit 
verhoudingsgewijs in mindere mate doen. Hoewel de risicogroep meer op het nu georiënteerd 
is, blijken HIV-positief geteste deelnemers juist toekomstgericht te zijn, de geschatte 
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tijdvoorkeur is significant lager. Dit is om twee redenen een opmerkelijk resultaat: ten eerste 
blijkt uit het onderzoek dat tijdvoorkeur in verband staat met seksueel gedrag. Daarnaast is de 
levensduur aanzienlijk korter, wat juist het “carpe diem” gedrag zou kunnen stimuleren. 
Alhoewel we geen gegevens hebben over meerdere perioden en dus niets kunnen zeggen over 
gedragsveranderingen, suggereren deze resultaten dat tijdvoorkeuren veranderen na besmet te 
zijn geraakt met HIV.  
 
Dit opvallende resultaat uit hoofdstuk 6 wordt verder onderzocht in hoofdstuk 7. De 
impliciete aanname dat slechts tijdvoorkeuren de waardering van toekomstige baten bepaalt 
wordt losgelaten en tijdvoorkeuren worden opnieuw geschat met correcties voor verschillen 
in verwachtte levensduur en risicohouding. Na deze correcties, die de geschatte 
tijdvoorkeuren van de andere groepen verhoudingsgewijs substantieel verlagen, vertonen 
HIV-positieven nog steeds een significant lagere tijdvoorkeur ten opzichte van de risicogroep. 
Uit de data blijkt dat HIV-positieve studenten met een medische verzekering echter wel een 
veel hogere tijdvoorkeur vertonen. Dit wordt verklaard door het feit dat de gemeten 
individuele tijdvoorkeur ook de perceptie over het toekomstige consumptieniveau bevat. Uit 
de experimentele data is de verwachte daling in het consumptieniveau over 2 jaar voor HIV-
positieven berekend welke uitkomt op 66% van het huidige consumptieniveau. Dit komt 
overeen met de daling die Steinberg et al. (2000) hebben gemeten in een empirisch onderzoek 
onder HIV-huishoudens in Zuid-Afrika. Het anticiperende gedrag van de HIV positieve 
groep komt dus niet alleen tot uiting in het totale bedrag dat zij sparen maar ook in de 
gemeten discontovoet van degenen die niet verzekerd zijn. Blijkbaar sparen ze niet voldoende 
om de verwachte consumptiedaling op te vangen en grepen ze de experimenten aan als een 
mogelijkheid om hun besparingen aan te vullen. Alhoewel de niet-verzekerde HIV positieve 
groep rekening blijkt te houden met een daling van het toekomstige consumptieniveau in de 
waardering van toekomstige baten, lijkt de risicogroep dit echter niet te doen. Wel houden zij 
rekening met een kortere levensduur. Na toepassing van de laatste correctie blijken HIV-
positieve deelnemers geen significant lagere tijdvoorkeur te hebben ten opzichte van de 
risicogroep. De gecorrigeerde schattingen laten nu wel een duidelijk positief verband tussen 
de verwachte besmettingskans en tijdvoorkeur zien. Een HIV besmetting verandert dus de 
waardering van toekomstige baten, ofwel de discontovoet, maar niet de individuele 
tijdvoorkeur. Omdat seksueel gedrag gerelateerd is aan risico- en tijdvoorkeuren, zou 
preventie gericht op risico- en tijdvoorkeurverandering bij kunnen dragen aan de beperking 
van een verdere verspreiding van het virus. Dit is geenszins eenvoudig aangezien risico- en 
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tijdvoorkeuren met name in de eerste levensjaren worden ontwikkeld, en bovendien is dit 
vanuit ethisch oogpunt wellicht ook niet wenselijk.  Echter preventie gericht op het vergroten 
van informatie over de totale verwachte kosten van risicovol seksueel gedrag, zou de keuze 
voor dit gedrag ook al kunnen beperken. Men kan hierbij denken aan zowel het informeren 
over de actuele besmettingskans als de kosten van een besmetting, zodat mensen op basis van 
hun eigen risico- en tijdvoorkeuren een voor hen optimale beslissing kunnen nemen. Gegeven 
de hoge tijdvoorkeur van de risicogroep kunnen ook monetaire prikkels zoals gratis 
condooms ervoor zorgen dat de keuze voor risicovol seksueel gedrag wordt beperkt. 
 
Al met al, blijkt dat mensen die zich bewust zijn van de AIDS-epidemie, zowel de vervroegde 
sterftekans als de toename in de verwachte ziektekosten meenemen in hun spaargedrag. 
Binnen de onderzochte groep leidt dit per saldo toch tot een toename van de individuele 
besparingen. Deze toename vergroot de mogelijkheden voor gezinnen om de financiële 
consequenties van een HIV-besmetting het hoofd te kunnen bieden. Sparen vergroot niet 
alleen de toegang tot medische behandeling maar verlengt de productieve periode zodat de 
negatieve impact op de economische groei hierdoor wordt verkleind. Mensen die zich niet 
voldoende bewust zijn van de besmettingskans en de bijbehorende kosten zullen 
onvoldoende anticiperen op de economische consequenties. Deze mensen moeten dus 
bewust worden gemaakt van de risico’s die ze lopen. Hiervoor zijn 2 mogelijkheden: Het 
vergroten van de testintensiteit, waarbij wel moet worden toegezien op de beperking van de 
externe effecten zoals de stigmatisering van HIV-positieve individuen. Daarnaast, 
preventiecampagnes waarin naast op het bestaan van AIDS en de preventiemogelijkheden, 
sterk de nadruk wordt gelegd op het feitelijke besmettingspercentage en de financiële 
consequenties van een HIV besmetting.  
 
Ook blijkt riskant seksueel gedrag een economische keuze te zijn die afhangt van de 
individuele risicohouding en tijdvoorkeur. Juist de risicohouding en tijdvoorkeuren, die horen 
bij riskant seksueel gedrag beïnvloeden het HIV-anticiperend spaarmotief negatief. Hier zien 
we dat de mensen die eigenlijk zouden moeten sparen het te weinig doen. In HIV-preventie is 
het daarom van belang, om naast het vergroten van de testintensiteit en het vergroten van de 
kennis van de feitelijke besmettingskans, ook aandacht te hebben voor het veranderen van de 
risicohouding en tijdvoorkeur van mensen. Dit laatste vergt echter een compleet andere 
invalshoek dan de huidige, is geenszins eenvoudig en op individueel niveau wellicht onethisch 
en dus niet wenselijk. Het veranderen van de risicohouding en de tijdvoorkeur zou echter 
Nederlandse Samenvatting  
 
248 
twee positieve effecten kunnen hebben. Het zou niet alleen het riskante seksuele gedrag 
kunnen beperken, wat een verdere verspreiding van het virus tegengaat. Daarnaast kan 
hierdoor het “HIV-anticiperend spaarmotief” worden gestimuleerd, zodat mensen die het 
virus alsnog oplopen beter in staat zijn met de economische consequenties om te gaan. 
Discussie over de ontwikkeling van preventie gericht op het beïnvloeden van deze 
karakteristieken is daarom op basis van de resultaten van dit onderzoek sterk aan te bevelen. 
  
 
